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ABSTRACT 
Many sustainability concerns have led to a push for more sustainable electricity systems. 
Governments and utilities have responded to these pressures by making changes ranging from 
minor incremental adjustments to sweeping transformations. This dissertation is focused on 
determining how we can best understand such transitions of electricity systems and what 
possibilities exist for First Nations to participate in them.  
This dissertation involves case studies of three Canadian provinces – Nova Scotia, 
Ontario and Saskatchewan – based on a review of relevant documents and semi-structured 
interviews. The theoretical basis of this dissertation is derived from the sustainability transitions 
field and discourse coalition theory. 
The conclusion of this research is a helpful and robust integrated sustainability transition 
framework, which is developed by combining elements of the multi-level perspective (MLP) and 
technological innovation system (TIS) frameworks from the sustainability transitions field, and 
supplementing those elements with features from discourse coalition theory. This integrated 
sustainability transition framework can usefully explain the complex dynamics involved in 
transitions of electricity systems. The typology of transition pathways – distinguishing between 
the possibilities of reproduction, transformation, technological substitution, reconfiguration, and 
de-alignment/re-alignment – provides insights into the direction of the transition. The various 
TIS functions add a needed element of agency and provide insights into the rate of progress 
along the particular transition pathway. Discourse coalition theory adds a greater degree of 
agency by uncovering the political dynamics involved.  
By considering factors for successful First Nations participation as important TIS 
functions, the integrated sustainability transition framework presented in this dissertation helps 
iii 
explain the possibilities for First Nations participation. Successful First Nations participation is 
more likely to occur where governments are proudly engaging in reconciliation efforts and 
resurgence support and where they embrace distributed, clean energy projects and deliberately 
open up space for new actors to participate in the electricity sector. In order to achieve the 
momentum needed to take advantage of a window of opportunity to participate, First Nations 
need a project champion, stable governance, access to cash, partnerships with the private sector, 
and must ensure that the focus remains on sustainable development and delivery of benefits to 
the entire community.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1928, the Hudson Bay Mining and Smelting Company and the Churchill River Power 
Company began constructing the Island Falls hydroelectric facility in northern Saskatchewan. 
According to the Saskatchewan Power Corporation, which eventually purchased the Island Falls 
dam, the project had various negative impacts on First Nations. Flooding had significant effects 
on traditional lifestyles, wildlife and the landscape. Many First Nations people worked as 
labourers on the construction project but, in order to do so, they had to relinquish their status as 
registered Indians. Giving up this official status meant that the Crown was no longer responsible 
for guaranteeing certain rights and benefits to them, including on-reserve housing, education and 
exemptions from some federal and provincial taxes. Relinquishing status as registered Indians 
also meant they were no longer guaranteed the treaty right to hunt, trap and fish. The First 
Nations workers built homes around the new dam in order to be close to the worksite and benefit 
from a sense of community, but the Hudson Bay Mining and Smelting Company soon forced 
them to leave those homes, abandon their community and move across the water, in order to 
make room for non-Aboriginal workers brought in from southern Saskatchewan. This new, 
exclusive community for the non-Aboriginal workers had electricity, running water and indoor 
plumbing and included a golf course, hockey rink, tennis courts, swimming pool, grocery store 
and a nurse. The First Nations workers and their families were not only evicted to make way for 
this new community, but they were largely barred from the community, able only to purchase 
groceries one day a week, and only from the back door of the grocery store (Rude, 2013).  
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The story of the Island Falls hydroelectric facility and its effects on local First Nations is 
hardly isolated. Similar stories exist throughout Canada. In many instances, First Nations 
communities have borne the brunt of the negative impacts of hydroelectric development while 
experiencing few if any of the benefits (Rude, 2013). One might expect that such a negative 
history with electricity generation projects would mean First Nations would steer clear of this 
sector, but that is not the case. Today, more and more First Nations communities are keen to 
participate in the electricity sector. In particular, many First Nations are looking at smaller-scale 
sustainable electricity ventures as smart projects in which to be involved.  
With current electricity systems under increasing pressure and with a growing desire for 
more sustainable modes of electricity generation, there are windows of opportunity for non-
traditional actors, including First Nations, to have a role in transitioning our electricity systems to 
more sustainable modes. In this dissertation, I analyze the role of politics in not only enabling or 
constraining such sustainability transitions, but also the role of politics in facilitating or 
restricting the potential participation of First Nations in those transitions. If we are going to move 
toward more sustainable modes of electricity generation, then I am interested in the possibilities 
for First Nations to participate in those transitions and experience some much needed economic 
and social benefits. To that end, I draw on First Nations economic development literature, 
discourse coalition theory, and sustainability transition studies – an emerging field of study 
focused on long-term and multi-dimensional transformation processes aimed at improved 
sustainability. This dissertation is intended for an audience engaged in those particular fields, as 
well as being of interest to policy makers, First Nations leaders, and stakeholders concerned with 
sustainability transitions, electricity generation, and First Nations economic self-sufficiency. 
This introductory chapter discusses the reason current electricity systems are under 
pressure and why there is a growing desire for more sustainable pathways. It also outlines the 
possible convergence of the move toward more environmentally benign electricity systems with a 
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move to address the stark poverty and lack of economic opportunities that are persistent in many 
First Nations throughout Canada. This introductory chapter then discusses the purpose and 
objectives of this research and outlines the research questions addressed by this dissertation. 
1.1 The Need for More Sustainable Electricity Pathways 
Current electricity systems1 are under pressure. Combustible fuels account for nearly 61 
per cent of electricity generation in member countries of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (IEA, 2013a). Such electricity systems produce heat-trapping 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that contribute to climate change as the global average 
temperature increases, sea levels rise, oceans acidify, and extreme weather events intensify 
(Climate Change Congress, 2009). In the year 2000, Canada’s electricity sector contributed 129 
megatonnes of CO2 equivalent (MtCO2e), or nearly 18 per cent of total national emissions. The 
latest figures show that emissions from Canada’s electricity sector have declined by 39 
megatonnes to 90 MtCO2e. This decline is attributed to a variety of factors, including an 
economic downturn, the return to service of some nuclear units, some fuel switching to natural 
gas, the closure of coal-fired electricity generation facilities in the province of Ontario, and a 
variety of efficiency incentives throughout the country (Environment Canada, 2013b). But nearly 
21 per cent of Canada’s electricity sector is still based on fossil-fuel combustion (CEA, 2012). As 
a result, the electricity sector continues to contribute approximately 13 per cent of Canada’s total 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Environment Canada, 2013b). 
Fossil-fuel based electricity generation is also the largest uncontrolled industrial source of 
mercury emissions in Canada and accounts for a significant proportion of the country’s emissions 
                                                
1 I broadly define the electricity system as the infrastructure, rules, and actors that enable the supply and demand of 
electricity in a defined geographical area. 
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of nitrogen oxide and sulphur dioxide, which contribute to smog, acid rain and fine particulate 
matter (Environment Canada, 2013a). Environment Canada (2013a) points out that the electricity 
sector has substantial negative effects on water, habitat and species. The Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment, which was initiated by the United Nations and involved more than 1,360 experts 
worldwide, revealed that the manner in which we are using nearly two-thirds of ecosystem 
services2 is unsustainable (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). Canada has the seventh 
largest per-capita ecological footprint in the world; when combined with the effects of heating 
and transportation, electricity generation accounts for half of Canada’s ecological footprint 
(WWF, 2013). 
For many, these sustainability concerns underscore the need to transition to more 
sustainable3 pathways, especially when combined with concerns about the security of the supply 
of non-renewable energy sources. The International Energy Agency (2013) has emphasized that, 
“electricity generation must get cleaner, and do so quickly.” The World Business Council on 
Sustainable Development (2013) says that, “electricity is at the heart of the global energy 
challenge. … The sector plays an essential role in ensuring an effective transition toward a low-
carbon economy.” At the 2011 United Nations Climate Change Conference, 25 major electrical 
utilities, representing 10 per cent of the world’s power production, established the Global 
Electricity Initiative, based on the premise that, “clean electricity is a fundamental solution to the 
challenge of climate change” (GEI, 2013). These organizations, along with the myriad of policy 
makers, public intellectuals and academics that have weighed in on the topic, offer various 
                                                
2 Ecosystems provide 24 distinct services, including: provisioning services, such as food, water, timber and fibre; 
regulating services, such as water quality and waste treatment; and supporting services, such as soil formation and 
pollination (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). 
3 Sustainability, in this context, is primarily understood from an environmental perspective, meaning pathways that 
are more environmentally benign than current systems, with fewer greenhouse gas emissions, fewer impacts on 
sensitive ecosystems, and less pollution and waste. 
 
  5 
prescriptions and have different motivations, but they are all clear on one thing: we need to 
transition our electricity systems to more sustainable modes of production and consumption. 
1.2 Political and Policy Considerations Related to Electricity Generation 
When decisions are made about electricity generation, a variety of political and policy 
considerations are at play. Decision makers consider the capacity factor for each generation 
technology, which is the ratio of its actual output to its potential output if it could operate at its 
full nameplate capacity. Generally, the capacity factor for natural gas generation, using 
combined-cycle technology, is 87 per cent; for coal generation it is 85 per cent; for hydro it is 53 
per cent; for wind it is 35 per cent; and for solar photo-voltaic it is 25 per cent. Decision makers 
also consider the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE), which represents the per-kilowatt-hour cost 
of building and operating a power plant over its assumed life span, including: capital costs; fixed 
and variable operating and maintenance costs; and transmission investments. The Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) outlines both the capacity factor and the estimated LCOE for 
new generation resources entering service in 2019 (Table 1-1). While the capacity factor and the 
costs will vary somewhat due to a variety of factors, including region, geography and existing 
infrastructure, the EIA estimates provide a good indication of the relative capacity and costs of 
each of the generation options. It must be noted that any carbon-pricing mechanisms are not 
included in these estimates from the EIA, and would certainly add costs for the coal- and gas-
based power plants. 
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Table 1-1.  Estimated levelized cost of electricity for new generation resources (EIA, 2014) 
  Avg. LCOE (2012 $/MWh) for plants entering service 2019 
Plant type 
Capacity 
factor (%) 
Capital 
cost 
Fixed 
O&M 
Variable 
O&M 
(incl. 
fuel) 
Trans. 
inves. 
Total 
system 
LCOE 
Dispatchable technologies 
      Conventional coal 85 60.0 4.2 30.3 1.2 95.6 
IGCC  85 76.1 6.9 31.7 1.2 115.9 
IGCC with CCS 85 97.8 9.8 38.6 1.2 147.4 
Natural gas-fired 
 
 
    Conv. combined cycle 87 14.3 1.7 49.1 1.2 66.3 
Advanced combined cycle 87 15.7 2.0 45.5 1.2 64.4 
Advanced CC with CCS 87 30.3 4.2 55.6 1.2 91.3 
Conv. combustion turbine 30 40.2 2.8 82.0 3.4 128.4 
Adv. combustion turbine 30 27.3 2.7 70.3 3.4 103.8 
Advanced nuclear 90 71.4 11.8 11.8 1.1 96.1 
Geothermal 92 34.2 12.2 0.0 1.4 47.9 
Biomass 83 47.4 14.5 39.5 1.2 102.6 
       
Non-dispatchable technologies       
Wind 35 64.1 13.0 0.0 3.2 80.3 
Wind-offshore 37 175.4 22.8 0.0 5.8 204.1 
Solar PV 25 114.5 11.4 0.0 4.1 130.0 
Solar thermal 20 195.0 42.1 0.0 6.0 243.1 
Hydro 53 72.0 4.1 6.4 2.0 84.5 
 
Increasingly, decision makers also tend to consider the environmental impact of each of the 
generation options. These considerations include the relative GHG emissions of the various 
electricity generation options, which are outlined in Table 1-2.  
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Table 1-2.  Relative GHG emissions intensity of electricity generation sources (WNA, 2013) 
 Tonnes CO2e/GWh 
Technology Mean Low High 
Lignite 1,054 790 1,372 
Coal 888 756 1,310 
Oil 733 547 935 
Natural gas 499 362 891 
Solar PV 85 13 731 
Biomass 45 10 101 
Nuclear 29 2 130 
Hydroelectric 26 2 237 
Wind 26 6 124 
 
Decision makers also consider the relative impact on population health as a result of emissions of 
CO2, sulphur oxides, nitrogen oxides and fine particulate matter. In addition to costs, generation 
capacity, and emissions, decision makers consider economic implications, including jobs, the 
impact on local resource development, and local spin-off effects. 
1.3 The Possibilities for First Nations Involvement 
Electricity-system transitions open up possibilities for non-traditional actors to enter the 
electricity sector. Such participation of non-traditional actors could help achieve greater 
sustainability while also allowing those actors to secure the benefits associated with that 
transition. First Nations4 are one such group of non-traditional actors that may seek to contribute 
to and benefit from electricity-system transitions.  
First Nations communities have a significantly lower standard of living than the rest of 
Canada, with glaring health, social, and economic disparities. Compared to non-Aboriginal 
                                                
4 Section 35 of The Constitution Act, 1982 identifies three distinct peoples as Aboriginal: Indian, Inuit, and Métis 
peoples. There are 633 individual Aboriginal nations across Canada. This dissertation will focus exclusively on 
Indian bands, now commonly referred to as First Nations. 
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people in Canada, the First Nations population has worse outcomes in terms of education, 
employment, economic well being, health, housing and social inclusion. The Canadian Human 
Rights Commission reviewed a number of studies conducted between 2005 and 2010 and 
concluded that First Nations: 
• Are less likely to attend university; 
• Are more likely to rely on employment insurance and social assistance; 
• Have lower median after-tax incomes; 
• Are more likely to be victims of violent crimes and physical, emotional and sexual abuse; 
• Are more likely to suffer from obesity; 
• Are less likely to report ‘very good’ or ‘excellent’ states of mental health; 
• Are more likely to be incarcerated and less likely to be paroled; 
• Are more likely to live in housing that requires major repair; and 
• Are less likely to vote in municipal, provincial or federal elections (CHRC, 2013). 
As well, fewer than 50 per cent of First Nations children living on reserve complete their high 
school education (CHRC, 2013) and half of First Nations children in Canada live below the 
poverty line (CCPA, 2013). 
Because of the stark poverty and lack of economic opportunities that afflict many First 
Nations in Canada, it is not surprising that some First Nations communities are pursuing 
opportunities to establish, own, and operate sustainable electricity generation projects. Such 
projects could deliver economic and social benefits to First Nations in a manner that is in keeping 
with their cultural and spiritual connections to the environment. According to Krupa (2012), “in 
Canada, historically marginalized Aboriginal peoples remain one of the groups with the greatest 
potential for meeting [Canada’s] enormous renewable energy development needs” (p. 710) and: 
Renewable energy is an attractive choice as a central pillar of a First Nations development 
strategy. … Aboriginals generally possess a sophisticated understanding of the intricate 
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complexity of the natural world and the importance of reducing societal impacts on the 
environment in which they live (p. 711). 
 
1.4 Research Questions and Objectives 
Sustainability transitions are long-term, multi-dimensional transformation processes 
toward more sustainable modes of production and consumption (Kemp, 1994; Geels & Schot, 
2010). They are distinguished from other socio-technical transitions5 by their normative goal of 
achieving increased environmental sustainability. Environmental sustainability is rarely an 
absolute objective; rather, sustainability is generally a matter of degree. Therefore, the normative 
goal of sustainability transitions is to achieve greater sustainability, with systems that are more 
environmentally benign, with fewer greenhouse gas emissions, fewer impacts on sensitive 
ecosystems, and less pollution and waste. The purpose of this dissertation is to improve our 
understanding of such sustainability transitions, particularly in electricity systems, as well as to 
examine what opportunities may exist for First Nations to participate in and benefit from those 
sustainability transitions, and what role politics plays in enabling or constraining sustainability 
transitions, as well as the participation of non-traditional actors such as First Nations in those 
transitions. The primary objective underlying this research is to make several important 
contributions to the emerging field of sustainability transition studies and to increase our 
understanding of the various dynamics affecting the likelihood of First Nations participation in 
electricity generation. 
  
                                                
5 Historical examples of other socio-technical transitions include transitions from cesspools to sewer systems, sailing 
ships to steam ships, traditional factories to mass production, and horse-drawn carriages to automobiles. These 
historical transitions are discussed on pages 21 and 22. 
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The research questions that form the basis of this dissertation are as follows: 
• How can the various elements of sustainability transition studies be combined and 
augmented to develop an integrated sustainability transition framework that is 
relevant to the Canadian context? 
• How can insights provided by an integrated sustainability transition framework help 
us understand the likelihood of First Nations participation in sustainable electricity 
transitions? 
In answer to these questions, I first develop an integrated sustainability transition framework, 
drawing on the existing literature as well as my research. I then extend that framework to address 
the issue of First Nations participation in sustainable electricity transitions. 
This dissertation makes several important contributions to the field of sustainability 
transition studies. It provides research from a non-European context, which is rare in the field. As 
far as I am aware, the focus on the role of indigenous groups is a first for sustainability transition 
studies. The Sustainability Transitions Research Network (STRN) recognizes that, “research 
across a broader range of countries and diversity of contexts will improve our understanding of 
the dynamics of transitions, in order to both inform policy and practitioners appropriately, and to 
improve concepts and theory” (Markard et al., 2010, p. 2).  
This dissertation also helps flesh out the role of political dynamics in sustainability 
transitions. An understanding of political dynamics is not yet well entrenched within 
sustainability transitions research. The STRN has called for “research that focuses on improving 
our understanding of how purposeful governance processes can actively engage with and shape 
sustainability transitions, with a focus on the politics that are involved and the ways in which 
power plays out” (Markard et al., 2010, p. 8). This dissertation helps fill this void.  
Finally, this dissertation presents an integrated sustainability transition framework that is 
relevant to the Canadian context, pertinent to the issue of the involvement of non-traditional 
actors, such as First Nations in Canada, and cognizant of the role of politics in transition 
processes. The STRN identifies as one of its key research priorities: “synthesizing perspectives 
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and approaches that can help to frame the study of transitions [emphasis added]” (Markard et al., 
2010, p. 6). Markard and Truffer (2008a) argue that, “a combined framework may offer benefits 
that – for certain analytical tasks – reach beyond the merits of each approach” (p. 15). This 
dissertation helps to meet that.  
Beyond its contribution to the sustainability transitions field, this dissertation also helps to 
increase our understanding of how spaces are opened up for First Nations communities interested 
in pursuing sustainable electricity projects, so such projects are no longer “frustratingly elusive 
dreams” (Cornell & Kalt, 1998, p. 2) and so First Nations are no longer forced to further their 
projects “through the cracks left open, by unexpected events and the passage of time, in the [the 
dominant society’s] own discourses” (Blaser et al., 2004, p. 3). To that end, this dissertation 
delivers relevant insights for policymakers and First Nations leaders about the various dynamics 
affecting the likelihood of First Nations participation in sustainable electricity transitions. 
1.5 Overview of the Dissertation 
In Chapter Two, I explore the sustainability transitions literature, outline the four 
approaches to the theoretical framing of sustainability transitions, and find that there have been 
growing calls for an integrated sustainability transition framework. I find that political dynamics 
have not yet been well entrenched within the field of sustainability transition studies, and that 
numerous scholars within the field have expressed the need to address this research gap. I also 
discuss the initial work done to incorporate politics in the field of sustainability transition studies, 
which employed an ideational view of politics. 
In Chapter Three, I focus on First Nations in Canada. I start off with a discussion about 
the history of colonialism and paternalism and the ongoing effects of that extended era. I find that 
the very concept of economic development is a controversial one for First Nations, but that the 
desire for economic self-sufficiency is universally shared. I outline the variety of factors that 
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contribute to economic self-sufficiency for First Nations. And I explore the literature on First 
Nations participation in renewable electricity generation, uncovering the multiple factors that 
contribute to the success of such ventures. 
In Chapter Four, I outline the methodology used in this dissertation. I explain the rationale 
for the case study approach and justify the choice of my particular cases. I outline the analytical 
framework and discuss how I will operationalize its main concepts. And I reflect on the 
limitations of the research design. 
Chapter Five, Six and Seven contain the empirical analysis of this dissertation. Chapter 
Five spells out the situation in Nova Scotia. Chapter Six focuses on Ontario. And Chapter Seven 
looks at Saskatchewan. 
In Chapter Eight, I transform the specific explanation of the cases into general, 
theoretically based explanations. I answer the first research question by proposing an integrated, 
augmented sustainability transition framework that is relevant to the Canadian context. I answer 
the second research question by specifying how the integrated, augmented sustainability 
transition framework can explain First Nations involvement in the electricity sector. Based on 
this research, I present several insights for First Nations leaders, policy makers, and activists. 
And I conclude by summarizing the contributions this dissertation makes to the field of 
knowledge and outlining potential avenues for further research.
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CHAPTER 2 
SUSTAINABILITY TRANSITIONS 
 
Sustainability transitions are long-term, multi-dimensional transformation processes 
through which socio-technical systems undergo fundamental shifts to more sustainable modes of 
production and consumption (Kemp 1994; Geels & Schot, 2010). Geels (2004) defines a socio-
technical system as, “the linkages between elements necessary to fulfill societal functions” (p. 
900). In the specific case of electricity, Kern (2009) identifies various elements of the socio-
technical system, including knowledge, fuel and transmission infrastructure, markets and user 
preferences, cultural and symbolic meanings, and regulations and policies (Figure 2-1). 
 
Figure 2-1.  Electricity socio-technical system (own illustration, based on Kern, 2009, p. 8) 
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Transitions of socio-technical systems can occur for a variety of reasons. What 
distinguishes sustainability transitions from other socio-technical systems is the normative goal 
of achieving increased sustainability. According to Markard et al. (2014),  
Sustainability transitions have been conceptualized as an intentional endeavour of socio-
technical transformation, guided by public policies. Such a process is not just inherently 
value-laden but also affects a broad range of stakeholders, which win or lose depending 
on how the transition unfolds (p. 5).   
Sustainability, in this context, is understood primarily from an environmental perspective. As 
such, the normative goal of sustainability transitions is to achieve socio-technical systems that are 
more environmentally benign than current systems, with fewer greenhouse gas emissions, fewer 
impacts on sensitive ecosystems, and less pollution and waste. 
Over the past couple of decades, there has been a growing recognition of a variety of 
factors related to sustainability transitions, especially that: 
• Technical innovations, on their own, tend to be insufficient to solve environmental 
problems, so they often must be accompanied by shifts in socio-cultural and economic 
conditions;   
• Traditional policy approaches tend to be incapable of meeting many of our current 
challenges because what are truly needed are radical, large-scale, integrated socio-
technical changes;  
• When considering policies related to sustainability and the environment, not enough 
attention is generally given to the important criteria of social and political feasibility; and 
• Network interactions and system failures, such as lock-in, are not yet systematically 
incorporated into most policy considerations (van den Bergh et al., 2011). 
The recognition of such factors has led to a growing interest in the emerging field of 
sustainability transition studies (van den Bergh et al., 2011). Research within this field builds on 
earlier work in institutional theory, technology and innovation studies, evolutionary economics, 
and sociology (Foxon et al., 2009). 
Other approaches to sustainable development tend to focus on just one of three aspects: 
(1) technical expertise and administration; (2) market reforms; or (3) behavioural change. In 
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contrast, the field of sustainability transition studies takes a broader perspective by focusing on 
co-evolutionary approaches and multi-dimensional interactions (STRN, 2012). The main 
argument that serves as the foundation of the field is as follows: change does not merely involve 
technology, but rather technical changes must be assessed in their institutional and social 
contexts; socio-technical systems tend to be stable and path dependent and thus resistant to 
change; but under certain conditions and given enough time, socio-technical systems can be 
reconfigured or replaced in order to achieve greater sustainability (STRN, 2012).  
The field of sustainability transition studies recognizes that fundamental transitions of 
socio-technical systems involve the interaction of both quick and protracted mutually reinforcing 
developments, including those that are technological, economic, institutional, political, socio-
cultural and ecological (Rotmans et al., 2001). Such transitions tend to unfold over a significant 
period of time – generally 25 to 50 years or even longer (Markard et al., 2012). Because the field 
views sustainability transitions as open-ended journeys, “the analytical emphasis is on processes 
such as learning, radical innovation, experimentation, searches for new paths, participatory 
approaches, multi-actor interactions, selection processes, reactions, and network evolution” 
(Markard et al., 2010). 
As a result, one of the main focuses in the field of sustainability transitions is on the 
various factors that sustain a socio-technical system. Smith and Stirling (2010) assert that: 
Some socio-technical systems are entrenched more deeply than others, in the sense that 
they enjoy greater institutional support, larger economic significance, more supportive 
infrastructures, better integration with other social practices, and broader political 
legitimacy. These strongly embedded, self-reinforcing systems are referred to as socio-
technical regimes, and form a meso level of analysis. Electricity systems based on 
centralized generation from fossil fuels and distributed to users through grids is an 
example of a regime in wealthy societies, which contrasts with systems using local 
renewables, for example, for which institutional support is less entrenched (para. 11). 
Socio-technical regimes stabilize existing trajectories through a variety of mutually reinforcing 
processes that are often highly institutionalized, including: 
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• Regulations and standards; 
• Markets and economies of scale;  
• Sunk investments in machines, infrastructures and competencies;  
• The cognitive routines, knowledge and abilities of the various actors involved in 
maintaining and supporting the existing systems; 
• Entrenched infrastructures and institutions that service and sustain existing systems; 
• The social significance of the existing systems; 
• The connections between the existing systems and political power; and 
• The adaptation of lifestyles to the existing systems (Geels & Schot, 2007; Markard et al., 
2010). 
As a result of such mutually reinforcing processes, socio-technical regimes are characterized by 
temporal and structural persistence; they tend only to undergo incremental change along well-
established pathways and it is difficult for more sustainable alternatives to find the needed space 
to trigger meaningful transitions. As a result, the other main focus in the field of sustainability 
transition studies is on determining the factors that destabilize existing regimes and consequently 
allow for the emergence of new, more sustainable regimes (Markard et al., 2012). 
2.1 Theoretical Approaches to Sustainability Transitions 
There are four different approaches to the theoretical framing of sustainability transitions: 
(1) strategic niche management; (2) transition management; (3) the multi-level perspective; and 
(4) technological innovation systems (Table 2-1).  
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Table 2-1.  Theoretical framing of sustainability transitions (Markard et al., 2012) 
Approach Key concepts Key Sources 
Strategic 
Niche 
Management 
When niche-level innovations gain momentum through social 
learning and experimentation, they can trigger shifts in the 
socio-technical regime. As such, SNM focuses on the 
deliberate creation and support of niche innovations 
Kemp et al., 
1998; Smith, 
2007; Raven 
& Geels, 
2010 
Transition 
Management 
TM is a model for both understanding and managing policy 
change. The management of transitions involves problem 
structuring, convening multi-stakeholder ‘arenas’ to undertake 
envisioning exercises, establishing new coalitions of actors, 
using multiple experiments, and ongoing evaluation and 
monitoring 
Kern & 
Smith, 2008; 
Loorbach, 
2010; 
Rotmans et 
al., 2001 
Multi-Level 
Perspective 
The multi-level perspective understands that the alignment of 
developments at multiple levels can lead to transitions. Like 
strategic niche management, this perspective involves both the 
niche and regime levels, but it adds the landscape level as well, 
which consists of the natural environment, macro-economy, 
political culture, demographic characteristics, and worldviews. 
Transitions occur through the interaction of stabilizing 
mechanisms at the regime level, regime-destabilizing dynamics 
at the landscape level, and the breakthrough of niche-level 
innovations 
Geels, 2002; 
Geels & 
Schot, 2007; 
Smith et al., 
2010 
Technological 
Innovation 
Systems 
The technological innovation systems framework focuses on a 
broad set of innovating actors, their networks, and their 
dependence on various institutional contexts to develop, 
diffuse, and utilize technological innovations. The driver 
behind transitions is understood to be the systematic interplay 
of firms and other actors within a particular institutional 
infrastructure. The goal of TIS analysis is to identify system 
failures – including inadequately functioning networks, 
infrastructure failures, and institutional failures – in order to 
correct them through regulations and policies at particular 
points where such interventions are likely to be effective. A 
typical task in such analysis is to identify drivers and barriers 
to innovation and transitions 
Bergek et al., 
2008; 
Jacobsson & 
Johnson, 
2000; 
Hekkert et 
al., 2007; 
Jacobsson & 
Bergek, 2011 
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2.2 Quasi-Evolutionary Approaches 
The first three approaches to the theoretical framing of sustainability transitions are 
closely related to one another (Markard & Truffer, 2008a). Strategic niche management, 
transition management and the multi-level perspective can broadly be grouped under the category 
of quasi-evolutionary approaches (Suurs, 2009). Each of these approaches focuses, to varying 
degrees, on the concept of a multi-level framework, consisting of meso-level socio-technical 
regimes, micro-level niche innovations and macro-level landscape pressures. 
Strategic niche management (SNM) focuses primarily on the role of innovations at the 
niche-level: through social learning processes and multiple experiments, niche-level innovations 
can gain enough momentum to effectively compete with the technologies that are dominant in the 
socio-technical regime. In this largely bottom-up approach, the management component of SNM 
focuses on the purposeful creation, support and protection of such niche-level innovations (Raven 
& Geels, 2010; Smith, 2007). SNM emerged early on as a possible way of sparking transitions 
(Kemp et al., 1998), however much of its promise has waned. Suurs (2009) notes that, “most 
SNM studies have not been able to show how niches transcend their niche status” (p. 24). As a 
result, though it has been the focus of many studies, SNM has not emerged as a leading school of 
thought within the field of sustainability transition studies. 
Transition management (TM) focuses on the role of reflexive and evolutionary 
governance processes in managing transitions. TM theorists believe that it is not possible to fully 
control long-term societal transitions, so management within the framework refers instead to the 
processes of shaping and steering (Kemp & Loorbach, 2003). As such, TM as a governance 
approach involves attempting to influence the process of societal change by seeking “promising 
pathways for the evolution of key societal sectors” (Meadowcroft & Bregha, 2009, p. 211); 
encouraging innovation and experimentation to accelerate movement along those pathways; 
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reflexively adapting along the way; and eventually achieving a new dynamic equilibrium (Kemp 
& Loorbach, 2003). Despite numerous TM studies and attempts at practical application, its 
effectiveness in actual policy contexts has not yet been demonstrated (Markard et al., 2012). 
The main features of the literature on the quasi-evolutionary theories are best captured in 
the multi-level perspective (MLP) (Figure 2-2). The MLP focuses on three levels: 
1. The niche level consists of innovative practices;  
2. The regime consists of the existing structure, including technology, science, markets/user 
preferences and policies; and  
3. The landscape consists of long-term, exogenous trends, including the natural 
environment, macro-economy, political culture, demographic characteristics, and 
worldviews (Grin, 2012).  
Smith et al. (2010) note that, “the allure of the MLP is that it provides a relatively straightforward 
way of ordering and simplifying the analysis of complex, large-scale structural transformations in 
production and consumption demanded by the normative goal of sustainable development” (p. 
441). 
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Figure 2-2.  Multi-level perspective (own illustration, based on Geels & Schot, 2007) 
The key processes under consideration within the MLP are the stabilizing mechanisms at 
the regime level and the regime-destabilizing dynamics at the landscape and niche levels. 
Regimes and niches work through sociological structuration while landscapes “provide deep-
structural ‘gradients of force’ that make some actions easier than others” (Geels & Schot, 2007, 
p. 403). Within the MLP, transitions are understood to result from an alignment of developments 
in the landscape, regime and niche levels, with meso-level socio-technical regimes experiencing 
downward pressure from macro-level societal landscapes as well as upward breakthroughs from 
micro-level niche innovations. An alignment of factors in these three levels creates a window of 
opportunity to transition toward a more sustainable socio-technical regime. Niche-level 
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innovations have a higher likelihood of destabilizing, reconfiguring, or replacing socio-technical 
regimes if there are simultaneous landscape pressures on the socio-technical regime (Geels, 2002; 
Geels & Schot, 2007; Markard et al., 2010; Smith et al., 2010; Geels, 2011).  
Geels & Schot (2007) emphasize the importance of both the nature and timing of the 
interactions between the niche, regime and landscape levels. Reinforcing landscape developments 
have stabilizing effects and do not serve as an impetus for a transition, whereas disruptive 
landscape developments apply pressure on the regime and act as a driver for a transition. Niche 
innovations have a competitive relationship with the regime when they serve to destabilize and 
replace it, whereas they have a symbiotic relationship with the regime when they can serve as 
competence- and performance-enhancing add-ons to the regime (Geels & Schot, 2007). The 
timing of landscape pressure on regimes relative to the state of niche developments is important 
and will lead to different transition pathways (Geels & Schot, 2007).  
Geels and Schot (2007) outline four transition pathways: (1) transformation; (2) 
reconfiguration; (3) technological substitution; and (4) de-alignment/re-alignment. Of course, in 
the absence of sufficient external landscape pressure, the socio-technical regime will remain 
dynamically stable and simply follow a reproduction process, but if landscape pressure exists to 
the degree that the regime is unable to withstand it, one of the following pathways will likely be 
followed, depending on the nature and timing of the multi-level interactions: 
1. Transformation: this pathway tends to be followed when moderate landscape pressure 
occurs and fully developed niche innovations already exist. Regime actors respond to the 
landscape pressure by adjusting their development paths, including through the adoption 
of niche innovations that add to the regime without substantially altering its basic 
architecture. An example of a historical socio-technical transition involving this pathway 
is the hygienic transition from cesspools to sewer systems in the Netherlands: in the 
1850s, when physicians initially raised concerns about the statistical correlation between 
infectious diseases and unsanitary conditions, including waste being dumped onto streets 
and into canals as well as the existence of overflowing cesspools, regime actors responded 
with minimal incremental improvements. However, the decades that followed saw a 
gradual adjustment in several key factors, including perceptions of disease and waste, 
expectations of authorities, and expectations about appropriate waste disposal. 
Developments at the landscape level, including industrialization and increasing 
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democratization, were crucial to this transformation pathway. Another important factor 
was the struggle between regime actors and outsiders, including coalitions of physicians 
and engineers that were heavily focused on sanitary reform. While the switch from 
cesspools to sewer systems involved some aspects of the technological substitution 
pathway, it is most correctly deemed a transformation process because sewer systems 
were not disruptive to the socio-technical regime and the new knowledge involved was 
simply added on to the existing knowledge (Geels & Schot, 2007, p. 407). 
2. Technological substitution: this pathway tends to be followed when there is significant 
landscape pressure and sufficiently developed niche innovations. Until landscape pressure 
is no longer bearable, regime actors remain satisfied with incremental improvements and 
pay minimal attention to niche innovations. But when landscape pressure becomes 
intolerable, niche innovations that have already stabilized and gathered internal 
momentum can finally break through and replace the existing regime, often by entering 
increasingly larger markets. Britain’s switch from sailing ships to steamships is a 
historical example of a socio-technical transition involving the technological substitution 
pathway. In 1838, the British government created a mail-steamer subsidy with the aim of 
improving communication within the British Empire through a faster pace and more 
reliable arrival times for its steamships. The market niche that resulted from this subsidy 
allowed a devoted community of steamship builders to emerge, leading to better 
proficiencies in steam technology and iron working and, most importantly, leading to 
improved performance of steamships. Despite this niche, and other niches such as steam 
tugs in ports, the sailing-ship regime remained both stable and innovative. But when 
landscape pressures in the form of political revolutions and the Irish potato famine caused 
mass emigration from Europe to North America – which boosted the trans-Atlantic 
passenger-ship market beginning in the late 1840s – steamships were ready to seize the 
opportunity. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 allowed for steamships to take a 
crucial role in oceanic freight trade, because sailing ships had the distinct disadvantage of 
having to travel around Africa. As a result, between 1870 and 1890, steamships replaced 
sailing ships through economic competition. Following the breakthrough of steamships, 
there were many adjustments in the socio-technical regime that helped facilitate further 
diffusion of steamships, including the enlarging of ports and the creation of global coal 
infrastructure (Geels & Schot, 2007, p. 411). 
3. Reconfiguration: this pathway tends to be followed when the socio-technical regime 
adopts symbiotic niche innovations to solve regime problems and improve performance; 
these changes subsequently generate further adjustments that alter the regime’s basic 
architecture, including technical changes and changes in user practices, perceptions and 
search heuristics. Geels and Schot (2007) note that, “while regime actors survive in the 
reconfiguration path, competition and tensions occur among component suppliers” (p. 
411). The American transition from traditional factories to mass production is a historical 
example of socio-technical transition involving the reconfiguration pathway. Several 
external landscape pressures influenced this change, including the emergence of a 
national market, population and economic growth, the rise of engineers, increasing 
pervasiveness of electricity, and the efficiency movement. Multiple component 
innovations – including the division of labour, mechanization, application of machine 
tools, and continuous-materials-handling techniques – interacted with the regime, initially 
through the adoption of particular innovations to solve specific problems, and then 
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serving to overhaul the basic architecture of the factory regime (Geels & Schot, 2007, p. 
411). 
4. De-alignment and re-alignment: this pathway tends to be followed when there is 
significant landscape pressure that causes major internal problems for the regime, leading 
regime actors to lose faith and reduce investments in the regime, including in related 
research and development. In such cases, if no clear regime substitute exists because 
niche innovations are not yet fully developed, then space is opened up for multiple niche 
innovations to co-exist and compete until one becomes dominant and stabilizes into a new 
regime. The American transition from horse-drawn carriages to automobiles is a historical 
example of a socio-technical transition involving the de-alignment and re-alignment 
pathway. Many landscape pressures existed that created problems for the horse-based 
transportation regime, including urbanization, immigration, the hygiene movement, 
electricity, political reform, a burgeoning middle class, and new values such as active 
sporting and the pursuit of fun. Multiple novelties that could replace horse-drawn 
carriages emerged and co-existed for a short period of time. Electric trams, bicycles and 
automobiles – including electric, gasoline and steam varieties – all benefited from this 
initially. But automobiles, particularly of the gasoline variety, eventually won out and 
were “supported by institutions such as fast food restaurants, shopping malls on the edge 
of cities, [and] drive-in movies” (Geels & Schot, 2007, p. 409). 
2.3 Technological Innovation Systems 
The other strand of research within the field of sustainable transition studies is 
technological innovation systems (TIS), which focuses on the “emergence of novel technologies 
and the institutional and organizational changes that have to go hand in hand with technology 
development” (Markard et al, 2012, p. 5). TIS analysis focuses on technological innovation and is 
explores the various dynamics that influence the emergence of a new technology or a new 
product. Markard and Truffer (2008a) define a technological innovation system as a “set of 
networks of actors and institutions that jointly interact in a specific technological field and 
contribute to the generation, diffusion and utilization of variants of a new technology and/or a 
new product” (p. 16). Suurs and Hekkert (2009a) point out that the TIS literature “stresses the 
importance of path dependency, positive feedback and cumulative causation for understanding 
technological change and long-term economic growth” (p. 1003). Suurs (2009) notes that:  
Technological innovation can be understood as the development of a set of interlinked 
technologies and institutions being shaped (and reshaped) through the activities of actors. 
In the course of time, the outcomes of these activities result in an accumulation of 
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structures. With these structures in place, the innovation process typically gains more 
direction and speed. Once a technological innovation takes off, it is expected to replace or 
rearrange important structures that support incumbent technologies, thereby possibly 
establishing a contribution to a transition (p. 17).  
The TIS perspective utilizes different language than the quasi-evolutionary frameworks, 
but some of its core concepts are similar. It focuses primarily on two key components: 
• A production component encompassing the established technologies, which only undergo 
incremental innovations in the absence of significant external challenges. This component 
has a similar role to that of the regime in the quasi-evolutionary approaches, in that it 
serves to stabilize and support existing technologies; and 
• An innovation component, in which the established production component undergoes 
fundamental transformation or replacement through the creation, diffusion, and utilization 
of new technologies, most often involving different actors, networks, and institutions than 
those involved in sustaining and reinforcing the established system. This component has 
some similarities to the concept of niches, in that it generates innovations that challenge 
the dominant technologies (Markard & Truffer, 2008a).  
The TIS approach is “essentially a growth model based on the notion of cumulative 
causation” (Suurs, 2009, p. 26). This framework, which explains the emergence of new 
technologies or new products, involves a build-up process encompassing seven key system 
functions (Bergek et al., 2008; Suurs, 2009; Suurs & Hekkert, 2009a; Suurs & Hekkert, 2009b): 
1. Entrepreneurial experimentation – projects, including experiments and demonstrations, 
that are intended to prove the usefulness of the emerging technology; 
2. Knowledge development – learning activities, typically through universities and research 
institutes, with a focus primarily on the emerging technology, but also on markets, 
networks, users, and so on; 
3. Knowledge diffusion – through networks, knowledge is interactively exchanged between 
actors by way of partnerships, meetings, workshops, conferences, etc.; 
4. Guidance of the search – positive or negative signals, such as expectations, promises, and 
policy directives, serve to steer technology development;  
5. Market formation – the normal phases are ‘nursing market’ in which the TIS forms, 
‘bridging market’ in which there are increases in volume and number of actors, and 
‘mature market’;  
6. Resource mobilization – the distribution of needed financial, material and human capital 
to support the emerging technology; and 
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7. Support from advocacy coalitions – in order to overcome inertia associated with 
resistance from actors in the incumbent system, other actors must provide necessary 
support, including political lobbying (Bergek et al., 2008; Suurs & Hekkert, 2008; Suurs, 
2009). 
Bergek et al. (2008) also note the role played by the development of positive externalities for the 
emerging technology, which results from the strengthening of each of the other seven functions.  
Suurs and Hekkert (2009b) argue that, “the system functions should not be regarded as 
independent variables, or static criteria. Rather, they are processes that can reinforce each other.  
In fact, they should reinforce each other, or otherwise there can be no build-up in the TIS” (p. 
676). To that end, Suurs (2009) identifies a sequence of ‘motors’, which generally represent 
successive steps in a cumulative causation growth model, in the sense that each motor builds 
upon another. The successive motors are: (1) the science and technology push (STP) motor; (2) 
the entrepreneurial motor; (3) the system building motor; and (4) the market motor (Figure 2-3). 
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Figure 2-3.  Sequence of TIS motors (own illustration, adapted from Suurs, 2009) 
Suurs notes that immature technological innovation systems generally do not develop 
anything other than an STP motor and that the entrepreneurial motor only emerges once the TIS 
is sufficiently developed to open up opportunities for firms. The system building motor 
represents a transformation of the entrepreneurial motor while the market motor typically 
develops from those structures shaped by the system building motor (Suurs, 2009). 
Bergek et al. (2008) identify two significant inducement mechanisms that influence the 
functional pattern of TIS development: a belief in growth potential affects market formation, 
entrepreneurial experimentation, and direction of the search; and government research and 
development policy provides resources for research and experimentation and signals 
attractiveness and therefore affects the direction of search, legitimation, resource mobilization, 
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and knowledge development and diffusion. Bergek et al. (2008) also identify six primary 
blocking mechanisms that impede emerging TISs: 
1. Uncertainties of needs among potential customers; 
2. Inadequate knowledge of relations between investments and benefits; 
3. Lack of capacity and inadequate understanding of demand; 
4. Lack of standards; 
5. Few university programs in the field; and 
6. Weak advocacy coalitions. 
From the TIS perspective, the role of policy makers is not only to provide project-specific 
support as well as support for research and development programs, but also to identify and 
address system failures, including inadequately functioning networks, infrastructure failures, and 
institutional failures (Bergek et al., 2008; Jacobsson & Johnson, 2000; Hekkert et al., 2007; 
Jacobsson & Bergek, 2011). TIS analysis often brings forward technology-specific policies in 
order to overcome barriers to innovation and transitions (Markard et al., 2012). 
2.4 Actors, Strategies and Resources 
A wide variety of actors can play important roles in transitions, including private firms, 
venture capitalists, policy makers, government agencies, non-governmental organizations, 
universities, research institutes, associations, social movements, customers, and citizens. Geels 
(2005) says, “the linkages between processes at different levels are made by actors in their 
cognitions and activities, the dynamics are not mechanical, but socially constructed. … [and] 
transitions are contested and different groups struggle, negotiate and form coalitions” (p. 453). 
Meadowcroft (2009) also notes that an important aspect of sustainability transitions is the 
broadening out of the decision space and the creation of new coalitions of actors. Based on their 
comprehensive review of a range of other transition studies (including Bakker et al., 2012; Budde 
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et al., 2012; Konrad et al., 2012; Penna & Geels, 2012; Quitzao et al., 2012; and Schuitmaker, 
2012), Farla et al. (2012) outline the roles of the main actors in transitions (Table 2-2). 
Table 2-2.  Main actor roles in transitions (Farla et al., 2012, p. 995) 
Actors Role in transitions 
Policymakers 
and government 
agencies 
Traditionally, policymakers and government agencies have financially 
supported innovations until they reach a competitive phase. More recently, 
they have also proactively facilitated the creation of niches. Policymakers 
and government agencies “tend to be constrained by relationships with wider 
publics and industry actors, following and reacting to the outcomes of the 
societal debate” (Farla et al., 2012, p. 995) 
Firms Firms actively engage with innovation trajectories by creating positive 
externalities for their innovations as they seek to gain momentum against 
incumbent technologies and competing niche innovations. Firms actively 
involved in the incumbent regime only engage in innovation when pressured 
to do so 
Social 
movements 
In their struggle against incumbent regimes, social movements use political 
contacts, deployment of financial resources and public information 
campaigns in their attempt to mobilize public and consumer support and 
action on the part of policymakers 
Research 
institutes and 
experts 
Research institutes help influence expectations; including how sensitive other 
actors are to hype/disappointment dynamics, which can lead those actors to 
adjust their strategies 
 
Geels and Schot (2007) assess the main actors and types of actions and interactions in the 
different MLP pathways (Table 2-3).  
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Table 2-3.  Main actors, actions and interactions in transition pathways (Geels & Schot, 2007) 
Transition 
pathway Main actors Types of actions and interactions 
Transformation Regime actors, 
outside voices 
Pressure on regime exerted by external forces, 
including outsiders who critique regime; institutional 
power struggles and negotiations occur as incumbent 
actors adjust various regime rules and even adopt non-
disruptive niche innovations 
Technical 
substitution 
Incumbent firms 
versus new 
firms 
Market competition occurs, as newcomers develop 
novelties that compete against existing regime 
technologies, resulting in power struggles between 
incumbent and niche firms, as preferred incumbent 
technology is exchanged for a disruptive niche 
innovation 
Reconfiguration Regime actors, 
suppliers 
There is competition between incumbent and niche 
suppliers, as regime actors begin adopting innovation 
components developed by niche suppliers. Adoption of 
niche components leads reconfiguration of system, 
through cumulative component changes and new 
practices  
De-alignment/  
re-alignment 
New niche 
actors 
Deep structural changes create substantial pressure on 
the existing regime. The regime erodes and eventually 
collapses as incumbents lose legitimacy. Multiple 
novelty innovations emerge. New niche actors compete 
for attention, resources and legitimacy. One niche 
innovation eventually wins and the regime re-
stabilizes. 
 
Markard and Truffer (2008b) point to the importance of resource endowments, which 
serve as “an indicator for the innovation potential of actors and a determinant of actor 
configuration within the system” (p. 444). Markard and Truffer (2008a) assert that the 
distribution of resources is also crucial: “how resources are distributed among actors … [helps to] 
explain the development of networks and the innovation potential of actors” (p. 14) (Table 2-4).  
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Table 2-4.  Dynamics based on distribution of resources (Markard & Truffer, 2008b, p. 446) 
Distribution of resources Dynamic 
A minimal number of actors 
control a broad range of critical 
resources  
The very few actors with control of resources dominate 
both the system structure and the direction of any 
innovation processes 
Different actors control different 
critical resources 
No single actor dominates the system structure or direction 
of the innovation process; coordination and collaboration 
are fundamental to advance the innovation process 
Many actors control substitutable 
resource profiles 
Coordination and collaboration are less likely in such an 
environment; imitation and competition is the dominant 
interaction mode 
 
2.5 Toward an Integrated Framework 
While most sustainability transitions scholars tend to adhere to one of the particular 
frameworks within the field, there is a growing desire among many in the field to establish an 
integrated sustainability transition framework. The Sustainability Transitions Research Network 
(STRN) identifies as one of its top priorities the following: “synthesizing perspectives and 
approaches that can help to frame the study of transitions [emphasis added]” (Markard et al., 
2010, p. 6).  
With the goal of an integrated framework in mind, Markard and Truffer (2008a) focus on 
what possibilities may arise through the combination of the TIS and MLP frameworks: 
The innovation systems approach and the multi-level framework represent different 
perspectives on processes of innovation and socio-technical transformation. They are 
however comparable in terms of basic concepts and theoretical roots, they share a number 
of similarities and they have complementary strengths. Especially the latter aspect leads 
us to conclude that a combined framework may offer benefits that – for certain analytical 
tasks – reach beyond the merits of each approach [emphasis added] (p. 15). 
In terms of similarities, Markard and Truffer (2008a) note that both approaches emphasize 
the importance of networks, learning processes, and institutions and they both recognize similar 
phenomena, including path dependency, interdependence and non-linearity. Suurs (2009) also 
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identifies that “both apply a holistic perspective including a variety of interrelated factors to 
explain the outcome(s) of these processes. And most importantly, the approaches both stress the 
importance of sustainable innovation to be understood as a build-up process” (p. 25). 
In terms of complementary strengths, Markard and Truffer (2008a) identify as the key 
contribution of the MLP framework its explanation of the transition process as stabilizing 
mechanisms at the regime level, regime-destabilizing pressures from the landscape level, and the 
emergence of niche-level innovations. This understanding of transition processes “leaves room 
for contingencies such as external shocks or disruptive changes at the landscape level” (Markard 
& Truffer, 2008a, p. 14). Markard and Truffer (2008a) assert that this may serve as a good 
complement to the TIS perspective, which is rather myopic and tends to ignore the system’s 
broader environment. Meanwhile, the key contributions of the TIS framework are its “more 
analytical approach with its elaborated framework of structural and functional analyses … [along 
with the fact that] it is a meso-level concept that reaches well beyond niche level processes … 
[and it] has the potential to more explicitly deal with firm strategies and agency” (Markard & 
Truffer, 2008a, p. 14). Markard and Truffer (2008a) note that this may serve as a good 
complement to the MLP framework, which has largely confined its focus on emerging 
innovations to the niche level but has not yet developed the elaborate concepts and tools 
necessary to adequately investigate niche-level dynamics. Markard and Truffer (2008a) also 
assert that the strengths of the TIS framework may help the MLP framework make up for the fact 
that it has little to offer with regard to the agency, roles and strategies of different actors or actor 
groups.  
2.6 The Politics of Sustainability Transitions 
While there is no question that political dynamics play an important part in transitions, 
exactly what role they play is not yet well entrenched within the sustainability transitions field. 
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Grin (2011) acknowledges that, “more research into the two-way relationships between transition 
dynamics and its politics is needed” (p. 87). Avelino and Rotmans (2009) say that, “whereas 
implicit references to power are obvious, an explicit integration of power concepts is lacking and 
confronts transition studies with a conceptual weakness” (p. 545). The STRN also recognizes the 
need for “research that focuses on improving our understanding of how purposeful governance 
processes can actively engage with and shape sustainability transitions, with a focus on the 
politics that are involved and the ways in which power plays out” (Markard et al., 2010, p. 8). 
The STRN’s research priorities in the area of ‘governance, power and politics’ include devising 
approaches that take into account an understanding of how “transitions involve mobilizations of 
power and legitimacy whilst simultaneously changing the sources of power and legitimacy” 
(Markard et al., 2010, p. 8). 
Traditional notions of politics have focused heavily on interests and power struggles, but 
scholars have increasingly embraced an ideational understanding of politics. For example, 
Fischer (2003) views politics as “a struggle for power played out in significant part through 
arguments about the ‘best story’” (Fischer, 2003, p. x). Fisher (2003) says: 
Political action is constituted by discourses, from hegemonic discourses embedded in the 
existing institutions … to the oppositional efforts of other groups attempting to create new 
discourses. … Public policies are not only influenced by the discourses of particular 
groups, they are shaped and supported by the institutional processes in which specific 
discursive practices are embedded, processes which can have a life of their own (p. 45). 
Stone (2002) shares Fischer’s view, asserting that “the essence of policy-making in 
political communities” is a “struggle of ideas” (p. 11). Hajer (1993; 1995; 2005; 2013) also holds 
an ideational understanding of politics and focuses heavily on the importance of discourse. Hajer 
(1995) defines discourse as “a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorizations that is 
produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning 
is given to physical and social realities” (p. 60). Discourses frame certain problems and they 
  33 
deliberately ignore other problems; they distinguish certain aspects of a situation and 
intentionally disregard other aspects. Hajer (1993) notes that: 
The ideas, concepts and categories that constitute a discourse vary in character: they can 
be normative or analytical convictions; they can be based on historical references; they 
can reflect myths about nature. As such, discourses provide the tools with which problems 
are constructed. Discourse at the same time forms the context in which phenomena are 
understood and thus predetermines the definition of the problem (p. 45).  
For Hajer (1993), politics is ultimately a struggle for discursive hegemony in which different 
actors from various backgrounds form coalitions around specific rhetorical arguments and 
persuasive practices with the aim of bringing new actors in and garnering increased support for 
their particular definition of reality. 
Hajer (1993) defines a discourse coalition as “the ensemble of a set of storylines, the 
actors that utter these storylines, and the practices that conform to these storylines, all organized 
around a discourse” (p. 47). Table 2-5 outlines the important components of the discourse 
coalition approach. Hajer (1995) asserts that: 
Storylines are devices through which actors are positioned, and through which specific 
ideas of ‘blame’ and ‘responsibility’, and of ‘urgency’ and ‘responsible behavior’ are 
attributed. Through storylines, actors can be positioned as victims or polluters, as problem 
solvers, as perpetrators, as top scientists, or as scaremongers (p. 65).  
These new storylines can reorder the way in which we understand policy problems and, as 
a result, they can facilitate change (Hajer, 1995). The acceptability of new storylines depends on 
a few factors: whether actors like the way in which they have been positioned and framed in the 
storyline; whether actors find that subject-positioning and the overall structure of the storyline 
credible; and whether actors trust the individuals, groups, organizations or institutions that are 
creating and disseminating the storyline (Hajer, 1995).  
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Table 2-5.  Components of the discourse coalition approach (Hajer, 1993; 1995) 
Term Meaning 
Discourse “A specific ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorizations that is 
produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and 
through which meaning is given to physical and social realities” (Hajer, 
1995, p. 60) 
Storylines Generative narratives through which actors give meaning to social and 
physical phenomena. Judged by the criteria of attractiveness, credibility and 
trust 
Discourse 
coalition 
“The ensemble of a set of storylines, the actors that utter these storylines, 
and the practices that conform to these storylines, all organized around a 
discourse” (Hajer, 1993, p. 47). 
Discourse 
structuration 
(discursive 
hegemony) 
A particular discourse essentially becomes dominant, in that it affects the 
way a society views the world 
Discourse 
institutionalization 
When discourse through which many people conceptualize the world 
solidifies into an institution through organizational practices or a dominant 
mode of reasoning 
Discursive cement Simple, generative metaphors and storylines that bind together diverse 
discourse coalitions 
Discursive order The routinization of the cognitive commitments implicit in storylines, so 
that they appear ‘natural’ 
Discursive closure An interpretive process leading to the selection of simple metaphors to 
represent complex storylines and policy ideas. Erases the uncertainty and 
contingency of the knowledge upon which storylines are based. 
 
In a nutshell, actors use storylines to reduce the discursive complexity of a particular 
problem and open up new possibilities for addressing that problem. According to Fogel (2002), 
“storylines become tropes or figures of speech that rationalize a specific approach to what seems 
to be a coherent problem and allow actors to understand where their work and lives fit into a 
larger picture” (p. 65). This leads to the development of a broad discourse coalition and, “as more 
actors start to use a given storyline, it acquires a ritual character that gives permanence to the 
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debate” (Fogel, 2002, p. 65). In their review of the discourse coalition literature, Leifeld and 
Haunss (2012, p. 385) reveal seven characteristics of successful discourse coalitions: 
1. Their core frames and actors are stable over time; 
2. Their members exhibit strong ideational congruence; 
3. Their members stand united against rival coalitions; 
4. They attract a sizeable constituency; 
5. They effectively dominate the core frames of a particular discursive struggle; 
6. They can effectively integrate their frames into a consistent and compelling storyline; and 
7. Their ‘frame bundle’ is broad enough to draw in other actors and build a strong coalition, 
without being too diverse. 
Hajer (2013) points to three general advantages of using a discourse coalition approach: 
1. It provides the theoretical tools to analyze disagreements over specific issues within their 
broader political milieu and to analyze strategic action within the context of discourses 
and institutional practices; 
2. Rather than simply referring to interests, it takes the explanation further by analyzing how 
those interests are played out in the context of discourses and institutions; and 
3. It clarifies how different actors reproduce or contest a given bias without actually sharing 
deep values or coordinating their actions. 
Szarka (2004) notes that, “the value of [the discourse coalition] approach is that it illuminates 
how discourse becomes a means to political action” (p. 319).  
With the aim of addressing the significant research gaps with regard to the role of politics 
in sustainability transitions, Kern (2009; 2012) employs a ‘discursive lens’ and concludes that the 
politics of sustainability transitions “can usefully be conceptualized and explained as struggles 
about meaning. These are shaped in turn through discursive interactions between actors as well as 
existing institutions” (Kern, 2009, p. xi), and that, “political struggles about meaning within 
existing institutional contexts enable, shape, and constrain policy initiatives” (Kern, 2009, p. 
187). Frantzeskaki et al. (2012) say that, “by introducing discourse analysis [to sustainability 
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transition studies, Kern] provides us with the conceptual language to analyze the political nature 
of the governance of sustainable transitions” (p. 177).  
Rosenbloom and Meadowcroft (2014) assessed the history of the electricity sector in 
Ontario, utilizing the MLP framework, and concluded that: “political intervention was decisive in 
consolidating major shifts in the system of electricity provision” (p. 671); “politico-economic 
coalitions have played a pivotal role in instigating change and/or resisting it” (p. 677); and  
Politics has played a fundamental role in propping up, directing and tearing down 
successive electricity regimes. Indeed, understanding regime change in this context was 
only possible through a close inspection of impinging political dynamics. Bringing 
political developments from the background to the foreground has yielded important 
insights with respect to the evolution of Ontario’s electricity system (p. 678). 
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CHAPTER 3 
FIRST NATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
Oral tradition tells us that First Nations have lived on this land since time immemorial. 
There is well-documented evidence of their presence going back at least as far as 40,000 years 
(Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 1996). In the 1500s, Europeans began forming 
permanent settlements in North America and, beginning in 1701, numerous formal treaties were 
signed between the newcomers and First Nations. In 1763, King George issued a Royal 
Proclamation recognizing Aboriginal rights and title to the land and thereby setting the 
constitutional basis for future negotiations of treaties. In 1867, when the Dominion of Canada 
was created, section 91(24) of The British North America Act entrenched the federal 
government’s responsibility for “Indians and Lands reserved for Indians.” Between 1871 and 
1921, the 11 numbered treaties were signed between the Crown and First Nations (Figure 2-1), 
ensuring Canadian sovereignty over the vast territory and allowing for coordinated European 
settlement and access to natural resources. At the time, First Nations tended to welcome the 
treaties because their communities faced considerable distress due to epidemic and famine as well 
as economic challenges resulting from the extinction of bison (AANDC, 2010a).  
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Figure 3-1.  Historical treaties in Canada (own illustration) 
3.1 The Legacy of Colonialism 
Much of the early contact between First Nations and newcomers showed signs of 
promise; relationships were characterized by cooperation, sharing, partnerships, intermarriage, 
and treaties (Miller, 2000; Dickason & McNabb, 2008). Poelzer and Coates (Forthcoming) argue 
that the initial relationships forged between First Nations and newcomers, particularly through 
the fur trade, “provided the first, longest lasting and most successful example in Canadian history 
of our ability to find common ground” (p. 37).  
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But, despite that initial promise, much of Canada’s history with First Nations has been 
marked by colonialism, assimilation and attempts at cultural extermination (Asch, 2000; Coon 
Come, 2004; Blaser et al., 2004; Hoffman, 2008; Ralston Saul, 2008; Sutton Lutz, 2007). 
According to Hoffman (2008), colonialism involves a “deep form of control and subordination 
[in that it] necessitates the denigration of Aboriginal systems of social organization and 
governance since … the process of forming a community means ‘unforming’ the existing 
community” (p. 104). Hoffman (2008) argues this insidious form of domination, manipulation 
and control of First Nations people and communities has been so pervasive that its effects will 
still likely be felt decades after colonialist approaches are shelved for good. 
Throughout Canadian history The Indian Act has served as a significant tool of 
colonialism. Introduced in 1867, this federal legislation consolidated various existing regulations 
and increased the authority of the federal Indian Affairs department. In particular, it provided the 
department with the power to have significant intervention in the lives of First Nations people 
and their communities and to make sweeping policy decisions on a variety of topics, including 
determining who legally counted as an Indian; controlling Indian lands, resources and finances; 
and “promoting civilization” (AANDC, 2010a, p. 8). The Government of Canada now 
acknowledges that: 
The principle behind the Act was that it was the Crown’s responsibility to care for and 
protect the interests of First Nations people by acting as their ‘guardians’ until such time 
as they could reach a level of sophistication that allowed them to fully integrate into 
Canadian society. The Indian Act was frequently amended in the 70 years after it was 
passed into law in 1876. The amendments were largely concerned with assimilation and 
civilization of First Nations people. Amendments to the Indian Act became increasingly 
restrictive and imposed ever-greater controls upon the lives of First Nations peoples 
(AANDC, 2010a, p. 8). 
Restrictions under The Indian Act included a ban on traditional spiritual and cultural ceremonies 
as well as a prohibition against political organizing without prior government approval. The 
Indian Act also outlined parameters for “Indian Reserves – tracts of land, the legal title to which 
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is vested in Her Majesty, that have been set apart by Her Majesty for the use and benefit of a 
band” (Canada, 2013). Figure 2-2 shows the First Nations reserve territory throughout Canada. 
 
Figure 3-2.  Reserve territory in Canada (own illustration) 
Craik (2008) argues that treaties and agreements reduced the area available to maintain 
First Nations economies and traditional modes of life: “the relationships forged with Aboriginal 
nations by the colonial newcomers were processes of displacement and dispossession that, over 
time, left the Aboriginal nations with little, or nothing” (p. 281). Neu (2000) notes that “the 
reserve land base was insufficient to sustain either the traditional hunter/gatherer lifestyle or the 
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agrarian lifestyle … neither the reserve land base, including the quality of the land, nor the 
assistance provided was sufficient to sustain Indigenous peoples” (p. 275).  
In the late 1800s, First Nations reserves became largely childless zones when 
government-funded, church-run residential schools were established for First Nations children. 
The underlying motivation for the establishment of these schools was to “kill the Indian in the 
child” (TRC, 2013). All of these colonialist policies and actions adversely affected First Nations’ 
systems of social organization and governance. These historical arrangements, which limited the 
land base of First Nations and tore apart their family and community structures, served as 
significant impediments to advancing their own projects and achieving their full potential, 
individually and collectively. 
The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples notes that, for much of Canada’s history, 
First Nations were viewed as an obstacle to development: 
More and more, non-Aboriginal immigrants were interested in establishing permanent 
settlements on the land, clearing it for agricultural purposes, and taking advantage of the 
timber, fish, and other resources to meet their own needs or to supply markets elsewhere. 
They were determined not to be frustrated or delayed unduly by those who claimed title to 
the land and used it in the Aboriginal way. In something of a return to earlier notions of 
the ‘civilized’ and ‘savage’ uses of land, Aboriginal people came to be regarded as 
impediments to productive development (Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 
1996, vol. 1, ch. 5). 
As a result of such a view, government and industry actors tended to employ harsh colonialist 
approaches against First Nations. 
But then things started turning around, slowly. Because First Nations people participated 
in the First and Second World Wars and the Korean War, a committee consisting of both 
members of parliament and senators was struck in 1946 to review the federal government’s 
policies related to First Nations affairs. Thus began the very long and slow process of “rolling 
back paternalism” (AANDC, 2010a, p. 9). In 1951, the ban on First Nations ceremonies was 
lifted; in 1960, First Nations men were given the vote in federal elections; in 1982, the federal 
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government affirmed Aboriginal and treaty rights in section 35 of the newly repatriated 
constitution; in 1991, the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples was established to examine 
historical and contemporary relations; in 1995, the federal government formally recognized 
Aboriginal self-government as an existing, inherent right under section 35 of the constitution; in 
2008, the federal government formally apologized for the mistreatment of First Nations children 
in residential schools, including emotional, physical and sexual abuse as well as separation from 
families and communities; and, also in 2008, the federal government established the Indian 
Residential Schools Truth and Reconciliation Commission.  
Despite this progress, First Nations academic Pam Palmater (2011) notes that, “while 
Canada has publicly denounced the attitudes of superiority upon which assimilatory laws and 
policies were previously based, the majority of these laws and policies remain unchanged” (p. 
114). The sluggish pace of the ‘roll back of paternalism’ has led to many significant disputes and 
protests over the last few decades, including but certainly not limited to: the Oka crisis in 1990; 
the Gustafson Lake standoff in 1995; the Ipperwash land dispute in 1995; and the Caledonia land 
dispute in 2006.  
In December 2012, the Idle No More movement began, including mass protests and flash-
mob demonstrations throughout Canada along with high-profile hunger strikes. The Idle No 
More manifesto includes the following statement: 
The spirit and intent of the Treaty agreements meant that First Nations peoples would 
share the land, but retain their inherent rights to lands and resources. Instead, First 
Nations have experienced a history of colonization which has resulted in outstanding land 
claims, lack of resources and unequal funding for services such as education and housing 
(Idle No More, 2013). 
Several First Nations leaders and authors have articulated similar sentiments. Coon Come (2004) 
says that First Nations people strive not only to survive the negative impacts of development, but 
they also want to share in the benefits of development, a struggle that is rooted in their desire for 
self-governance and self-determination. Harries-Jones (2004) argues that the ability to control 
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their own forms of development is of utmost importance to First Nations. Blaser (2004) focuses 
on the importance of ‘life projects’ for First Nations, which “encompass visions of the world and 
the future [that] diverge from development in their attention to the uniqueness of people’s 
experiences of place and self and their rejection of visions that claim to be universal” (p. 26). 
Blaser et al. (2004) conceive of place and identity as a knot made up of two kinds of ‘threads’: 
(1) horizontal threads—the trans-place linkages in a spatial sense; and (2) vertical threads—
connections comprised of specific histories and landscapes. According to Blaser et al. (2004), 
development has altered the previous knot mix by suppressing the vertical threads. As a result, 
First Nations life projects tend in many ways to be devoted to reestablishing those vertical 
threads. According to Blaser et al. (2004): 
Ever since the newcomers secured their domination over Indigenous peoples, they refused 
to recognize the latter’s conceptions of right and the pursuit of their life projects … As a 
consequence of the subordination of Indigenous peoples, their life projects have had to be 
furthered through the cracks left open, by unexpected events and the passage of time, in 
the oppressors’ own discourses (p. 3). 
A presenter to the contentious MacKenzie Valley pipeline inquiry in 1975 also asserted that First 
Nations communities have had little say over their own destinies: “Do you think that this is the 
way the Indian people chose to have this community? Do you think that people here had any 
voice in planning this community?” (Phillip Blake, quoted in Watkins, 1977, p. 5). Sen (1999) 
refers to such restrictions as ‘unfreedoms’, which “arise either through inadequate processes … 
or through inadequate opportunities that some people have for achieving what they minimally 
would like to achieve” (Ch. 1, para.10). There are various types of unfreedoms, including those 
related to political, economic, and social matters and a lack of transparency or security (Sen 
1999). Sen (1999) argues that policymakers must pay attention to expanding people’s capabilities 
“to lead the kind of lives they value—and have reason to value” (Ch. 1, para. 12). To this end, 
Sen (1999) envisions a critical role for institutions and policies: 
  44 
Our opportunities and prospects depend crucially on what institutions exist and how they 
function. Not only do institutions contribute to our freedoms, their roles can be sensibly 
evaluated in the light of their contributions to our freedom. … Public policy has a role not 
only in attempting to implement the priorities that emerge from social values and 
affirmations, but also in facilitating and guaranteeing fuller public participation (Ch. 5). 
For decades, institutions, policies and discourses have created a legacy of colonialism and 
paternalism and served to hinder First Nations from realizing their own life projects and from 
leading the kinds of lives they value and lives they have reason to value. 
 
3.2 First Nations Economic Development  
For First Nations, the very concept of ‘economic development’ is contested and 
controversial. Some, like Clarence Louie, chief of the Osoyoos Indian Band in the Okanagan 
region of British Columbia, assert that economic development is of pivotal importance. Chief 
Louie says that, “economic development is how we hunt today. If you call yourself a leader, give 
all your people a chance at the dignity of a job, equal opportunity and the individual 
responsibility to earn a living” (Helin, 2006, p. 235). At the same time, others, like Kahnawake 
Mohawk academic Taiaiake Alfred, see economic development as a defeat of First Nations 
values and traditional ways of being. Alfred (2005) contends that: 
Today, self-government and economic development signify the defeat of our people’s 
struggles just as surely as, to our grandparents, residential schools, land dispossession, 
and police beatings signified the supposed supremacy of white power and the subjugation 
and humiliation of the first and real peoples of this land (p. 37). 
Clifford Atleo, a member of the Nuu-chah-nulth and Tsimshian First Nations in British 
Columbia, argues that economic development has come to dominate discussions about First 
Nations self-sufficiency for two reasons: (1) “the ‘Indian problem’ continues to be framed in the 
context of persistent colonial assumptions about Indigenous ‘primitivism’ on the one hand, and 
Western ‘progress’ on the other … [and] solutions inherently seek to address ‘gaps’ between the 
two societies” (Atleo, 2009, p. 3); and (2) “Indigenous peoples find themselves in the unenviable 
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positions of having to choose between feeding their families, often compromising their principles 
in the process, and starvation” (Atleo, 2009, p. 3). Such concern about First Nations economic 
development is understandable, given the fact that, as Anderson (2005) notes: 
Throughout the middle decades of the 20th century, Indigenous people, along with other 
poor populations of the world, were the target of a wide range of initiatives, efforts and 
programs to assist in economic development. In large part these top-down, externally 
developed, modernization-based efforts failed to improve the economic circumstance of 
the world’s poor, including Indigenous people, while at the same time damaging the 
traditional economy, leaving communities less self-reliant and therefore worse off than 
before. Reacting to these circumstances and the centuries of colonization that caused 
them, Indigenous peoples are struggling to reassert their nationhood within the post-
colonial states in which they find themselves (p. 1). 
Though there is disagreement related to the emphasis on economic development, there is 
apparent agreement on the importance of economic self-sufficiency. Even Taiaiake Alfred (2005), 
who passionately asserts that economic development represents a ‘defeat’ for First Nations, states 
that, “political approaches to making change that do not include a solid plan for economic self-
sufficiency on either a personal or collective level are doomed to fail” (p. 223). 
A decade-long study at Harvard University – the Project on American Indian Economic 
Development – examined why some First Nations communities achieve economic self-
sufficiency while others do not. The commonly heard explanations tend to centre around low 
levels of educational achievement, inhibited access to capital, poor quality land bases, and 
minimal resource endowments, but the Harvard study points instead to other factors. In 
particular, Cornell and Kalt identify institutions of governance, both those that are imposed and 
selected, as well as the cultural norms that bind formal and informal institutions (Cornell and 
Kalt, 1990; 1995; 1997a; 1997b; 2000). Cornell and Kalt (1998) conclude that, “without 
sovereignty and nation-building, economic development is likely to remain a frustratingly elusive 
dream” (p. 2). They contrast two distinct approaches to economic development in First Nations 
communities: (1) a jobs and income approach, which focuses on having businesses established 
on the reserve in an often unsuccessful attempt to solve the problem of poverty and 
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unemployment; and (2) a nation-building approach, which recognizes that jobs and businesses 
are important, but knows that what is needed is a more ambitious and comprehensive approach of 
nation building and a broad resurgence of First Nations (Cornell and Kalt, 1998).  
In keeping with Cornell and Kalt’s findings in their extensive study, Anderson (2005) 
notes the occurrence of “a second wave of Indigenous development (the first being top-down, 
state-directed efforts usually aimed at modernization), one in which Indigenous peoples are 
striving to rebuild their nations and improve their lot through economic development on their 
own terms” (p. 1). Anderson (1997) identifies eight key characteristics of successful First Nations 
economic development: 
1. Collective approach – individual First Nations exhibit a collective approach to economic 
development; 
2. Focus on self-sufficiency – attaining self-sufficiency is a primary objective; 
3. Focus on improving socioeconomic circumstances – improving people’s quality of life is 
also a key objective; 
4. Focus on strengthening traditions – through any development activities, there is a strong 
emphasis on preserving and strengthening traditional culture, values and language; 
5. Desire to exercise control – by creating and operating businesses, First Nations seek to 
achieve control over their own economic destiny; 
6. Desire to compete profitably – like all those who create and operate businesses, First 
Nations aim for long-term profitability; 
7. Focus on alliances – to achieve success, it is common to form alliances and joint ventures 
with other First Nations as well as non-First Nation partners; and 
8. Building capacity for economic self-sufficiency – First Nations work for self-sufficiency 
through education and training, through institution- and nation-building efforts, and 
through the fulfillment of their Aboriginal and treaty rights. 
A study initiated by the Atlantic Policy Congress of First Nations Chiefs Secretariat (2010) 
arrived at similar conclusions: First Nations businesses often have a substantial cultural 
component; are characterized by broader obligations to family and community; and are oriented 
  47 
toward “setting the stage for a more solid future for one’s children and for future Aboriginal 
generations in general” (p. 5). 
Shanks (2005) examines “the reasons why most First Nations find themselves in a 
quagmire of under-performing or virtually non-existent economies” (p. 4) and asserts that the 
reason “is a complex mix of historic circumstance, purposeful public policy and social dynamics” 
(p. 4). Shanks (2005) identifies the broad themes that emerged through interviews with key First 
Nations stakeholders: 
• A culture of dependency versus a culture of striving for excellence – a significant 
impediment to economic self-sufficiency is a “communal inferiority complex [that] 
appears to manifest itself as an attitude of waiting for rather than seeking opportunity” 
(Shanks, 2005, p. 11). By contrast, First Nations that have moved toward economic self-
sufficiency “have created a culture of striving for excellence” (Shanks, 2005, p. 12); 
• Planning versus being reactive – a significant lack of human and financial resources 
impedes effective planning on many First Nations. As such, “they are usually not well-
positioned to realize any benefits from real opportunities, much less maximize potential 
opportunities for lack of trained management or workers or means of accessing necessary 
capital” (Shanks, 2005, p. 12); 
• The need for an updated approach to land management – “most First Nations economic 
development practitioners believe … the current system [of land management] is too 
ponderous, overly complicated, and fraught with uncertainty” (Shanks, 2005, p. 13); 
• The challenges amassing sufficient equity – First Nations communities tend to have 
significant difficulty accruing the equity needed to participate in economic opportunities; 
• The challenges accessing capital – because of  “a strong anti-reserve bias within the 
mainstream business community” (Shanks, 2005, p. 15), First Nations encounter 
significant barriers when seeking to access financial resources; 
• Compromised business management – business management can be compromised by 
undue political interference, and it can also be compromised because of the limited 
number of people with management skills and experience, which is a result of limited on-
reserve entrepreneurship; 
• Not enough job training – due to a lack of resources and lack of planning, job training has 
generally been insufficient; 
• Lack of economic infrastructure – a significant lack of infrastructure on most First 
Nations impedes economic activity of any significant scale; and 
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• Considerations with regard to First Nations culture – “cultural considerations do appear 
to factor into the kinds of businesses that First Nations will pursue, or to the extent 
possible, allow within their territories” (Shanks, 2005, p. 18). 
Shanks (2005) also points to the ongoing ‘omnipresent’ and ‘invasive’ nature of The Indian Act 
and its adverse impact on First Nations economic development, noting that “some find its 
existence so overwhelming that economic development is not even attempted” while “others 
recognize it as out of date and out of touch with modern realities and look for ways to work 
around its anachronistic requirements” (p. 9). 
In collaboration with the First Nations Leadership Council, the British Columbia Ministry 
of Technology, Trade and Economic Development conducted an examination of economic 
accomplishments and challenges within First Nations. The Ministry identified two different 
approaches to First Nations economic development: (1) supporting First Nations entrepreneurs 
and their individual enterprises; and (2) developing community-owned and operated enterprises 
(British Columbia, 2008). The key themes that emerged from this examination are as follows: 
• Understanding both the historical and current context of communities – economic success 
requires understanding both the historical and current context of First Nations 
communities, including the fact that “First Nations have historically not been afforded the 
opportunity for meaningful participation and engagement in economic development 
projects” (British Columbia, 2008, p. 13); 
• Understanding the impediments arising from limited opportunities – First Nations 
economic success is impeded by limited opportunities for self-government; no equity 
accumulation for First Nations homeowners; complicated application processes for 
licenses and tenures; and limited expertise, training and capacity in each of these areas; 
• Planning – due to limited planning expertise and capacity, and due to limited access to 
funding for planning processes, many First Nations do not engage in much needed 
planning exercises, thereby failing to engage the broader community and create 
accountability by establishing clear anticipated outcomes; 
• Leadership, corporate governance and capacity – the Ministry noted that, “Chief and 
Council have the ultimate responsibility for the success of economic activities in their 
communities, but they need to fulfill that responsibility without interfering in day-to-day 
business operations” (British Columbia, 2008, p. 19); 
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• Benefit- and revenue-sharing agreements – despite the fact that First Nations would 
obviously benefit immensely from benefit- and revenue-sharing agreements, there are no 
guidelines or standards for such agreements; 
• Partnerships – partnerships assist First Nations by bringing capital and expertise to the 
table, but the problem is that, “industry and First Nations are unsure of how and where to 
find prospective partners [and there is a] lack of First Nations expertise related to the 
negotiation of agreements in a range of different economic sectors” (British Columbia, 
2008, p. 22); and 
• Access to capital: for most First Nations, “sources of capital for economic ventures are 
limited, unaffordable, restrictive and insufficient” (British Columbia, 2008, p. 23). 
Despite the many barriers to economic self-sufficiency, Anderson (2005) asserts: 
Aboriginal people in Canada are not standing idly by accepting the status quo. They are 
pursuing a strategy of economic development with entrepreneurship – the identification of 
unmet or under-satisfied needs and related opportunities, and the creation of enterprises, 
products and services in response to these opportunities – at its heart. It is believed that, 
through entrepreneurship and business development, they can attain their socioeconomic 
objectives (p. 2). 
Table 3-1 outlines the key characteristics of First Nations economic development identified in the 
literature. 
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Table 3-1.  Characteristics of First Nations development 
Characteristics of First Nations development Sources 
Tends to be devoted to reestablishing connections to 
histories and landscapes (‘vertical threads’) 
Blaser et al. (2004) 
Collective approach, characterized by broader 
obligations to extended family, the local community 
and broader First Nations community 
Anderson (2005); APCFNCS (2010) 
A strong cultural element, with a focus on 
strengthening traditions 
Anderson (2005); APCFNCS (2010); 
Shanks (2005) 
The Indian Act has ongoing, omnipresent and 
invasive nature 
Shanks (2005) 
Impeded by continuing challenges stemming form 
historical context 
British Columbia (2008) 
Impeded by limited and insufficient sources of 
capital and generally limited opportunities 
British Columbia (2008); Shanks (2005) 
Impeded by limited experience with appropriate 
corporate governance and business leadership 
British Columbia (2008); Shanks (2005) 
Focus on building alliances Anderson (2005); British Columbia 
(2008) 
Desire to exercise control Anderson (2005) 
  
Desire to compete profitably Anderson (2005) 
Focus on building capacity Anderson (2005); British Columbia 
(2008); Shanks (2005);  
Focus on self-sufficiency Anderson (2005) 
Focus on improving socioeconomic circumstances 
and setting the stage for future generations 
Anderson (2005); APCFNCS (2010) 
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3.3 First Nations Participation in Sustainable Electricity Generation 
One approach to modern First Nations economic development – or pursuit of economic 
self-sufficiency – is through involvement in sustainable electricity generation. For the bulk of 
history, electricity generation projects have left a bad taste in the mouths of First Nations 
communities. As demonstrated in the case of the Island Falls hydroelectric project discussed in 
Chapter One, such projects have generally consisted of large-scale hydro developments and there 
are four primary reasons for the historical bad taste: (1) governments and utilities have tended to 
engage in unilateral decision making; (2) the interests of the hydro developments have tended to 
come first; (3) there have been substantial, negative impacts on habitat, flooding and traditional 
livelihoods; and (4) there has been minimal First Nations participation in these projects 
(Henderson, 2013, p. 48). Even relatively recent developments share these characteristics. For 
example, Warner (1999) assesses the 1975 agreement in northern Quebec between the Cree, 
Inuit, Hydro Quebec, the Government of Canada, and two development corporations. Warner 
(1999) notes that there was a definite fait accompli nature to those negotiations: construction of 
access roads began four years before the agreement was reached; construction of the first dam 
began two years before the agreement was reached; and a court injunction that briefly halted 
construction was quickly overturned on appeal. This is not surprising, because the dominant view 
reflected the terra nullis arguments of old, as outlined by then premier, Robert Bourassa: “this 
inhospitable and desolate land, inhabited only by a handful of Inuit and Crees, is today becoming 
Quebec’s new frontier” (Martin, 2009, p. 23). Waldrum (1998) argues that these practices are 
highly reminiscent of the colonialist philosophies and tactics employed by government and 
industry in the 19th century:  
A resource is identified as valuable to the general society, and the Natives who are using 
that resource must be convinced that they should surrender it for the ‘common good’. … 
Once the resource has been secured and the Native people have been appeased, they are 
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largely ignored. Poverty and hardship frequently result, as the people discover that they 
can no longer make a living from the resources (p. 4). 
Hoffman and Bradley’s (2008) assessment of the situation in northern Manitoba reflects the 
divide-and-conquer approach that Waldrum identified: “this isolationist strategy also confronts 
individual communities with a remarkable reality … they are unable to negotiate as anything 
other than small, isolated and impoverished communities in a manner that essentially pits them 
against other equally powerless communities” (p. 154).  
Despite an overwhelmingly negative history in relation to electricity generation projects, 
more and more First Nations communities today are looking at smaller-scale sustainable 
electricity ventures as smart projects in which to be involved. Krupa (2012) argues that, “in 
Canada, historically marginalized Aboriginal peoples remain one of the groups with the greatest 
potential for meeting [Canada’s] enormous renewable energy development needs” (p. 710). 
Krupa (2012) also notes that: 
Renewable energy is an attractive choice as a central pillar of a First Nations development 
strategy. … Aboriginals generally possess a sophisticated understanding of the intricate 
complexity of the natural world and the importance of reducing societal impacts on the 
environment in which they live (p. 711). 
Henderson (2013) notes that First Nations involvement in renewable power is “a reality that is 
snowballing across Canada” (p. 15). Despite being a low-margin business, sustainable electricity 
ventures can provide a reliable stream of income that steadily grows as debts decline, and such 
projects also allow communities to build business management skills and provide good jobs and 
spin-off contract opportunities (Henderson 2013). Henderson (2013) identifies four stages of 
development in terms of First Nations involvement in sustainable electricity projects (Table 3-2). 
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Table 3-2.  Stages of First Nations involvement in electricity generation (Henderson, 2013) 
‘Early’ stage 
1987—1999 
‘Pioneering’ stage 
2000—2009 
‘Growth’ stage 
2010—2020 
‘Diversified’ stage 
2020—2035 
First Nations 
communities began 
considering 
sustainable electricity 
generation projects as 
a way to revitalize 
their local economies. 
Pic River First Nation 
in northern Ontario 
was an early entrant 
with its Wawatay 
Generating Station. 
Many electricity 
markets became more 
liberalized and open 
for competition. This 
allowed new actors, 
including First 
Nations, to enter the 
electricity sector. The 
China Creek Hydro 
Project of the 
Hupacasath First 
Nation and a biomass-
energy project in 
Ouje-Bougamou, 
Quebec, are two key 
examples. 
Initially, First Nations 
in Ontario and BC led 
the way with 
sustainable electricity 
projects. First Nations 
in nearly all provinces 
and territories are now 
pursuing projects. 
It is expected that, 
following the growth 
stage, the number of 
First Nations 
electricity projects 
brought on line each 
year will occur at a 
more moderate pace 
and the overall mix 
will be relatively 
diverse. 
 
Ultimately, the most fundamental factor for First Nations to be able to pursue sustainable 
electricity generation projects is the opening of a window of opportunity that allows change to 
occur in the existing electricity generation system and specifically allows new actors to 
participate in the sector. However, Krupa (2012) and Henderson (2013) identify various other 
elements of successful First Nations participation in electricity generation projects (Table 3-3). 
Both authors focus on the importance of sufficient financial resources; enhanced capacity, 
capability and confidence; and a strong sustainable development focus, seeking to deliver 
economic, environmental and social benefits to the whole community. They also identify the 
need for partnerships with private firms; long-term clarity about the electricity sector; 
governments, Crown utilities and electricity regulators that embrace clean energy projects as an 
important part of achieving a more sustainable future; and government programs that foster First 
Nations participation in the electricity sector. Henderson (2013) also identifies the need for a 
local project champion and strong governance. And Krupa (2012) notes that significant health, 
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social and economic disparities frequently impede First Nations economic development, 
including within the electricity sector; as such, projects are successful where greater equality has 
already been achieved.   
Table 3-3.  Elements of successful First Nations participation in electricity generation 
Theme  Krupa (2012) Henderson (2013) 
Committed and capable local leader to serve as 
the project champion 
 ✓ 
Strong governance to support the project and 
ensure accountable and transparent financial 
management 
 ✓ 
Access to sufficient financial resources to 
enable revenue-generating activities 
✓ ✓ 
Governments, Crown utilities and energy 
regulators that embrace clean energy projects 
as a crucial part of achieving a more 
sustainable future 
✓ ✓ 
Government policies and programs that foster 
participation, including mechanisms that 
facilitate the sale of electricity to provincial 
grids 
✓ ✓ 
Partnerships with private construction, 
technology and development agencies (rather 
than just contracts) 
✓ ✓ 
Long-term clarity regarding the electricity 
sector, what policy changes will occur, what 
incentives will exist, and so on 
✓ ✓ 
The capacity, capability and confidence of 
First Nations are enhanced 
✓ ✓ 
A focus on sustainable development – the 
project needs to focus on delivering economic, 
environmental and social benefits to the whole 
community, in a manner that develops skills 
and capacity within the community, and is 
sustainable over the long term 
✓ ✓ 
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Theme  Krupa (2012) Henderson (2013) 
Greater equality (health, social and economic 
disparities that are lessened) 
✓  
✓ = directly discussed by author  | ✓ = generally alluded to by author 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH STRATEGY 
 
This dissertation is aimed at answering two questions: (1) how can the various elements of 
sustainability transition studies be combined and augmented to develop an integrated 
sustainability transition framework that is relevant to the Canadian context? And (2) how can 
insights provided by an integrated sustainability transition framework help us understand the 
likelihood of First Nations participation in sustainable electricity transitions? With the aim of 
answering these research questions, this dissertation involves case studies of three provinces. 
This chapter justifies the research design of this dissertation and provides details of the 
methodology used. 
4.1 Analytical Framework 
Sustainability transition studies forms the basis of this dissertation’s analytical framework 
(Figure 4-1). As noted in Chapter Two, the sustainability transitions field is broad, with four main 
approaches to the theoretical framing of sustainability transitions. My focus in this dissertation is 
on determining how the various elements of sustainability transition studies can be combined and 
augmented to develop an integrated sustainability transition framework that is relevant to the 
Canadian context. In particular, this dissertation combines elements of the MLP and the TIS 
approaches. As discussed in Chapter 2, Markard and Truffer (2008a) and Suurs (2009) undertook 
initial work on integrating the MLP and TIS approaches. Markard and Truffer (2008a) assert that 
both the MLP and TIS approaches emphasize the importance of networks, learning processes, 
and institutions and recognize similar phenomena, including path dependency, interdependence 
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and non-linearity. Suurs (2009) also identifies that “both [the MLP and TIS approaches] apply a 
holistic perspective including a variety of interrelated factors to explain the outcome(s) of these 
processes. And most importantly, the approaches both stress the importance of sustainable 
innovation to be understood as a build-up process” (p. 25). Markard and Truffer (2008a) identify 
as the key contribution of the MLP framework its explanation of the transition process as 
stabilizing mechanisms at the regime level, regime-destabilizing pressures from the landscape 
level, and the emergence of niche-level innovations. This understanding “leaves room for 
contingencies such as external shocks or disruptive changes at the landscape level” (Markard & 
Truffer, 2008a, p. 14). Markard and Truffer (2008a) assert that this could serve as a good 
complement to the TIS perspective, which is rather myopic and tends to ignore the system’s 
broader environment, but has a “more analytical approach [than the MLP] with its elaborated 
framework of structural and functional analyses … [along with the fact that] it is a meso-level 
concept that reaches well beyond niche level processes … [and it] has the potential to more 
explicitly deal with firm strategies and agency” (Markard & Truffer, 2008a, p. 14). Markard and 
Truffer (2008a) note that this may serve as a good complement to the MLP framework, which 
has largely confined its focus on emerging innovations to the niche level but has not yet 
developed the elaborate concepts and tools necessary to adequately investigate niche-level 
dynamics.  
As noted in Chapter 2, the TIS approach has traditionally focused on the various 
dynamics at play in the emergence of new technologies and new products. My analytical 
framework deviates from this approach, in that I do not incorporate the TIS functions in a manner 
that is focused on moving a new technology from the concept phase to the commercialization 
phase. Rather, my analytical framework is more interested in the end phase of the traditional 
focus of TIS analysis – which is the deployment of technologies to new contexts. My analytical 
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framework also examines the functions necessary for new actors to participate the electricity 
sector. 
In recognition of the fact that political dynamics are not yet well entrenched within the 
field (Shove and Walker, 2007; Avelino & Rotmans, 2009; Markard et al., 2010; Grin, 2011; 
Markard et al., 2012), I supplement the sustainability transition theory by incorporating insights 
from discourse coalition theory in order to effectively add political dynamics to this dissertation’s 
analytical framework. In using a discursive approach to incorporate political dynamics into 
sustainability transition studies, I am following the lead of Kern (2009; 2012).  
 
 
Figure 4-1.  Overview of analytical framework 
The final product – an integrated, augmented sustainability transition framework that is 
relevant in the Canadian context – sheds light on the second key focus of this dissertation: 
determining how insights provided by an integrated framework might help to better understand 
the likelihood of First Nations participation in sustainability transitions, particularly within the 
electricity sector. 
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This particular research is not conducive to the establishment of specific hypotheses from 
the outset. As Loorbach (2007) notes:  
A societal transition theory in a nascent stage is not fully falsifiable in the Popperian 
sense and will never be, in view of the fundamental uncertainties and the impossibility to 
measure the different dimensions of transitions exactly. Transition research is therefore 
exploratory; it aims at developing and adjusting research hypotheses as an integrated part 
of the research process. … The basic hypothesis which is to be tested and elaborated in 
transition research is that the multi-level and multiphase concepts [such as technological 
innovation systems] form a sound and adequate heuristic framework to describe and 
explain the complex dynamics of societal transformations (p. 32). 
This dissertation is hardly starting from scratch in terms of theoretical development 
because many of the puzzle pieces are already known. Chapter Two explored in detail the 
important elements of sustainability transition studies and discourse coalition theory. The 
question this dissertation addresses is how exactly those puzzle pieces can fit together in a way 
that is relevant to this particular context. 
4.2 Research Strategy 
Based on the nature of this dissertation, I used a qualitative research approach. According 
to Cresswell (1998), “the [qualitative] researcher builds a complex, holistic picture, analyzes 
words, reports detailed views of informants, and conducts the study in a natural setting” (p. 15). 
Fischer (2003) emphasizes the importance of undertaking qualitative research when studying 
policy change: “The key to explaining how change comes about has to be grounded in a detailed 
examination of the circumstances at play in specific cases. For this purpose, quantitative methods 
have to take a back seat to qualitative research” (p. 108).  
In keeping with Fischer’s (2003) view that it is vital to undertake “a detailed examination 
of the circumstances at play in specific cases” (p. 108), I opted for a case-study methodology for 
this dissertation. Yin (1994) defines case-study research as “an empirical inquiry that investigates 
a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between 
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phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are 
used” (p. 13). Flyvbjerg (2006) asserts that case studies help researchers develop a “nuanced 
view of reality” (p. 223). This is highly applicable to this dissertation, given that my research 
questions aim to uncover and develop empirically rich descriptions of the political and policy 
processes that contribute to sustainability transitions of electricity systems and the participation 
of non-traditional actors, such as First Nations. 
Within the broader case-study methodology, my chosen research strategies for this 
dissertation are process tracing and discourse analysis. The aim of process tracing is to identify 
contingent mechanisms. Kern (2009) asserts that: 
When theories are underspecified, process tracing can be used to further develop middle-
range theory by identifying one or more causal processes that explain an outcome. … [I]t 
does not aim at establishing general laws (if X, then Y) but at identifying contingent 
mechanisms (X leads to Y in this case, through steps A, B, C). The process tracing 
method does not necessarily rely on simple linear reasoning but, through detailed case 
studies, can take interacting causal variables into account (such as ideas, institutions and 
interests) for the explanation of complex processes (p. 63). 
According to various authors (Yee, 1996; Campbell, 2002; and Kern, 2009), process tracing is 
particularly valuable in revealing the causal influence that discourse has in policy processes. 
Campbell (2002) says process tracing allows researchers to demonstrate “how specific actors 
carried certain ideas into the policy-making fray and used them effectively” (p. 29).  
I combine a process-tracing approach with discourse analysis in this dissertation. Hajer 
(2013) defines discourse analysis as follows: 
Discourse analysis is a method to analyze what language does, the politics of meaning 
that takes place, the way in which it affects perceptions and cognitions, the way in which 
it distributes power to some and less to others. Discourse analysis suggests furthermore 
that there are certain regularities. This is what makes it different from narrative analysis. 
Discourse analysis suggests that there are certain structures in language that influence 
politics. 
The University of Sussex’s guide to qualitative research methods notes that the combination of a 
process-tracing approach with discourse analysis is an appropriate one: 
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Process tracing is, basically, a system that offers a way to researchers for organizing the 
data collected in a systematic way. By pointing at the nodal points and raising interactions 
between actors and their context, it helps in identifying not only mechanisms but also 
common discourses or narratives that can be later analyzed with other methods such as 
discourse analysis (University of Sussex, 2014). 
4.3 Case Selection 
This dissertation focuses on case studies of three Canadian provinces: Nova Scotia, 
Ontario and Saskatchewan (Figure 4-2).  
 
 
 
Figure 4-2.  Map of Canada identifying selected provinces 
I opted for province-wide case studies because, under the Canadian constitution, provinces are 
responsible for the development, conservation and management of electricity. This means that the 
majority of political and policy factors that influence the electricity sector occur at the provincial 
level. This constitutional responsibility has also resulted in electricity companies that tend to 
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serve just one province, as is the case in the three selected provinces. The unit of analysis in this 
dissertation is the selected policy initiatives aimed at both increasing the sustainability of the 
electricity system and opening up space for First Nations to be involved in the electricity sector. 
The rationale for this particular case selection is not because these are necessarily 
representative cases; rather, Nova Scotia, Ontario and Saskatchewan were selected based on a 
strategic sampling approach that seeks cases which “cover the known range and variation” 
(Hakim, 1994, p. 64) and also display a high degree of the particular phenomenon being 
researched (Pettigrew, 1990). In Nova Scotia, all 13 First Nations are involved in the electricity 
sector; in Ontario, 35 First Nations are involved in the electricity sector, representing 
approximately 26 per cent of First Nations in the province; and in Saskatchewan, eleven First 
Nations are involved in the electricity sector, representing about 15 per cent of total First Nations 
in the province. A substantial degree of polarity is added in that each of the provinces has 
undertaken different policy approaches with regard to their electricity systems and to the 
involvement of First Nations in those systems. And, while Nova Scotia and Saskatchewan are 
similar in terms of the challenge of providing electricity to small, dispersed populations and also 
in terms of their history of reliance on coal-fired generation, Ontario’s reality is significantly 
different: a large, highly concentrated population with substantial reliance on nuclear generation 
rather than coal-fired generation. Table 4-1 presents an overview of the selected cases. 
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Table 4-1.  Overview of selected cases 
 Nova Scotia Ontario Saskatchewan 
Main 
electricity 
generation 
players 
Nova Scotia Power 
(Private) 
Ontario Power 
Generation (Crown 
corporation) (70%) 
Bruce Power (Private) 
(20%) 
SaskPower           
(Crown corporation) 
Specific 
measures to 
encourage 
First Nations 
participation 
Community Feed-in 
Tariff Program 
Funding and 
professional assistance 
to develop capacity on 
energy issues  
Funding to assist the 
development of a 
Mi’kmaq-specific 
Renewable Energy 
Strategy 
Feed-in Tariff Program 
Aboriginal Price Adder 
Aboriginal Energy 
Partnerships Program 
Aboriginal Renewable 
Energy Network 
Aboriginal Renewable 
Energy Fund 
Aboriginal Community 
Energy Plans 
Aboriginal Advisory 
Committee 
Aboriginal Energy 
Working Group 
Aboriginal Transmission 
Fund 
Aboriginal Loan 
Guarantee Program 
Long-term power 
purchase agreements 
(PPAs) 
 
First Nations Power 
Authority (FNPA) 
Total number 
of First 
Nations 
13 133 74 
Number of 
First Nations 
involved in 
electricity 
generation 
13  
(100%) 
35  
(26%) 
11 
(15%) 
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4.4 Data Collection and Analysis 
The analysis of the three case studies relies on three sources of data: 
• Review of relevant literature (discussed in Chapters Two and Three); 
• Analysis of relevant policy documents (including media reports, legislative transcripts, 
government publications, and internal documents); and 
• Semi-structured interviews with key actors. 
The analysis triangulates between the information from these different sources, which is 
recommended as an effective approach to case study research (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). 
I received approval for this research from the Research Ethics Board at the University of 
Saskatchewan in October 2013. In general, I followed Hajer’s approach to discourse-focused 
research, starting with standard desk research to establish an initial chronology and a first reading 
of how events played out through a survey of relevant documents. Then, I took in several 
presentations and had numerous informal side conversation at two relevant conferences: 
Generation West: The Future of Electricity in Western Canada conference, which took place in 
Regina on December 10 and 11, 2013, and the International Indigenous Energy Conference, 
which took place in Vancouver on January 27 and 28, 2014. These presentations and informal 
discussions were in place of what Hajer (2005) refers to as ‘helicopter’ interviews, with the aim 
of clarifying the focus of the next steps of my research. I then engaged in in-depth document 
analysis in order to clarify the process of events and understand the structuration and production 
of the various discourses. I then conducted semi-structured interviews with significant actors to 
generate more information about the causal chains – or “which led to what” (Hajer, 2005, p. 306) 
– and to strengthen the understanding of the meaning of particular events, how cognitive shifts 
occurred and how reframing of issues occurred. Between May 21, 2014 and September 22, 2014, 
10 interviews were conducted with actors in Nova Scotia, 14 interviews were conducted with 
actors in Ontario, and 10 interviews were conducted with actors in Saskatchewan (Appendix A); 
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these interviews were based on a flexible schedule (Appendix B) and were recorded, with all 
relevant aspects transcribed for further analysis. The empirical analysis of the information 
gathered through the document analysis and interviews focused on bringing clarity to the account 
of circumstances under investigation through identification of key incidents, identification of 
argumentation sites, analysis of positioning effects, and uncovering meaning and causal 
mechanisms. This is helpful for reconstructing discourses and cognitive shifts that are relevant to 
the analysis. Fischer (2003) notes that: “[because] meanings are not directly observable, the realm 
of meaning has to be approached through reflection and interpretive analysis” (p. 139). As such, 
the aim of the researcher is to try “as it were, to get inside the heads of the particular players in an 
effort to figure out the thinking behind the actions at issue” (Fischer, 2003, p. 141). Kvale (1996) 
describes this approach as follows: 
The researcher has a perspective on what is investigated and interprets the interviews 
from this perspective. The interpreter goes beyond what is directly said to work out 
structures and relations of meaning not immediately apparent in a text. This requires a 
certain distance from what is said, which is achieved by a methodological or theoretical 
stance, recontextualizing what is said in a specific conceptual context (p. 201). 
The main analytical concepts of this dissertation provide the context for this interpretation: 
storylines, processes of coordinative and communicative discourse, the effects of the discourse, 
and the nature and timing of the interaction between the niche, regime and landscape levels. To 
structure the rich empirical data in line with these key concepts, I used NVivo qualitative 
research software to manually code the policy documents and transcripts from the semi-
structured interviews. 
4.5 Operationalization of Analytical Framework 
This section outlines how the concepts of the analytical framework guide the empirical 
analysis (Table 4-2). The analysis within each case study is carried out in six steps. First, I outline 
the historical context of the socio-technical regime. Second, I outline the parameters and explore 
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the details of established systems. Through reviewing policy documents, I identify the various 
components that serve to stabilize those existing institutions. Third, based on findings from 
media reports and interview transcripts, I investigate and discuss the regime-destabilizing 
dynamics at the niche and landscape levels. Fourth, I uncover and discuss the storylines 
employed by different actors, including the behind-the-scenes ‘coordinative’ discourse as well as 
the public ‘communicative’ discourse. I also discuss the coalition of actors that develop and 
utilize those storylines. Fifth, I examine whether many people use the discourse to conceptualize 
their world (referred to as discourse structuration) and whether the discourse has solidified into 
policy, institutions and organizational practices (referred to as discourse institutionalization). 
Sixth, I explore whether the structuration and institutionalization of the discourse have had any 
profound effect on the existing regime – either to destabilize or reinforce it. By undertaking these 
steps, I am evaluating whether a sustainability transition framework, with political dynamics 
included, provides a sound and adequate heuristic framework to describe and explain the 
complex dynamics of electricity-system transformations. 
Table 4-2.  Operationalization of main concepts of analytical framework 
Concept Definition Key dimensions Sources of information 
Socio-technical 
regime 
The established, 
dynamically stable 
structure and institutions 
that, in the absence of 
regime-destabilizing 
dynamics, tend to 
undergo only 
incremental change 
along well-established 
trajectories (Kemp et al., 
1998) 
Various components 
(including policy, 
science, technology, 
industry, markets/user 
preferences and culture) 
that serve to stabilize 
and support the existing 
institutions 
- Policy documents 
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Concept Definition Key dimensions Sources of information 
Niche-level 
innovations 
The creation, diffusion 
and utilization of new 
technologies (involving 
new actors, networks 
and institutions) with 
aim of transforming or 
replacing the established 
system (Markard and 
Truffer, 2008a) 
Different technologies, 
actors, networks and 
institutions than those 
stabilizing and 
supporting the existing 
institutions 
- Media reports 
- Interview transcripts 
Landscape “Deep structural 
gradients of force that 
make some actions 
easier than others” 
(Geels & Schot, 2007, p. 
403) 
Natural environment, 
macro-economy, 
political culture, 
demographic 
characteristics and 
worldviews 
- Media reports 
- Policy documents 
- Interview transcripts 
TIS Functions The TIS approach is 
“essentially a growth 
model based on the 
notion of cumulative 
causation” (Suurs, 2009, 
p. 26). This build-up 
process encompasses 
seven key system 
functions (Bergek et al., 
2008; Suurs, 2009; 
Suurs & Hekkert, 2009a; 
Suurs & Hekkert, 
2009b). 
TIS functions: (1) 
entrepreneurial 
experimentation; (2) 
knowledge 
development; (3) 
knowledge diffusion; (4) 
guidance of the search; 
(5) market formation; 
(6) resource 
mobilization; and (7) 
support from advocacy 
coalitions 
TIS motors: (1) science 
and technology push 
(STP) motor; (2) 
entrepreneurial motor; 
(3) system building 
motor; and (4) market 
motor 
 
- Media reports 
- Policy documents 
- Interview transcripts 
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Concept Definition Key dimensions Sources of information 
Storyline “The medium through 
which different actors 
try to impose their view 
of reality on others, 
suggest certain social 
positions and practices, 
and criticize alternative 
social arrangements” 
(Hajer, 1993, p. 47) 
Narratives, structuring 
ideas and themes, 
problem framing, 
metaphors, analogies, 
historical references, 
appeals to fear or guilt, 
cognitive and normative 
ideas 
- Media reports 
- Policy documents 
- Legislative transcripts 
- Interview transcripts 
Coordinative 
discourse 
“Policy ideas are 
generated and 
constructed through 
communication between 
key policy actors” 
(Kern, 2009, p. 49) 
Behind-the-scenes 
discussions and 
negotiations involving 
elected officials, civil 
servants, experts and 
interest groups 
- Interview transcripts 
- Internal documents 
Communicative 
discourse 
“Political 
communication with the 
public about policy 
problems and their 
envisaged solutions” 
(Kern, 2009, p. 50) 
Public discussion of 
ideas and public 
announcements of 
decisions 
- Policy documents 
- Legislative transcripts 
- Interview transcripts 
Discourse 
coalitions 
“The ensemble of a set 
of storylines, the actors 
that utter these 
storylines, and the 
practices that conform to 
these storylines, all 
organized around a 
discourse” (Hajer, 1993, 
p. 47) 
The coalition of actors 
producing and using a 
particular storyline 
- Media reports 
- Policy documents 
- Legislative transcripts 
- Interview transcripts 
- Internal documents 
- Secondary literature 
Effects of 
discourse 
Discourse structuration –
whether people use the 
discourse to 
conceptualize the world 
(Hajer, 1995, p. 60) 
Key actors’ use of ideas, 
concepts and categories 
- Policy documents 
- Interview transcripts 
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Concept Definition Key dimensions Sources of information 
Discourse 
institutionalization – 
whether the discourse 
has solidified into 
policy, institutions and 
organizational practices 
(Hajer, 1995, p. 61) 
Effects on government 
policy and 
organizational practice 
- Policy documents 
- Interview transcripts 
Transition 
dynamics 
Whether discourse 
structuration and 
institutionalization have 
served to either reinforce 
or destabilize the 
existing regime 
Changes in the regime - Media reports 
- Policy documents 
- Interview transcripts 
 
4.6 Limitations of the Research Design 
All research designs have strengths and weaknesses and it is important to be transparent 
about the limitations of the chosen research design. It is also important to discuss how those 
limitations have been addressed in order to deliver a strong, valid and useful contribution to the 
field of knowledge. 
The sheer complexity of the electricity sector, including the layering of multiple 
generation technologies and the central role of electricity to both economic development and 
public welfare, makes it challenging to cleanly apply sustainability transition frameworks. 
Rosenbloom and Meadowcroft (2014) argue that: 
Socio-technical regime changes [in the electricity sector] are rather different from more 
straightforward socio-technical system replacement observed in other sectors (sailing 
ships to steam ships, outhouses to piped sewage systems, canals to railroads, and so on). 
From an alternative perspective, it could be argued that only through a fundamental break 
with the centralized model of electricity provision – for example, a shift to a dramatically 
decentralized system relying on widely distributed renewable generation – would a really 
radically different electricity ‘regime’ emerge. However, we believe that telling the story 
this way would be to brush over the societal significance of [the changes in electricity 
systems] (p. 678). 
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Despite the difficulty in easily applying sustainability transition frameworks to electricity 
systems, I agree with Rosenbloom and Meadowcroft (2014) that the field of sustainability 
transitions has significant insights to offer in terms of sustainability transitions in electricity 
systems. Uncovering what some of those insights are, within the particular context of Nova 
Scotia, Ontario and Saskatchewan, is the purpose of this dissertation. After all, as Loorbach 
(2007) argues: “The basic hypothesis which is to be tested and elaborated in transition research is 
that the multi-level and multiphase concepts form a sound and adequate heuristic framework to 
describe and explain the complex dynamics of societal transformations” (p. 32). 
Since the focus of many transition studies has been historical, involving the examination 
of a full transition that occurred in the past, some may critique this dissertation for focusing on 
sustainability transitions in electricity systems that have not fully played out. Not surprisingly, I 
disagree. As already discussed, transitions in the electricity sector are not as clear-cut as many of 
the well-studied historical transitions, especially because of the layering of multiple generation 
technologies and the central role of electricity to both economic development and public welfare 
(Rosenbloom & Meadowcroft, 2014). As well, this dissertation is focused on one key aspect of 
transitions – the opening up of space for new actors to participate in the sector. In each of the 
jurisdictions studied in this dissertation, policy changes have occurred over the last decade in 
relation to their electricity systems and varying degrees of policy measures have been undertaken 
to open up space for new actors, including First Nations to participate in the electricity sector. 
That is precisely what this dissertation assesses and, in so doing, it yields useful insights that 
advance knowledge in the field of sustainability transition studies. 
Discourse is a complicated causal variable to investigate and, as a result, some may 
question the internal validity of the research design in this dissertation. Schmidt (2003) asserts 
that: “the ideas [that discourse] articulates cannot easily be separated from the interests that find 
expression through it, from the institutional interactions that shape its expression, or from the 
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cultural norms that frame it” (p. 129). Kern (2009) argues that: “interests and institutions do not 
exist independently of discourse. Interests are defined by discursive positioning and institutions 
are understood as past discourses ‘solidified’” (p. 61). Further to that, Hajer (1995) says: 
Discourse analysis is not to be counter posed with institutional analysis, but is rather a 
different way of looking at institutions that is meant to shed new light on the functioning 
of those institutions, how power is structured in institutional arrangements, and how 
political change in such arrangements comes about (p. 264). 
Fisher (2003) says: “political action is constituted by discourses, from hegemonic discourses 
embedded in the existing institutions … to the oppositional efforts of other groups attempting to 
create new discourses” (p. 45). Discourse is an appropriate causal mechanism to investigate. The 
research design of this dissertation was selected in order to address any concerns about the causal 
mechanism under investigation and to ensure the internal validity of this study. According to 
Campbell (2002), process-tracing case studies are effective research approaches for research 
involving discourse. Campbell (2002) says, “one way to explain how ideas affect policy making 
is to show through careful process tracing how specific actors carried certain ideas into the 
policy-making fray and used them effectively” (p. 29). 
Critics may argue that results from case-study research are not statistically generalizable. 
That point is true, but it neglects to consider how the case-study approach contributes 
significantly to scientific development. Yin (1994) argues that the value of case studies lies in 
their ‘analytic generalizability’ in that, “a previously developed theory is used as a template with 
which to compare the empirical results of the case study. If two or more cases are shown to 
support the same theory, replication may be claimed” (p. 32). I also reiterate Fischer’s (2003) 
point, that: “the key to explaining how change comes about has to be grounded in a detailed 
examination of the circumstances at play in specific cases. For this purpose, quantitative methods 
have to take a back seat to qualitative research [emphasis added]” (p. 108).  
  72 
A final criticism of this dissertation’s research design is that it has limited capacity in 
terms of providing specific policy prescriptions. This is not an unanticipated criticism, because 
the field of sustainability transitions has struggled with delivering effective policy prescriptions 
since its inception. Strategic niche management emerged early on as a potential approach to spark 
transitions, but its initial promise has largely waned (Kemp et al., 1998). There have been 
numerous attempts at practical applications of the transition management approach, but its 
promise has also waned (Markard et al., 2012). The technological innovation systems approach 
points to the need to correct system failures through policy interventions at particular points 
where such interventions are likely to be most effective (Jacobsson & Bergek, 2011), but the 
literature has largely neglected to outline specific policy prescriptions beyond that general 
assessment. At the same time, discourse analysis is also not amenable to delivering specific 
policy prescriptions either. Kern (2009) notes that: 
Discourse analysis does not lead to identification of the ‘right thing to do’ for policy 
makers to support a transition towards a more sustainable electricity system. Nor does a 
discourse analytic approach allow evaluation of the … case studies in terms of which 
approach is (going to be) more successful. Its aim is more modest: by identifying 
discursive processes it sheds light on the specific situational logic on which policy 
framing and practices are based and can thus contribute to more reflexivity about the role 
and importance of discourses (p. 82). 
With this in mind, this dissertation is appropriately aimed at analyzing policy making, rather than 
at prescribing specific policy approaches. Nevertheless, the insights offered through this 
dissertation should be informative and enlightening for policy makers, First Nations leaders and 
stakeholders concerned with sustainability transitions, particularly in electricity systems, as well 
stakeholders concerned with First Nations sustainable development and economic self-
sufficiency more broadly. 
It is also important to note that this dissertation is not aimed at assessing the public policy 
merits or the economic viability of the particular policy approaches undertaken in the three 
selected provinces. The unit of analysis in this dissertation is the selected policy initiatives aimed 
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at both increasing the sustainability of the electricity system and opening up space for First 
Nations to be involved in the electricity sector. The focus is on ascertaining the various dynamics 
that contributed to those policy initiatives and looking at how successful they were in opening up 
space for First Nations participation in the electricity sector. The focus of this dissertation is not 
to assess the overall wisdom of the particular approaches followed in each of the provinces.
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CHAPTER 5 
NOVA SCOTIA 
 
Nova Scotia’s electricity regime has faced a variety of landscape pressures over the past 
couple of decades, including the decline in domestic coal supplies, the soaring costs of importing 
coal, public resentment toward the privatized electrical utility, the trend toward increased 
competition within electricity sectors elsewhere, and the growing pressure for climate change 
mitigation. In response to these landscape-level pressures on its electricity regime, Nova Scotia 
took several significant steps along a transformation pathway, in which it adopted proven niche 
innovations in a manner that did not significantly disrupt the existing regime, and in which it 
invited new actors to participate in the system while keeping the main incumbent actor in place. 
Progress along the transformation pathway was tentative at first, with the introduction of a very 
minimal voluntary target for new renewable power in 2001. A series of mandated targets were 
introduced in 2006, early 2009 and mid 2009, which accelerated progress along the 
transformation pathway. In 2010, the government released its renewable electricity strategy, 
laying out its plan to achieve 25 per cent renewable power by 2015 and 40 per cent renewable 
power by 2020. As part of its plan, the government split large-scale renewable projects between 
Nova Scotia Power and independent power producers (IPPs) and it introduced a community feed-
in tariff (COMFIT) program and an enhanced net-metering program for individual homes. 
The province’s progress along the transformation pathway has been powered by various 
technological innovation system (TIS) functions. The government provided positive signals (TIS 
function: guidance of the search) through policy directives, such as the renewable portfolio 
standard and the COMFIT. It also provided negative signals through its policy directives, such as 
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the imposition of hard caps on Nova Scotia Power’s emissions. With increases in the volume of 
renewable electricity and the number of actors involved in the sector (TIS function: market 
formation), Nova Scotia has largely developed a ‘bridging market,’ which is the middle phase 
between a ‘nursing market’ and a ‘mature market.’ Nova Scotia has made a concerted effort to 
mobilize and distribute the needed financial, material and human capital to support the 
deployment of renewable electricity generation (TIS function: resource mobilization), by 
providing incentives for participation in the sector and offering assistance with capacity 
enhancement and planning. And advocacy groups played an important role in encouraging 
government action (TIS function: support from advocacy coalitions). However, as a result of 
government policy, which is clearly entrenched within legislation and largely supported across 
party lines, support from advocacy groups is increasingly less crucial. As a result of the interplay 
of these TIS functions in the Nova Scotia case, the province has developed several TIS motors: 
an entrepreneurial motor, a system building motor and a promising market motor. 
Employing an ideational understanding of politics and, specifically by applying a 
discourse coalitions lens, it is clear that political dynamics helped fuel each of those TIS motors 
and played a crucial role in the ongoing transition of Nova Scotia’s electricity sector. The 
dominant discourse regarding changes to Nova Scotia’s electricity regime involved a variety of 
interrelated elements: bringing stability and affordability to electricity rates; unshackling from 
foreign coal; taking back control of the province’s energy future; creating jobs and boosting the 
economy; creating a cleaner, greener province; and leading Canada, North America and the 
world; in significant part, by supporting local, community-based renewable electricity projects. 
This dominant discourse solidified into institutions and organizational practices and facilitated 
adjustments in the socio-technical regime. 
One of the significant changes to the Nova Scotia’s electricity regime – and a key one 
under examination in this dissertation – is the opening up of space for new actors, especially First 
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Nations, to participate in the electricity sector. Nova Scotia accomplished this with the 
introduction of its COMFIT program. Under the COMFIT, the 13 Mi’kmaq6 First Nations and 
their business enterprises are able to qualify for the community feed-in tariff for any projects 
located on reserve land and land they lease or own. All 13 Mi’kmaq Nations are involved in 
renewable electricity generation projects, with 13.4 per cent of overall approved COMFIT 
generation coming from Mi’kmaq projects (Nova Scotia, 2012c; 2012d; 2013b; 2013c). 
This chapter delves into the sustainability transition in Nova Scotia’s electricity system. It 
explores the broader context, including an overview of the history of electricity generation within 
the province. It then explores the factors that contributed to recent changes in Nova Scotia’s 
electricity regime, especially the inclusion of new actors within the sector, and the significant 
involvement of First Nations in renewable electricity generation projects.  
5.1 History of Power Generation in Nova Scotia  
By the early 1890s, most urban areas in Nova Scotia were electrified to some degree, 
often by small generating stations that were only capable of handling the electrical load required 
to light the town (King, 1999, p. 25). Low population density, few major urban centres, and the 
significant distances between those centres contributed to a highly fragmented electricity system. 
King (1999) asserts that: 
Perhaps the most recurrent theme in the history of electrification in Nova Scotia has been 
the persistence of systemic fragmentation … a chaotic, unintegrated network: instead of a 
province-wide (or even district- or county-wide) web of interconnected power stations 
linked by transmission lines … [Nova Scotia had] a plethora of small utility companies, 
each owned by a petty local entrepreneur and serving a very limited area, often just one 
town (p. 24).  
                                                
6 Mi’kmaq is the proper plural usage. Mi’kmaw is the singular form of Mi’kmaq. Mi’kmaw can also serve as an 
adjective where it precedes a noun (i.e., Mi’kmaw Nation).  
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In 1919, the provincial government established the Nova Scotia Power Commission as a 
publicly owned utility focused primarily on developing the province’s hydro resources (Archer, 
1969). Despite the establishment of the commission, Nova Scotia still had 53 distinct electrical 
utilities in 1934, the year that the Report of the Royal Commission – Provincial Economic Inquiry 
was released. The Royal Commission commented on this fragmentation: “In a community of half 
a million people and in a country 21,000 square miles in area this multitude and diversity of 
organizations is remarkable” (Biss, 1934, p. 80). Because these 53 separate utilities were not able 
to benefit from economies of scale, they provided generally inadequate service and charged 
higher-than-average rates. As a result, among its key recommendations, the Royal Commission 
urged the creation of a central agency to co-ordinate the fragmented electrical utility system 
(King, 1999).  
In 1937, with the passage of The Rural Electrification Act, the Nova Scotia Power 
Commission’s role was expanded from that of a generally passive development body to that of an 
active, competitive utility. Over the next three decades, the Commission slowly addressed the 
long-standing systemic fragmentation. It started by integrating its own electrical systems, moved 
on to establish linkages with other utilities, and then focused on purchasing other utilities and 
integrating them into the Commission’s system (King, 1999). In 1972, the Nova Scotia Power 
Commission bought out the only remaining investor-owned utility in the province, the Nova 
Scotia Light and Power Company. A year later, the Commission became the Nova Scotia Power 
Corporation (King, 1999), which, for the next two decades, served as the province’s Crown-
owned monopoly electricity provider. 
In 1992, the provincial government opted to privatize Nova Scotia Power in order to 
obtain a significant infusion of cash to alleviate the growing provincial deficit (Clancy et al., 
2000). The price tag for Nova Scotia Power was $851.4 million; this was the largest to-date 
equity transaction completed in Canada (Nova Scotia Power, 2011a). An article in The Wall 
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Street Journal noted that, “the decision to privatize Nova Scotia Power Corp. is highly unusual in 
Canada, where most electric utilities … remain state-owned” (McGee, 1992). A business 
columnist in The Globe and Mail praised the privatization move: 
Across the country, these great bastions of state ownership … have ballooned into vast 
wastelands of inefficiency and debt. In almost every case, the power companies have 
become pawns of politicians, and badly managed uneconomic enterprises with poor 
environmental records and bloated bureaucracies (Corcoran, 1992). 
Some environmental advocates also applauded the privatization:  
Lawrence Solomon of Energy Probe, a Toronto-based environmental advocacy group, 
called the privatization “a small first step” on the way to breaking the monopoly of large 
state-owned utilities that his group contends leads to economic waste and environmental 
problems … [including] costly and polluting megaprojects (McGee, 1992). 
However, reaction the following year indicated some initial displeasure with the perceived 
consequences of the privatization of Nova Scotia Power. 
In the past, the Corporation treated environmental issues as political obstacles: now that 
the utility is no longer responsible to the Legislature it will be even less sensitive to 
environmental criticism. It’s thus not surprising that sulphur dioxide emissions at the 
Tufts Cove generating plant in Dartmouth began to increase almost immediately after 
privatization. People in the area are tasting the free market with every breath they take 
(Webster, 1993). 
Table 5-1 outlines the history of electricity generation in Nova Scotia. 
Table 5-1.  History of electricity generation in Nova Scotia 
 Pre-1919 1919-1971 1972-1991 1992-2009 2010- 
Ownership Private Mixed but 
increasingly 
public 
Public Private Private, with 
some 
community-
based 
generation 
Guiding 
principles 
Profit 
maximization 
Expansion 
and industrial 
development  
Service to 
citizens 
Profit 
maximization 
Profit 
maximization, 
increased 
sustainability 
and reliance 
on renewables 
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 Pre-1919 1919-1971 1972-1991 1992-2009 2010- 
Planning Market 
directed 
Combination 
of gov’t and 
market 
direction 
Central 
command 
and control 
Market 
directed 
Primarily 
market 
directed, but 
increasing 
government 
direction 
Market Free market Combination 
of gov’t and 
market 
direction 
Non-market Regulated 
monopoly 
Regulated 
monopoly, 
with some 
competition 
for generation 
 
System 
organization 
Fragmented, 
decentralized 
Still largely 
fragmented, 
but 
increasingly 
centralized 
Centralized Centralized Still primarily 
centralized, 
with 
increasing 
distributed 
generation 
Technology 
preference 
Oil-fired 
thermal 
Oil-fired 
thermal, with 
some hydro 
Coal-fired 
thermal 
Coal-fired 
thermal 
Decreasing 
coal-fired 
thermal, with 
growing 
preference for 
renewables 
 
Oil was the primary source of electricity for many decades in Nova Scotia, until the 
OPEC crisis in the 1970s. The disruptive landscape developments created by the OPEC crisis 
destabilized the socio-technical regime and led the province to quickly shift its electricity 
generation system to coal. Nova Scotia converted some of its oil power plants to coal-fired 
generation and, in the years that followed, it built new coal generation stations (Nova Scotia, 
2001). While this involved some aspects of technological substitution, it is more correctly 
deemed a transformation process, because the main regime actors remained in place and simply 
responded to landscape pressure by adjusting their development paths and adopting non-
disruptive innovations to respond to landscape pressure. 
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Provincial coal supplies managed to meet Nova Scotia Power’s fuel requirements from 
the 1970s through the mid-1990s, but then rising costs and international competition started 
leading to closures of the province’s coalmines. As a result, in 1996, Nova Scotia Power had to 
start importing coal to meet its fuel requirements (Nova Scotia, 2001). The percentage of Nova 
Scotia’s electricity generated by burning coal peaked at 80 per cent in 2006 (Nova Scotia Power, 
2011a). By 2012, that percentage had declined to 59 per cent (Nova Scotia, 2014e).  
Nova Scotia Power, which remains a virtual monopolist in the supply of electricity in the 
province, currently operates four coal power plants; one power plant that runs on natural gas or 
oil; one tidal and 33 hydro stations; two wind farms and two additional wind turbine sites; and a 
biomass power plant. In addition to the 59 per cent of its electricity generated using coal in 2012, 
18 per cent came from renewable sources; 21 per cent from natural gas; and the remaining two 
per cent was either imported or generated using oil (Nova Scotia Power, 2014).  
5.2 Moving toward Sustainability in Nova Scotia 
In the absence of destabilizing pressure, socio-technical regimes tend to undergo only 
incremental change along well-established trajectories (Kemp et al., 1998). Much of the pressure 
comes from the landscape level – the “deep structural gradients of force that make some actions 
easier than others” (Geels & Schot, 2007, p. 403). As early as 2001, the effects of certain 
landscape pressures on Nova Scotia’s electricity sector were apparent. That year, the Nova Scotia 
government undertook a consultation process to develop a new energy strategy. The initial 
consultation document pointed to three challenges for its electricity sector: (1) the Kyoto Protocol 
of 1997 which, “established new targets for environmental management and emissions that 
contribute to climate change … [and] also increased many people’s awareness of environmental 
issues involving the energy industry;” (2) the fact that “domestic coal is now less available and 
less used in generating electricity;” and (3) the trend toward increasing competition in the 
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electricity sector in other jurisdictions (Nova Scotia, 2001a, p. 6). Progressive Conservative 
Premier John Hamm wrote in the introduction to the consultation document: 
In a rapidly changing world, the energy industry and government must balance their 
social obligations with an environment that fosters commercial development. Trends to 
introduce market competitiveness into the generation, transmission and distribution of 
electricity, and the increase in concerns over environmental effects of the production and 
use of hydrocarbons on air quality and global warming must be strategically managed. 
Nova Scotia must also continue to ensure its business climate is competitive and attractive 
so that the energy sector significantly contributes to the province’s future economic 
growth (Nova Scotia, 2001, p. 3). 
Changes in worldviews, the macro-economy and political culture were beginning to put pressure 
on Nova Scotia’s electricity sector. 
The government released its new energy strategy late in 2001. The strategy focused on a 
variety of themes, including: thinking long-term; learning lessons from elsewhere; maximizing 
economic benefits within the province; improving the environment; increasing renewable energy 
production; and taking a cautious approach to competition in the electricity sector (Nova Scotia, 
2001b). The government said:  
In electric power generation, competition will be gradually introduced. This will enable 
the province to develop new sources of renewable energy and create opportunities to 
export power. Municipal utilities will gain access to the transmission system so they can 
buy power from any generator. There will be open competition for new power generation. 
Renewable energy standards will be set (Nova Scotia, 2001b). 
This strategy largely represented a reproduction pathway, in which the socio-technical regime 
remained dynamically stable. However, in some ways, it represented an extremely preliminary 
step down a transformation pathway – in the words of Premier Hamm, it was a “careful, 
measured response” (Power Engineering International, 2001). The regime actors responded to the 
moderate landscape pressure by incrementally adopting a very small amount of niche innovations 
in a manner that would not significantly disrupt the existing socio-technical regime. For example, 
the government set a voluntary target of 2.5 per cent or 50 MW of new renewable generation and 
its overall energy strategy strongly reinforced the existing system: 
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The strategy recognizes that coal will continue to play a major role in electrical generation 
in the province for many years to come. It encourages the development of local coal 
resources where it is economically and environmentally feasible. Opportunities for 
surface mining as part of land reclamation are expected to be identified in Cape Breton. 
Other mine developments may also be possible with advances in clean-coal technology 
(Nova Scotia, 2001b). 
The focus of the energy strategy can mostly be characterized as a reproduction process, leaving 
the existing electricity regime dynamically stable, but it is clear that at least one foot was slowly 
making its way toward the transformation pathway, in which proven niche innovations are 
adopted without significantly disrupting the existing regime, and in which space is opened up for 
new actors to participate in the system but the main incumbent actor is not displaced. 
In 2002, the government established the Electricity Marketplace Governance Committee 
(EMGC), with the stated purpose of “report[ing] to the Minister of Energy and recommend[ing] 
the implementation, development, structure, economic considerations, and rules to introduce 
electricity competition in Nova Scotia” (Nova Scotia, 2002). The EMGC consisted of various 
stakeholder groups – Canadian Federation of Independent Business, Canadian Manufacturers and 
Exporters, Consumers’ Association of Canada, Electricity Consumers Alliance of Nova Scotia, 
Municipal Electric Utilities of Nova Scotia Cooperative, Renewable Energy Industries of Nova 
Scotia, and Nova Scotia Power (Nova Scotia, 2003a). In late 2003, in its final report, the EMGC 
made the broad recommendation “that Nova Scotia generate more power using renewable energy 
sources and gradually introduce competition in the province’s electricity marketplace” (Nova 
Scotia, 2003b). This represented added pressure on Nova Scotia’s existing electricity socio-
technical regime. 
In 2003, the Nova Scotia government released its green strategy, entitled Toward a 
Sustainable Environment. The plan acknowledged that Canada had become a signatory to the 
Kyoto Protocol in 2002 and it said, “the Province of Nova Scotia is committed to addressing 
climate change and supports the development of a fair and realistic national plan” (Nova Scotia, 
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2003c, p. 5). It focused on the need for “an integrated approach” which included a pledge to 
“create a regulatory climate that encourages the development of a renewable energy industry 
within the province” (Nova Scotia, 2003c, p. 19). However, it would take several years for the 
government to enact significant regulatory changes to that effect, implying that the landscape 
pressure on the existing electricity regime was largely bearable. 
In 2004, Nova Scotia Power brought together 135 randomly selected customers to discuss 
energy planning. The ‘Customer Energy Forum’ utilized an innovative deliberative-polling 
approach for the first time in Canada,  in which participants were provided with access to 
balanced information. At the end of the forum, nearly three-quarters of participants supported 
increased reliance on renewable energy sources. In fact, 
When asked if Nova Scotia Power should only meet federal and provincial requirements 
in the production of electricity as a means to produce electricity as inexpensively as 
possible or whether Nova Scotia Power should go beyond the current requirements to 
reduce pollution or greenhouse gases, even if that meant higher bills—the response to go 
beyond was three to one at 73 per cent, with 26 per cent saying meet current requirements 
(Guild et al., 2004).  
When asked about their willingness to pay for particular options, wind power received the 
highest median response at five dollars more per month (Guild et al., 2004). This was useful 
information for government actors and Nova Scotia Power and what it told them was that, when 
provided with unbiased information about renewable electricity, Nova Scotians largely support it 
and are even willing to pay more for it (interview 10). 
Also in 2004, an independent study revealed that Nova Scotia was responsible for one-
quarter of all sulphur-oxide emissions in Canada, a fact mostly attributable to the province’s 
heavy reliance on coal-fired power plants (Auld, 2004). In response, a Halifax Herald editorial, 
which was reprinted in the Toronto Star, criticized the electrical generation system in Nova 
Scotia and called for the provincial government to demonstrate leadership:  
Nova Scotia is the little engine that could. Pollute, that is. … Part of the solution is to turn 
up the heat on Nova Scotia Power. The utility should be legally bound to make renewable 
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energy a growing percentage of the power supply. … Real strides in developing 
renewable energy … won’t be made without legislative impetus, simply because no one 
seems to be in a hurry to explore alternatives (“Struggling to find more green energy”, 
2004). 
In 2006, government acted to push for increased reliance on renewable power, taking 
several actual steps down the transformation pathway. Early that year, Rodney MacDonald was 
sworn in as premier, following the resignation of John Hamm. Under a new premier, the 
Progressive Conservative government moved “to force Nova Scotia Power to purchase more 
electricity generated by wind and solar power” (“Nova Scotia wants 20 per cent”, 2006), with the 
aim of doubling renewable power to roughly 20 per cent. Through these initiatives, regime actors 
were responding to increased landscape pressure – the rising costs of importing coal; public 
resentment toward the privatized electrical utility; the trend toward increased competition within 
electricity sectors; and the growing pressure around climate change mitigation. The regime actors 
responded to those increased landscape-level pressures by adjusting their development paths, 
including through the adoption of non-disruptive niche innovations. The new requirement for the 
incumbent actor to purchase more renewable power, rather than generate more renewable power, 
also opened the door for new actors to participate in the electricity sector. 
In response to the government’s regulatory changes, Nova Scotia Power forecasted higher 
power bills, arguing that, “the proposed 2013 standard [doubling the current percentage] of 
energy from renewable sources may not be technically achievable,” and it explicitly questioned 
whether it was an approach that really “works best for Nova Scotians” (“Nova Scotia wants 20 
per cent”, 2006). Despite Nova Scotia Power’s opposition, the government pushed ahead. In 
2007, the government unveiled new renewable energy regulations, which set a clear renewable 
energy standard: 20 per cent renewable power by 2013, representing a 15 per cent increase in 
renewable electricity generation. The regulations also restricted the first five per cent of new 
renewable power to IPPs, further opening up space for new actors to participate in the existing 
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socio-technical regime and representing further progress along the transformation pathway (Nova 
Scotia House of Assembly, 2007). 
Also in 2007, the government introduced The Environmental Goals and Sustainable 
Prosperity Act, with the stated aim of ensuring that the province has “one of the cleanest and 
most sustainable environments in the world by the year 2020” (Nova Scotia House of Assembly, 
2007). All three political parties in the Nova Scotia House of Assembly unanimously supported 
this legislation. Included among the 21 commitments within the legislation was a 10 per cent 
reduction of GHG emissions, below 1990 levels, by 2020.  
Two years later, the government unveiled yet another new energy strategy, as well as a 
climate change action plan, which included new emission reduction targets for 2015, 2020 and 
2050, and staged emission caps on Nova Scotia Power for 2010, 2015 and 2020. The plan also 
boosted smaller-scale renewable electricity projects with a commitment to net metering, allowing 
Nova Scotia customers to install wind turbines or other renewable electricity projects up to one 
megawatt in size to get credit against their power bill for the electricity they generate annually 
(Nova Scotia, 2009b). Again, this represented additional steps – however small they may be – 
along the transformation pathway, in response to landscape-level pressure, in which the the 
incumbent actor was left in place but space was opened up for new actors and the province’s 
reliance on renewable electricity generation was slowly increased. 
5.3 Embracing Community Power in Nova Scotia 
A provincial election was held in Nova Scotia in June 2009. Throughout that campaign, it 
was evident that a degree of discursive hegemony had already occurred, with each of the political 
parties emphasizing within their respective campaign platforms the importance of increasing the 
province’s reliance on renewable electricity. This is not surprising, given that each of the three 
political parties in the Legislative Assembly had unanimously embraced The Environmental 
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Goals and Sustainable Prosperity Act two years earlier. During the 2009 campaign, the 
Progressive Conservatives emphasized their record in government, pointing to their recently 
released Energy Strategy and Climate Change Action Plan, which they argued would ensure that, 
“by 2020, Nova Scotia will be cleaner, greener and more prosperous” (Nova Scotia Progressive 
Conservatives, 2009, p. 18). The Official Opposition New Democrats promised to increase 
renewable energy to 25 per cent by 2015, as part of their pledge to “create the secure jobs Nova 
Scotia’s economy need” (Nova Scotia New Democrats, 2009, p. 4). The New Democrats also 
focused on the affordability of electricity, with a key campaign plank pledging to “roll back the 
Conservatives eight per cent tax increase on home electricity” (Nova Scotia New Democrats, 
2009, p. 4). The third party Liberals also included a focus on renewable energy, pledging that 
they would: “focus on the development of a renewable energy industry that will generate jobs, 
guarantee economic growth and provide energy security into the future” (Nova Scotia Liberals, 
2009, p. 1). 
The New Democrats won the 2009 election and, as the new government, promptly 
announced the accelerated renewable targets the party had promised during the campaign: 25 per 
cent renewables by 2015, moving the previous government’s target up by five years. Following a 
consultation process, the provincial government released its Renewable Electricity Plan: A Path 
to Good Jobs, Stable Prices and a Cleaner Environment in April 2010. The government 
identified six principles that guided the development of its renewables plan: (1) managing costs 
for ratepayers; (2) strengthening security through diversity; (3) building economic opportunities 
in rural Nova Scotia; (4) protecting the environment and ensuring sustainability; (5) maximizing 
community involvement and social benefits; and (6) holding themselves accountable (Nova 
Scotia, 2010a, p. 8). These guiding principles reveal the various discursive elements at play in the 
politics of Nova Scotia’s electricity transition.  
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In its renewable electricity strategy, the government pointed to the landscape-level 
developments that were increasingly putting pressure on the existing socio-technical regime and, 
in so doing, the government revealed what would become a vital component of the discussion 
surrounding the transition of its electricity sector: 
The motivation for this plan is simple: nearly 90 per cent of the province’s electricity 
supply comes from fossil fuels – most of it coal. Coal made more sense when it was 
mined here in Nova Scotia, but now we buy it from others. This over-reliance on a single 
fuel source weakens our energy security, binds us to the volatile and upward trend of 
international prices, and drains wealth away from the province. Equally important, it has a 
negative impact on both our health and our environment (Nova Scotia, 2010a, p. 2). 
The government also said, “Nova Scotia’s economy has been exposed to insecure overseas 
supplies of an increasingly expensive, unhealthy, environmentally unfriendly fuel. We need to 
begin changing that, and this is the plan for doing so” (Nova Scotia, 2010a, p. 5). The plan 
included enshrining within legislation the government’s already-established commitment to have 
25 per cent renewable power by 2015. It also included a new target of 40 per cent renewable 
power by 2020.  
The government’s renewable electricity plan said the transition would be well organized 
and that it would involve many actors: 
The province will make an orderly transition to new, local, renewable energy sources. 
This plan uses several different mechanisms to achieve that transition. It creates a role for 
everyone from Nova Scotia Power – who will continue their regulated obligations – and 
large independent producers, to community organizations and committed citizens (Nova 
Scotia, 2010a, p. 2). 
To open up space for new actors to be involved in the electricity sector as IPPs, the government’s 
renewables plan explicitly committed that it would evenly split large- and medium-sized 
renewable energy projects between Nova Scotia Power and IPPs, taking another step along the 
transformation pathway by further adjusting the regime rules in order to adopt to niche 
innovations that add to the regime without substantially altering its basic architecture. 
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As a specific measure to facilitate the participation of new actors in the electricity sector, 
the government established the COMFIT program, the first known feed-in tariff program in the 
world to specifically target community-based wind, biomass, in-stream tidal and run-of-river 
hydro projects. Through the COMFIT program, First Nations, municipalities, co-operatives and 
not-for-profit groups receive an established price per kilowatt hour (kWh) of electricity they 
produce using renewable electricity generation projects. Nova Scotia’s COMFIT rates, designed 
to reflect basic cost recovery, are as follows:  
• Wind power, up to 50 kW: 49.9¢ per kWh 
• Wind power, over 50 kW: 13.1¢ per kWh 
• Small-scale in-stream tidal: 65.2¢ per kWh 
• Run-of-the-river hydroelectricity: 14.0¢ per kWh 
• Combined heat and power biomass: 17.5¢ per kWh (Nova Scotia, 2010b). 
The COMFIT focused on supporting technologies that had already been proven elsewhere and 
that were also deemed relatively affordable; the COMFIT did not support solar because the 
government deemed it unaffordable (interviews 4 and 9). 
The idea behind the COMFIT initiative was to provide project proponents with enough 
economic certainty to invest in local renewable energy projects. These projects are connected to 
the grid at the distribution level and, due to constrained capacity at that level, are generally less 
than 2 MW, but can be up to 6 MW in some areas of the province. With the exception of 
municipalities, these community-based entities are required to own a majority of the proposed 
project in order for it to qualify for the COMFIT program (Nova Scotia, 2010a). According to the 
government’s estimation, for every megawatt of energy produced through the COMFIT program, 
between $2 million and $3 million in economic activity is generated for the local community 
(Nova Scotia, 2013c).  
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While the government acknowledged that there are various economies of scale that allow 
large-scale renewable projects to produce electricity cheaper than smaller-scale projects, it said it 
made “a conscious decision” not to extend the COMFIT program to large projects, “partly to 
ensure widely dispersed energy sources, and partly to encourage rural community economic 
development” (Nova Scotia, 2010a, p. 26). Another key rationale for the community focus was 
that the government anticipated increased community buy-in to renewable projects as a result of 
the COMFIT; the government said it expected the COMFIT to “promote greater public 
understanding and acceptance of renewable resources” (Nova Scotia, 2010a, p. 11). A 
community activist said:  
I really love talking about the COMFIT because it’s a really good example of Nova Scotia 
doing a good job of watching what’s happening elsewhere and responding to that 
appropriately. So, what I put that down to is Nova Scotia deciding that a feed-in tariff 
would be kind of an appropriate program for the province and saying, hey, Ontario has 
implemented a feed-in tariff there. And watching Ontario, it was very obvious that a huge 
part of the problem with the way the feed-in tariffs were implemented in that province 
was that they did not have enough of a community focus, there wasn’t enough of an 
emphasis on developers actually communicating effectively and meaningfully with 
communities that they were putting projects up in, and ensuring that those communities 
directly benefited from those projects. And so now in Ontario what they have is a 
situation where there are several municipalities that have banned wind development in 
their borders and there are huge community groups that have been formed to make sure 
that wind development is consistently stalled in Ontario because there is this impression 
that it’s all just big foreign enterprises coming into Ontario and ruining their land and 
their communities in order to reap profits that they just take away. So I would say that the 
COMFIT here in Nova Scotia was directly informed by watching that experience in 
Ontario and thinking of the best way to avoid it (interview 6). 
Other interview participants also identified increased community support as a primary motivating 
factor for the development of the COMFIT program (interviews 2, 3, 5, 7 and 9). And a former 
government politician notes that: “the COMFIT was really about empowering communities to 
recognize that they could be a part of getting us off of coal and natural gas and putting us onto a 
sustainable path forward for electricity in this province that we haven’t seen ever before” 
(interview 4).  
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Another important motivating factor for the COMFIT was that it involved the government 
taking on Nova Scotia Power in a small, but significant way. Several interview participants noted 
that, when the government is seen to take action against Nova Scotia Power, it resonates with 
most Nova Scotians (interviews 4, 5, 6 and 9). A prominent insider notes that there is a “built-in 
hate factor” that many Nova Scotians have for Nova Scotia Power, in part because: 
The public has an ownership of Nova Scotia Power that they’ve clung onto even though 
it’s been almost 25 years since it’s been a private company. And some people are still 
upset about that. They don’t understand why government did it. All they know is that 
there used to be a lot more people working there and they used to pay a lot less. … You 
don’t see Nova Scotia Power or [its parent company] Emera do things as good corporate 
citizens, they do it exactly to the rule of law, and I’ve watched incarnations of how 
they’ve gone about their public relations aspects, but at the end of the day, the tone might 
change but the actions are identical. The only way to deal with Nova Scotia Power is by 
legislation and regulations, it is the only way which they understand. That’s it, that’s all 
they understand. … The government always has to talk tough, and they always have to 
pass a rule or make a law, and it’s never quite enough for the public but it always pisses 
Nova Scotia Power off. … It’s a very, very challenging relationship (interview 7). 
A former government politician also acknowledges that taking on Nova Scotia Power was indeed 
part of the motivation behind the COMFIT program: “[the COMFIT] is essentially getting rid of 
that idea that Nova Scotia Power has a monopoly on power generation” (interview 4). 
 Nova Scotia Power was relatively cautious in its public statements regarding the 
government’s imposition of the new renewable portfolio standard: “publicly, [Nova Scotia 
Power] said they’re working toward this [renewable portfolio], but of course they wanted to 
dictate their own rules” (interview 7). Nova Scotia Power wanted to protect its monopoly on 
electricity generation:  
Nova Scotia Power has had a policy of fighting any independent power production. 
They’ve been very jealous of their monopoly. And I mean, why give up something you’ve 
got, why open yourself up to any kind of competition. The notion around IPPs, and what 
they can do, Nova Scotia Power has fought it every single inch of the way. Everything has 
been forced upon them. They have not willingly done anything (interview 7). 
Another insider has a somewhat different perspective on the corporation’s response to IPPs: 
“They didn’t want to disadvantage their own business, … It wasn’t a bigoted or doctrinaire 
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opposition that they espoused, like, oh my God, this can never happen, and I think they realized 
that they would legitimately have to accommodate that and try to make it work” (interview 10). 
Other than from Nova Scotia Power, there was minimal discernible opposition to the 
COMFIT component of the government’s renewable electricity plan. However, as can be 
expected in any parliamentary democracy, there were disagreements and a fair amount of 
political posturing by the other two political parties about other details of the government’s 
renewable electricity plan. Much of the focus was on affordability. After all, the government 
readily admitted that electricity prices would have to rise in the short term in order to pay for its 
renewable electricity plan, but it argued its plan would ultimately lead to price stability and 
affordability: 
The transition from imported fuels to renewable electricity and cleaner local fuels will 
increase power bills in the short term, but offer lower and more stable rates in the long 
run. Not making this transition would shackle ratepayers to the wild price swings and the 
relentless upward march of international energy markets. And, in the long run, this plan is 
about making life more affordable – doing nothing would cost more. … We can keep 
going down that path and doom consumers to an unsustainable future, or we can bite the 
bullet and make the necessary investments to have a secure, safe, affordable, and 
sustainable energy economy. How hard is that bullet? Government estimates that 
measures in this plan will result in a 1% to 2% increase annually on electricity bills. To 
reach 2015, this would add an average of approximately $10-$20 annually to the average 
single family home electricity (closer to $20-$40 if electricity is used for heating) (Nova 
Scotia, 2010a, p. 26). 
The third party Progressive Conservatives attempted to make some political points by playing off 
the government’s ‘bite-the-bullet’ line. Progressive Conservative leader Jamie Baillie said:  
[The government] cranked up their own renewable targets to the most aggressive in North 
America, patted themselves on the back, passed the cost on to you and me, and then told 
you [that] you need to bite the bullet and pay more, finally confessing that it’s two per 
cent more on every bill (“Jamie Baillie’s Unforced Error”, 2011). 
The Official Opposition Liberals largely focused their attention on Efficiency Nova Scotia, an 
arms-length non-profit corporation created by the New Democrat government to better manage 
use of electricity, which the Liberals argued was costing Nova Scotians too much (“Stephen 
McNeil’s Brownout”, 2012). The Liberals also focused heavily on their desire to open up the 
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electricity market to competition, a move they argued would lead to increased affordability for 
Nova Scotians (“The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Baillie”, 2012). Despite some concerns 
about the pace of change with the renewable electricity strategy and its effect on affordability for 
Nova Scotians, the COMFIT program itself was largely supported (interviews 4, 7 and 9). 
The heavy focus of Nova Scotia’s Opposition parties, and the governing party as well, on 
affordability of electricity rates is understandable. Gifford (2013) points out the anger of Nova 
Scotians about increases to their electricity rates: 
Nova Scotians are angry about the increases in electricity rates from [Nova Scotia Power] 
over the last several years. Electricity rates increased by almost 58% from 2001 to 2012. 
Most of those increases occurred before 2009, but the latest rounds have incensed Nova 
Scotians more than ever as stories of [Nova Scotia Power’s parent company] Emera’s 
record profits and million dollar salaries for top executives along with requests for annual 
rate increases make them particularly galling (p. 1). 
Abreu (2013) says the anger of Nova Scotians over increases in electricity rates had a significant 
polarizing impact on the political discourse. 
Public debate is polarized and politicized. [Nova Scotia Power] and the provincial New 
Democratic Party government link rate increases to the rising cost of coal and demand 
decline. The [Liberal] Official Opposition pinpoints the cost of Nova Scotia’s efficiency 
programs as an undue burden for ratepayers. The Progressive Conservative caucus warns 
against the costs of investing in too much renewable energy too fast. Solidarity Halifax 
and other advocacy groups demand that NS government expropriate the private utility. 
The Lower Power Rates alliance connects high electricity rates to what it calls a “broken 
system” where regulatory authority is too weak to protect Nova Scotians (p. 10). 
The Ecology Action Centre (EAC) (2013) argued that: “Energy has become a political football in 
Nova Scotia. In response to public concern over rate increases, Nova Scotia’s political parties do 
Nova Scotians the disservice of crafting arguments that focus on short-term savings while often 
ignoring the big picture” (p. 2). 
The discourse around renewable electricity was certainly not limited to affordability, 
however. In fact, the broad storyline in the case of Nova Scotia’s renewable electricity consisted 
of the following interconnected elements: bringing stability and affordability to electricity rates; 
unshackling from foreign coal; taking back control of the province’s energy future; creating jobs 
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and boosting the economy; and creating a cleaner, greener province; all, in significant part, 
through supporting local, community-based renewable electricity projects. Because its domestic 
coal industry was decimated, Nova Scotia imports most of its coal from Colombia (EAC, 2013). 
The Ecology Action Centre (2013) notes that Nova Scotia’s “reliance on fossil fuel imports is 
unique in Canada” (p. 2). Between 2005 and 2011, the price of coal jumped 75 per cent, which 
put significant upward pressure on electricity rates (Nova Scotia, 2011a). Thus, the discourse 
around electricity generation focused heavily on delivering more affordability to Nova Scotians 
and ending the volatility of Nova Scotia’s reliance on costly foreign coal. Premier Darrell Dexter 
said: “We are putting our energy future where it belongs; back in Nova Scotians’ hands” (Nova 
Scotia, 2010d); “the government has established aggressive targets to help reduce the province’s 
dependence on fossil fuels, a move that will make life more affordable for families by ensuring 
lower, more stable power rates in the long term” (Nova Scotia, 2011a); and “the days of double-
digit increases are over. By working together with partners … we are taking control of Nova 
Scotia’s energy future. This is an affordable, made-in-Atlantic Canada approach to a problem that 
has been around for more than a generation” (Nova Scotia, 2013d). By and large, this storyline 
was used by a broad range of actors to conceptualize the problem in Nova Scotia (interviews 3, 4, 
5, 6, 7 and 10), achieving what Hajer (1995) calls discourse structuration or discursive 
hegemony. 
While opposition political parties and Nova Scotia Power called the government’s 
approach to renewable energy ‘aggressive’ (Doucette, 2009), the government did not view that as 
a negative. In fact, the government enthusiastically embraced that term; using it 23 times in 19 
separate news releases between July 2009 and October 2012. The government also routinely used 
the word ‘ambitious’ to refer to its plan. The ‘aggressive’ and ‘ambitious’ labels fit well with the 
government’s narrative, which pushed the argument that Nova Scotia could punch well above its 
weight and provide leadership to Canada, North America and the entire world on renewable 
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energy (interviews 4 and 6). For example, in its 2010 Speech from the Throne, the government 
said: “Once Nova Scotia was known for shipbuilding, coal, and steel. Now, clean energy could 
be Nova Scotia’s next big industry. Nova Scotia’s ambitions in the area of clean energy are world 
class” (Nova Scotia, 2010c). In its 2010 budget speech, the government said, “Nova Scotia will 
take its rightful place as a leader in the renewable energy sector. Last summer, we announced a 
target of 25 per cent renewable energy by 2015 – the most aggressive standard of any 
government in North America” (Nova Scotia, 2010e). In its 2011 Speech from the Throne, it 
said: “Clean energy is the fuel of the future. Nova Scotia was the first province in Canada to 
institute hard caps on greenhouse gas emissions, and has set the most aggressive renewable 
energy standards in the world” (Nova Scotia, 2011b). In May 2013, in the Legislative Assembly, 
Premier Dexter said,  
The people of Nova Scotia know that the renewable electricity plan put forward by this 
government was not only the first one, but it was widely praised as one of the most 
progressive plans anywhere in North America. The kinds of things that we have done 
with respect to renewable energy have been praised by the David Suzuki Foundation. It is 
far and away the most rational, most progressive renewable energy and electrical plan in 
our country (Nova Scotia House of Assembly, 2013). 
Positioning Nova Scotia as a nation-, continent- and world-leading jurisdiction was a key part of 
the government’s narrative, and it became a component of the dominant discourse around 
renewable electricity in Nova Scotia.  
Unshackling from foreign coal, taking back control of the province’s energy future, 
creating jobs and boosting the economy were all crucial elements of the political discourse, and 
key motivating factors for the government’s policy direction. Leading Canada, North America 
and the world as well as creating a cleaner, greener province were also part of the discourse, but 
they were not as significant as the other pieces. However, the affordability aspect was 
undoubtedly what Nova Scotians cared most about. A former government MLA notes:  
So the unshackling of foreign coal, I mean I used that all the time ... when I did interviews 
and talked to people on the doorsteps, and you get the head nod from it, but at the end of 
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the day, what people want is affordable energy. And, because, you know, our average 
price for energy is about 12 cents a kilowatt hour, when in a province like Manitoba, it’s 6 
cents a kilowatt hour, people go ‘huh?’” (interview 4). 
Addressing this affordability angst was a key motivation in the government’s decision to increase 
community-based renewable power. It also motivated the government to eventually embrace the 
Maritime Link, the underwater cable that would bring electricity from the Muskrat Falls 
hydroelectric project in Labrador to Nova Scotia; however, at the time the government released 
its renewable electricity plan, it was still just exploring the possibilities around the Maritime 
Link, so its focus was heavily on domestic renewable electricity generation (Nova Scotia, 2010a). 
When the COMFIT program launched, the government’s target was 100 MW of 
electricity generated from such projects. By early 2014, the program had received 123 
applications totaling about 280 MW of capacity. The government approved 89 COMFIT projects, 
with a total generation capacity of 200 MW (Nova Scotia, 2014e). 
The Nova Scotia government also negotiated an equivalency agreement with the federal 
government in 2012, allowing the province to use its own regulatory approach instead of 
following federal regulations for coal-based generation (Nova Scotia, 2012f). The government 
said: 
This is a made-in-Nova Scotia solution that wouldn't have been possible if not for the 
strength of our greenhouse gas regulations and renewable energy plan. There is only one 
way to make sure we're getting the lowest, fairest prices – make the shift from imported 
coal to stable renewable energy right here in Atlantic Canada (Nova Scotia, 2012f). 
As already outlined, the dominant discourse regarding changes to Nova Scotia’s 
electricity regime involved a variety of interrelated elements: bringing stability and affordability 
to electricity rates; unshackling from foreign coal; taking back control of the province’s energy 
future; creating jobs and boosting the economy; creating a cleaner, greener province; and leading 
Canada, North America and the world; in significant part, by supporting local, community-based 
renewable electricity projects. The discourse coalition – the various actors that produced and used 
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this storyline – included a loose blend of government, political parties, First Nations, and 
advocacy groups. The coordinative, behind-the-scenes discourse focused on a variety of factors: 
meeting the province’s aggressive renewable electricity targets; reducing the province’s reliance 
of costly foreign coal; challenging Nova Scotia Power’s monopoly on power generation; 
empowering communities to recognize that they could benefit from the transition to renewable 
energy; supporting local economic development and job creation; learning lessons from Ontario, 
where a feed-in tariff had been introduced a few years earlier; and blunting criticism from some 
of the New Democrat government’s supporters who wanted any renewable electricity projects to 
be owned by the provincial government. The communicative discourse, which takes place in the 
public, focused primarily on affordability issues. It also included discussion about taking back 
control of the province’s energy future, boosting the economy and creating jobs.  
In many ways, the dominant discourse around the transition of the electricity sector has 
solidified into institutions and organizational practices, what Hajer calls discourse 
institutionalization. There are relatively aggressive targets for renewable power and emission 
reductions. The government is increasing the use of locally produced natural gas and establishing 
the Maritime Link to increase the capacity of the grid to absorb intermittent energy from local 
renewable sources. The COMFIT has resulted in many new actors entering the electricity sector 
and becoming increasingly entrenched as they gain expertise in renewable electricity generation. 
Enhanced net metering has given individuals and businesses the chance to participate in 
renewable electricity projects that are up to one megawatt. Other institutional components have 
been added to buttress this plan, including: a renewable electricity administrator, to manage the 
bidding process through which IPPs compete for projects; a sustainable energy planning group to 
“co-ordinate and support the efforts of various departments, regional development authorities, 
municipalities, regional sustainability offices, and non-governmental organizations” (Nova 
  97 
Scotia, 2010a, p. 21) and “a variety of programs to assist community groups in the technical, 
financial, and regulatory work needed to develop these projects” (Nova Scotia, 2010a, p. 21). 
For the purposes of the renewable electricity generation technologies employed in Nova 
Scotia, several of the TIS functions – primarily entrepreneurial experimentation, knowledge 
development, and knowledge diffusion – are not relevant, because the technologies under 
consideration are already well-established and proven; they did not require experimentation, 
development and knowledge diffusion within the Nova Scotia context.7 However, the remaining 
TIS functions are indeed relevant and they serve to provide insight into the progress Nova Scotia 
has made on renewable electricity: 
• Guidance of the search – the government has provided positive signals through policy 
directives, such as the renewable portfolio standard, COMFIT and enhanced net metering, 
all of which support increased use of renewable electricity generation technologies; the 
government has also provided negative signals through policy directives, such as hard 
caps on Nova Scotia Power’s emissions and relatively stringent GHG emission reduction 
targets; 
• Market formation – with increases in volume and number of actors, Nova Scotia has 
developed a ‘bridging market’, which is the middle phase between a ‘nursing market’ and 
a ‘mature market’; 
• Resource mobilization – Nova Scotia has made a concerted effort to distribute needed 
financial, material and human capital to support the deployment of renewable electricity 
generation, through initiatives such as the COMFIT and through funding the Mi’kmaq 
renewable energy advisor position and the Mi’kmaq-specific renewable energy strategy; 
and 
• Support from advocacy coalitions – as a result of government policy, which is clearly 
entrenched within legislation and largely supported across political party lines, support 
from advocacy groups is increasingly less crucial. 
As a result, applying Suurs (2009) typology of motors, Nova Scotia appears to have developed 
several TIS motors: 
• Entrepreneurial motor – government responded to landscape pressures with project-
specific subsidies, primarily in the form of the community feed-in tariff; government 
                                                
7 The exception to this would be with regard to large-scale tidal power, which the Nova Scotia government continues 
to support through R&D funding. 
  98 
regulation guaranteed a sizeable commercial environment and enactor support for specific 
technologies; 
• System building motor – government legislation requires the monopoly selector, Nova 
Scotia Power, to support renewable electricity enactors, thereby tackling the 
entanglements of the incumbent system; and 
• A (promising) market motor – as a result of government policy, the niche actors are 
increasingly entrenched within the system and, therefore, ongoing support from advocacy 
coalitions is less vital as it was throughout the earlier stages. 
This analysis, taking into account the perspective of TIS functions and motors, provides insight 
into the progress Nova Scotia had made along the transformation pathway. 
5.4 Involvement of First Nations in the Electricity Sector in Nova Scotia 
Nova Scotia is home to 13 Mi’kmaq First Nations. There are over 13,500 registered 
Indians in Nova Scotia, 65 per cent of which live on reserve (Nova Scotia, 2014a). The nature of 
the mid-18th century Treaty of Friendship has left a unique situation in Nova Scotia. In 1752, 
Chief Jean Baptiste Cope signed the Treaty of Friendship with Peregrine Thomas Hopson, 
governor of the province of Nova Scotia. The aim of this treaty was to end hostilities between the 
British and Mi’kmaq; it was not for the First Nations to cede or surrender rights to the land and 
resources. The federal government acknowledges this: 
Unlike later treaties signed in other parts of Canada, the Peace and Friendship Treaties did 
not involve First Nations surrendering rights to the lands and resources they had 
traditionally used and occupied. … First Nations maintain that they continue to hold 
Aboriginal rights and title throughout their traditional territory. This creates a special 
situation unlike any other found in Canada. There is no model or generic approach to 
follow on how to proceed in these negotiations (Government of Canada, 2014). 
Successive court cases, especially the Donald Marshall Jr. case in 1999 regarding fishing 
rights, forced the federal and provincial governments to begin negotiations with the Mi’kmaq. 
The Nova Scotia government acknowledges this, saying: 
Over the past thirty years, courts in Nova Scotia and Canada have recognized the 
existence and validity of Aboriginal and treaty rights and have tried to clarify the nature 
and extent of these rights. Canadian courts have consistently encouraged governments and 
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First Nations to approach questions of Aboriginal and treaty rights through negotiations 
rather than litigation. Such was the case in 1999 when the Supreme Court of Canada in 
the Donald Marshall Jr. case confirmed the existence of Mi'kmaq rights as outlined in the 
Treaties of 1760-61. The Supreme Court did not define how these rights were to be 
implemented, but instead encouraged the Parties to negotiate a resolution in a fair and 
equitable manner (Nova Scotia, 2014c). 
A former CEO of one of Nova Scotia’s First Nations says,  
We’d been telling them for a long time, up until 1998, that we had Aboriginal title and 
Aboriginal rights, and significant pre-Confederation Treaties that the Crown recognized 
us as equal. But of course the government and Canada and the province said, no, no, no 
you don’t. We control your destiny and you have to follow our rules. And by the fact that 
we won that case, it significantly changed the dynamic. I think it really affected the 
business community especially, who then pressured the province and the feds and said 
you have to do something here, we have to get certainty, we have to get some kind of 
relationship going (interview 1). 
As a direct result of the Supreme Court decision, the Mi’kmaq-Nova Scotia-Canada Tripartite 
Forum was established in 1997 “to provide the Mi’kmaq and federal/provincial government a 
place to resolve issues of mutual concern … [and to] build a foundation for prosperous and 
vibrant Mi’kmaw communities through partnership, commitment and respect” (Nova Scotia, 
2014b). In 2002, the three parties signed the Umbrella Agreement, committing to work together 
in good faith to resolve mutual issues and to enter formal negotiations on constitutionally 
protected Mi’kmaq rights. In 2007, the federal and provincial governments and the Assembly of 
Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq Chiefs signed the Mi’kmaq-Nova Scotia-Canada Framework Agreement, 
establishing the Made-in-Nova Scotia Process, which is “the forum for the Mi’kmaq, Nova 
Scotia and Canada to resolve issues related to Mi’kmaq treaty rights [and] Aboriginal rights, 
including Aboriginal title, and Mi’kmaq governance” (Nova Scotia, 2014d). The three parties 
meet monthly at the main negotiation table and also have various working groups (KMKNO, 
2014). 
 In 2007, the government established an Aboriginal set-aside for the Sydney Tar Ponds 
and Coke Ovens cleanup project, giving bidders with majority Aboriginal ownership and control 
priority on the cooling pond remediation project. A senior advisor for Membertou First Nation 
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said at the time: “This is the first Aboriginal set-aside for the province of Nova Scotia and we are 
looking forward to having an opportunity to do some of the cleanup work. Hopefully this will be 
a stepping stone for future work as the project progresses” (Nova Scotia, 2007). The following 
year, the government signed a procurement strategy with the Assembly of Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq 
Chiefs that identified numerous other aspects of the Sydney Tar Ponds and Coke Ovens 
remediation project that were set-aside for companies with majority Aboriginal ownership and 
control. The total value of the Aboriginal set-aside was $19 million, about five per cent of the 
total project costs (Nova Scotia, 2008a). 
 In 2008, for the first time in Nova Scotia’s history, the premier and cabinet had a formal 
joint meeting with the Assembly of Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq Chiefs. Premier MacDonald said, 
“Today’s meeting marks the beginning of a new era in relations between the provincial 
government and the Mi’kmaq leadership. It represents an opportunity to map out a way for the 
future and allows us to reaffirm our commitment to work together on issues that benefit 
everyone” (Nova Scotia, 2008b). 
In 2009, when the New Democrats formed government, Premier Darrell Dexter chose to 
serve as the Minister of Aboriginal Affairs, seeking to elevate the importance of the provincial 
government’s relations with the Mi’kmaq First Nations in Nova Scotia. As a senior member of 
the New Democrat government noted, “[Premier Dexter] felt that was the only way forward to 
having true dialogue with Aboriginal communities” (interview 4). In 2010, the federal and 
provincial governments and the Assembly of Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq Chiefs signed the Mi’kmaq-
Nova Scotia-Canada Consultation Terms of Reference, which lays out a process for the parties to 
follow for consultation with the Mi’kmaq. The provincial government notes:  
After centuries of no dialogue, this is the first time that the Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia and 
governments have had meaningful conversation on such a wide array of social, economic, 
cultural and governance issues. The Made-in-Nova Scotia Process has contributed 
substantially to creating stable and respectful relationships on rights matters among the 
parties. While differences remain, respect has grown, trust is on the rise and the parties 
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are engaged in consistently meaningful and constructive dialogue on important issues 
(Nova Scotia, 2013a). 
A former researcher with the Atlantic Policy Congress of First Nations Chiefs Secretariat notes, 
“One of the advantages in Nova Scotia, possibly that doesn’t happen elsewhere, there’s only one 
Aboriginal group – the Mi’kmaq – they’re very organized, they have the Assembly of Nova 
Scotia Chiefs, so they’re able to mobilize quickly” (interview 5). 
In 2010, when the provincial government established its renewable energy policy, it went 
out of its way to open up space for First Nations to participate in and benefit from the renewable 
electricity sector. The Department of Energy and Office of Aboriginal Affairs provided funding 
to the Kwilmu’kw Maw-klusuaqn Negotiation Office (KMKNO), otherwise known as the 
Mi’kmaq Rights Initiative, for the development of a Mi’kmaq Renewable Energy Strategy. The 
strategy is intended to “support the Assembly of Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq Chiefs in successfully 
pursuing direct and indirect renewable energy opportunities in Nova Scotia and ensuring the 
participation of the Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia in the renewable energy sector” (Nova Scotia, 
2012b). The provincial government also provided funding to the KMKNO to hire an energy 
professional to help develop capacity and support the implementation of the renewable energy 
strategy (Nova Scotia, 2012b). And the provincial government devoted $2 million to establish a 
Mi’kmaq Major Resource and Energy Fund, in part to help provide capital for renewable energy 
projects. 
In its 2010 renewable electricity strategy, the government said: 
The Mi’kmaq have expressed interest in collaborating on the development of Nova 
Scotia’s renewable energy sector. Continuing to build a positive relationship with the 
Mi’kmaq is a key priority for the province. Nova Scotia consults with the Mi’kmaq on all 
energy projects through the Mi’kmaq-Nova Scotia-Canada Consultation Terms of 
Reference. All the tools this plan provides – enhanced net metering, the community feed-
in tariff, the tidal array feed-in tariff, and competitive bidding – are available to the 
Mi’kmaq (Nova Scotia, 2010a). 
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According to an insider, the government’s motivation was to provide an opportunity for First 
Nations to earn ongoing revenue in a new sector: 
We wanted to empower First Nations to be part of it, because, like every Aboriginal 
community in the country they get their funding from the federal government, but if they 
don’t have any sort of economic development tools, other than casinos, which in Nova 
Scotia, that’s been the old approach … We felt that the only way forward was to empower 
them to have an ongoing revenue source from the most profitable corporation in Nova 
Scotia, which is Nova Scotia Power and Emera (interview 4). 
A senior advisor with the KMKNO says First Nations did not have to push for inclusion in the 
COMFIT program: 
It was sort of a given. But it wasn’t easy though. And the one thing the province had to 
kind of work around, and we gave them assistance on this, the province assumed initially 
that the bands would just use their own lands for wind projects or for something else, and 
we had to tell them that, as a result of our own study, that there’s not a lot of potential to 
use band lands, because of access to grid, wind regimes, and other factors, and so we said 
we need the policy to reflect that reality. So we had to craft out language that would enter 
the COMFIT. It speaks to the fact that the COMFIT award can be applied on both 
Mi’kmaq lands or on leased lands. This was important to us because for financing it 
would have been nearly impossible, given the constraints in the Indian Act, to finance 
wind projects on our land. … I have to say that the province has been nothing but helpful. 
I can’t think of any situation where they weren’t helpful. And never once can I think of a 
case where they were putting up any kind of roadblocks (interview 3). 
The government approved a total of 26.8 MW of Mi’kmaq COMFIT applications, 
amounting to 13.4 per cent of approved COMFIT projects: 
1. Millbrook First Nation – 6 MW wind project in the Millbrook area (Nova Scotia, 2012a); 
2. Assembly of Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq Chiefs – 4.6 MW wind project in Ketch Harbour 
(Nova Scotia, 2012c); 
3. Assembly of Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq Chiefs – 6 MW wind project in the Amherst area 
(Nova Scotia, 2012d); 
4. Assembly of Nova Scotia Mi’kmaq Chiefs – 4 MW wind project in the Whynachts 
Settlement (Nova Scotia, 2013b); 
5. Membertou First Nation – 1.8 MW project near Lower Wedgeport (Nova Scotia, 2012e).  
6. Eskasoni First Nation – 4.4 MW project, co-located with the 6 MW Millbrook-owned 
project (Nova Scotia, 2013c).  
  103 
This research reveals that most of the key elements identified in the literature as necessary 
for successful First Nations participation in the electricity sector (Krupa, 2012; Henderson, 2013) 
were fulfilled in Nova Scotia (interviews 1, 2, 3, 5 and 8). Of course, among the most crucial 
elements is that government embraces clean energy projects, fosters participation through 
mechanisms that facilitate the sale of electricity to the grid, and provides a degree of long-term 
clarity regarding the electricity sector, all of which have been fulfilled in Nova Scotia. As well, 
there are committed and capable local leaders serving as project champions, including a 
provincially funded Mi’kmaq renewable energy advisor to help coordinate and lead the collective 
efforts of the 13 First Nations and to enhance the capacity, capability and confidence of each of 
the First Nations. There is strong governance to support the projects and ensure accountable and 
transparent financial management, especially through the appropriate separation of political 
leaders and day-to-day business decisions. Partnerships with the private sector have been crucial 
to most of the renewable electricity projects, which have allowed First Nations to benefit from 
the expertise and capital-leveraging ability of those private companies. And there has been a 
strong focus on delivering benefits to the whole community, which has increased the level of 
buy-in on the part of First Nations people. While all 13 Mi’kmaq First Nations are involved in 
renewable electricity generation projects through their collective ownership of the Mi’kmaq 
Resource Partnership, individual First Nations that have access to sufficient financial resources to 
enable revenue-generating activities have found it easier to also take on their own renewable 
electricity projects. 
4.5 Conclusion 
Nova Scotia faced landscape-level pressures, including the decimation of its domestic 
coal industry, soaring costs of purchasing foreign coal, public resentment toward the privatized 
electrical utility, a trend toward increased competition within electricity sectors in other 
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jurisdictions, and growing pressure for action to mitigate climate change. The province responded 
to these pressures by adjusting its regime rules, including by implementing aggressive renewable 
electricity targets and creating a suite of programs to ramp up its reliance on renewable electricity 
and invite new actors to participate in the electricity sector, without substantially disrupting the 
existing system. Nova Scotia’s progress along this transformation pathway is related to its 
fulfillment of the various TIS functions, specifically: guidance of the search, with positive and 
negative signals through policy directives; market formation, with the creation of a ‘bridging 
market’ through increases in the volume of renewable electricity and in the number of actors 
involved in the sector; resource mobilization, through providing incentives for participation in 
the electricity sector and offering assistance with capacity enhancement and project planning; and 
support from advocacy coalitions, which was important but is increasingly less crucial because 
government policy is quite well-entrenched within legislation and is largely supported across 
partisan lines. As a result of the interplay of these TIS functions, Nova Scotia has developed 
several TIS motors: an entrepreneurial motor, a system building motor and a promising market 
motor. 
Political dynamics have been crucial in the ongoing transition of Nova Scotia’s electricity 
sector. The government, each of the political parties, First Nations, and advocacy groups all 
produced and used a storyline that focused on: bringing stability and affordability to electricity 
rates; unshackling from foreign coal; taking back control of the province’s energy future; creating 
jobs and boosting the economy; leading Canada, North America and the world; and creating a 
cleaner, greener province; in significant part by supporting local, community-based renewable 
electricity projects. This discourse has already solidified into institutions and organizational 
practices, fueling the TIS motors and leading to adjustments in the socio-technical regime. 
A crucial aspect of those adjustments in the socio-technical regime involved opening up 
the electricity sector to community participation, including First Nations, through the COMFIT 
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program. As a result of this particular initiative, along with other related government support, all 
of Nova Scotia’s Mi’kmaq Nations are involved in renewable electricity generation projects. 
These 13 First Nations are not only benefiting from their participation in the renewable electricity 
sector, but they are also helping Nova Scotia move further down the transformation path, as it 
seeks an electricity sector that is more sustainable. 
Table 5-2 outlines the operationalization of the analytical framework in Nova Scotia. 
Table 5-2.  Operationalization of analytical framework in Nova Scotia  
Concept Key dimensions Nova Scotia case 
Socio-technical 
regime 
Various components 
(policy, science, 
technology, industry, 
markets/user 
preferences and culture) 
that serve to stabilize 
and support the existing 
institutions 
- Centralized coal-fired thermal generation, which 
is privately owned by a publicly traded company, 
and which functions as a regulated monopoly 
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Concept Key dimensions Nova Scotia case 
Niche-level 
innovations 
Different technologies, 
actors, networks and 
institutions than those 
stabilizing and 
supporting the existing 
institutions 
- Technologies: Renewables (primarily wind, 
hydro, some biomass, and an R&D push for tidal) 
- Actors: provincial government, as regulator; IPPs, 
including community groups and First Nations, as 
enactors;  
- Networks: Electricity Marketplace Governance 
Committee, consisting of a variety of stakeholder 
groups, which urged increased use of renewable 
energy sources in 2003; Nova Scotia Power’s 
Customer Energy Forum, which brought together 
135 randomly selected customers in 2004 for a 
deliberative polling event that uncovered 
significant support for increased reliance on 
renewable energy sources; Ecology Action 
Centre, a non-profit environmental activist 
organization with a membership base of over 
2,500; the Lower Power Rates Alliance, a broad 
coalition of business owners and concerned 
citizens pushing for more affordable electricity 
rates  
- Institutions: New legislation and regulations 
setting renewable-portfolio standards and 
emission reductions, beginning in 2007 and 
strengthened in 2009, 2010 and 2011; the 
community feed-in tariff (COMFIT), which 
supports community involvement in the electricity 
sector  
Landscape Natural environment, 
macro-economy, 
political culture, 
demographic 
characteristics and 
worldviews 
- Massive increases in the costs of importing coal 
from South America (Nova Scotia’s own 
coalmines started closing in mid-1990s, due to 
rising costs and international competition) 
- Growing awareness of climate change and 
increasing policy agenda to address climate 
change (including impending federal coal 
regulations) 
- Nova Scotians’ significant resentment of Nova 
Scotia Power and their irritation at hundreds of 
millions of dollars leaving the province to pay its 
parent company’s shareholders 
- Successive court cases which forced better 
engagement with the Mi’kmaq 
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Concept Key dimensions Nova Scotia case 
TIS Functions TIS functions: (1) 
entrepreneurial 
experimentation; (2) 
knowledge 
development; (3) 
knowledge diffusion; 
(4) guidance of the 
search; (5) market 
formation; (6) resource 
mobilization; and (7) 
support from advocacy 
coalitions. 
TIS motors: (1) science 
and technology push 
(STP) motor; (2) 
entrepreneurial motor; 
(3) system building 
motor; and (4) market 
motor 
- Entrepreneurial experimentation, knowledge 
development and knowledge diffusion not crucial. 
- Each of the following functions fulfilled: guidance 
of the search (with positive and negative signals 
established through policy directives); market 
formation (with a bridging market); resource 
mobilization, with incentives and support 
programs; and support from advocacy coalitions. 
- Nova Scotia has developed several TIS motors: an 
entrepreneurial motor, a system building motor 
and a promising market motor. 
Storyline Narratives, structuring 
ideas and themes, 
problem framing, 
metaphors, analogies, 
historical references, 
appeals to fear or guilt, 
cognitive and normative 
ideas 
- Bringing stability and affordability to electricity 
rates 
- Unshackling from foreign coal 
- Taking back control of the province’s energy 
future 
- Creating good jobs and boosting the economy 
- Leading Canada, North America and the world 
- Creating a cleaner, greener province 
- All of the above, in significant part, by supporting 
local, community-based renewable power projects 
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Concept Key dimensions Nova Scotia case 
Coordinative 
discourse 
Behind-the-scenes 
discussions and 
negotiations involving 
elected officials, civil 
servants, experts and 
interest groups 
- Meeting the aggressive renewable electricity 
targets 
- Reducing the use of costly foreign coal 
- Helping to address the public’s ongoing 
annoyance with Nova Scotia Power by getting rid 
of the idea that it has a monopoly on power 
generation 
- Empowering communities to recognize that they 
could benefit from the transition to renewable 
energy 
- Supporting local economic development and job 
creation  
- Learning lessons from what happened in Ontario, 
where a feed-in tariff had been introduced a few 
years earlier 
- Blunting the criticism from some New Democrat 
supporters that these projects should be owned by 
the provincial government (by having them owned 
by community groups, municipalities and First 
Nations) 
Communicative 
discourse 
Public discussion of 
ideas and public 
announcements of 
decisions 
- Primary focus on bringing stability and 
affordability to electricity rates, by unshackling 
from foreign coal and taking back control of the 
province’s energy future 
- Additional focus on supporting local job creation 
and economic development as well as leading the 
nation, continent and world 
- Minimal focus on climate change and greenhouse 
gas emissions 
Discourse 
coalitions 
The coalition of actors 
producing and using the 
transition storyline 
- Loose blend of government, political parties, First 
Nations actors and advocacy groups, like the 
Ecology Action Centre 
Effects of 
discourse 
Key actors’ use of 
ideas, concepts and 
categories 
- General embrace of storyline by all political 
parties (with some disagreement over pace or 
relatively minor elements) 
 Effects on government 
policy and 
organizational practice 
- The government approved 89 COMFIT projects, 
with a total generation capacity of 200 MW, 
including six First Nations projects amounting to 
26.8 MW  
- All First Nations involved in transition 
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Concept Key dimensions Nova Scotia case 
Transition 
dynamics 
Changes in the regime - Reduced use of coal 
- Increased reliance on renewable power 
- Generation of electricity opened up to new actors 
and no longer monopolized 
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CHAPTER 6 
ONTARIO 
 
A variety of landscape-level dynamics put pressure on Ontario’s electricity regime. The 
most significant was the impact of coal-fired electricity generation on population health. An 
increasing number of smog days and growing awareness about the consequences of smog on 
human health led influential outsider groups to voice their concerns and articulate their demands, 
prompting government to take steps to rid the province’s electricity generation mix of coal and 
increase the province’s reliance on renewable power. The blackout of August 2003 led to 
concerns about the stability and reliability of Ontario’s electricity grid, compelling regime actors 
to respond with both rhetoric and actual measures to convince Ontarians that the province’s 
electricity system would be strengthened. The economic crisis of 2008 and 2009 hit Ontario 
particularly hard and led the government to develop new approaches in which it could use energy 
policy to subsidize businesses, create jobs and grow the province’s economy. 
Ontario’s responses to the landscape pressure and outside criticism set the province along 
a transformation pathway: it adopted proven niche innovations in a manner that did not 
significantly disrupt the existing regime, and invited new actors to participate in the system while 
keeping incumbent actors in place. Ontario forced coal-based generation out of its electricity 
regime and adopted already proven technologies and invited in an abundance of new actors to 
participate in the sector, all without seriously disrupting its existing electricity socio-technical 
regime. The province’s progress along the transformation pathway has been powered by several 
TIS functions: the government guided the search by providing positive signals, such as the feed-
in tariff (FIT), as well as negative signals, such as The Ending Coal for Cleaner Air Act. With 
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increases in the volume of renewable electricity and the number of actors involved in the sector, 
Ontario has already formed a ‘bridging market’ and is well on its way to developing a ‘mature 
market.’ Ontario has made a concerted effort to mobilize and distribute the needed financial, 
material and human capital to support the deployment of renewable electricity generation, 
through a variety of mechanisms. While advocacy groups played an important role in 
encouraging government action, their support is increasingly less crucial because of the 
significant progress that has already been made and the fact that government policy is already 
well entrenched. As a result of the interplay of these various TIS functions, Ontario has 
developed several TIS motors – an entrepreneurial motor, a system building motor and a 
promising market motor – all of which help to explain its progress along the transformation 
pathway. 
Political dynamics served to fuel each of those TIS motors and played a crucial role in the 
ongoing transition of Ontario’s electricity regime. The dominant storyline regarding changes to 
Ontario’s electricity sector involved a variety of interrelated elements: phasing out dirty coal-
fired power plants means cleaner air and, therefore, better health for Ontarians; more renewable 
energy means new investments in the province’s economy and more jobs for Ontarians; Ontario 
is delivering a more reliable and resilient electricity system as well as more opportunities for 
smaller power producers by focusing on distributed generation using smaller and cleaner sources, 
instead of exclusively relying on large, centralized power plants; and, by doing all of this, Ontario 
is leading North America. This dominant discourse solidified into institutions and organizational 
practices and served to facilitate transformation of the socio-technical regime. 
This chapter delves into the sustainability transition in Ontario’s electricity system. It 
explores the broader context, including a brief overview of the history of electricity generation in 
Ontario. It then explores the factors that contributed to the province’s move toward a more 
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sustainable electricity system, the inclusion of new actors within its electricity sector, and the 
involvement of First Nations in renewable electricity generation projects.  
6.1 History of Power Generation in Ontario 
Privately owned coal-fired generators initially dominated Ontario’s electricity sector, but 
a major strike by Pennsylvania coal miners in 1902 resulted in a significant shortage of fuel for 
electricity generation in Ontario. This landscape pressure contributed to the province’s relatively 
rapid transition from coal-fired generation to hydroelectric development (Nelles, 2005). In 1906, 
the provincial government established the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario 
(HEPCO), which was the first provincially owned power utility in Canada. HEPCO’s initial 
mandate was primarily to regulate private electricity companies and build grid infrastructure, but 
that expanded significantly in the years that followed. HEPCO weakened incumbents by 
restricting their export contracts to the United States and imposing limits on the amount of water 
they could use at Niagara; once the private firms were sufficiently weakened, HEPCO purchased 
them (Nelles, 2005). In 1922, HEPCO bought the largest remaining private electricity generation 
firm (Rosenbloom & Meadowcroft 2014). 
Hydroelectric generation remained dominant in Ontario until the 1950s, when coal- and 
nuclear-based generation emerged as the preferred technologies and remained so until the 1970s 
and 1990s respectively. Coal fell out of favour in the 1970s due to rising prices, which further 
entrenched nuclear technology within the province’s electricity regime and nuclear power 
became increasingly politically divisive, especially after the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl 
incidents. As a result, natural gas was the preferred fuel for electricity generation in the late 
1990s and early 2000s. Since then, the sector has had a preference for mixed generation, 
including a focus on increased renewable energy sources, which largely resulted from new, 
politically imposed guiding principles (Rosenbloom & Meadowcroft, 2014). 
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A strong preference for public ownership remained a dominant characteristic of Ontario’s 
electricity sector until 1998, when the government introduced The Energy Competition Act, 
dismantling HEPCO, which was by then renamed Ontario Hydro, into five separate entities: 
Ontario Power Generation (OPG), responsible for electricity generation; Hydro One, responsible 
for transmission and distribution; the Electrical Safety Authority, responsible for administering 
safety regulations; the Ontario Electricity Financial Corporation, responsible for managing 
Ontario Hydro’s remaining debt; and the Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO), 
responsible for managing the competitive market (Rosenbloom & Meadowcroft, 2014). The 
government’s ultimate goal was to privatize these entities and deregulate the electricity market, 
but it never achieved its desired model. Electricity prices rose substantially, due to “a perfect 
storm of landscape developments” (Rosenbloom & Meadowcroft, 2014), including California’s 
energy crisis – in which market manipulations led to a shortage of electricity supply and 
blackouts – as well as the collapse of Enron, a major summer heat wave, and lengthy repairs to 
Ontario’s nuclear reactors. The public reacted with anger and the government froze electricity 
rates in 2002, largely abandoning its plan to move to a deregulated, privatized model. 
When a new government was elected in 2003, it promptly shifted the guiding principles of 
Ontario’s electricity system. The new focus was on phasing out coal-based generation, ramping 
up conservation and significantly increasing the province’s reliance on renewable energy. The 
new government also restored some central planning to the electricity system, asserting a 
significant degree of political direction (Spears, 2011).  
Table 6-1 outlines the history of electricity generation in Ontario. 
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Table 6-1.  History of electricity generation in Ontario (Rosenbloom & Meadowcroft, 2014). 
 Pre-1906 1906-1922 1922-1998 1998-2002 2003- 
Ownership Exclusively 
private 
Predominantly 
private, with 
creeping 
public 
ownership 
Public Still 
predominantly 
public, but 
clear push for 
privatization 
Mixed 
Guiding 
principles 
Profit 
maximization 
Mixed (profit 
and service) 
Expansion 
and industrial 
development 
Profit 
maximization 
Phasing out 
coal, 
increasing 
conservation, 
green energy 
strategy 
Planning Market 
directed 
Combination 
of gov’t and 
market 
direction 
Central 
command 
and control 
Market 
directed 
Central 
planning and 
market 
direction 
Market Free market Regulated 
monopoly 
Non-market Competitive Regulated/ 
competitive 
System 
organization 
Centralized 
with 
fragmented 
grid 
Centralized Centralized 
megaprojects 
Centralized 
with some  
distributed 
smaller 
projects 
Predominantly 
centralized 
with 
increasing 
distributed 
generation 
Technology 
preference 
Coal (pre 
1902) and 
Hydro (post 
1902) 
Hydro Hydro (1922-
50s); Coal 
(1950s-70s); 
Nuclear 
(1950s-90s) 
Natural gas 
and other 
cost-
competitive 
sources 
Mixed, with 
preference for 
cleaner 
technologies 
 
6.2 Pushing to Phase Out Coal in Ontario 
Concerns about smog and its health consequences served as significant landscape-level 
pressure, which significantly affected Ontario’s electricity socio-technical regime. Rosenbloom 
and Meadowcroft (2014) point out that: “concerns over the environmental and health impacts of 
conventional generation have gradually increased since the 1970s” (p. 676). In 1998, Ontario’s 
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doctors began sounding the alarm over the effects of smog on population health (“Get tough on 
smog”, 1998). That year, the Ontario Medical Association (OMA) partnered with the Greater Bay 
Area Foundation and the Muskoka Lakes Association – groups representing cottagers in the 
Georgian Bay and Muskoka Lakes areas – to release a report entitled, Health Effects of Ground 
Ozone (OMA 2000). Two years later, the OMA again partnered with these two cottagers’ 
associations to release The Illness Cost of Air Pollution (OMA, 2000). The research contained in 
the reports showed that smog led to 1,900 premature deaths and 13,000 emergency-room visits 
every single year in Ontario; the reports also demonstrated that smog cost the province $1.1 
billion in health care service costs and reduced economic productivity every year (“Plan to clean 
the air good for Ontario”, 2002). These population health arguments put pressure on the existing 
socio-technical regime and led to a significant degree of political consensus about the need to 
phase out coal-based electricity generation (interviews 1, 12, 13 and 14); in the lead up to the 
2003 election, all three main political parties agreed that coal should be removed from the 
province’s electricity generation mix (Spears, 2011). 
When the Liberals won the 2003 election, they promptly responded to the landscape 
pressure and criticism from outside voices by shifting the guiding principles of the province’s 
electricity regime, with a key focus on phasing out coal and restoring an element of central 
planning to the electricity system (Spears, 2011). A former cabinet minister identifies the multi-
faceted rationale for the government’s move as follows: 
Well, at the macro level, it was the government’s commitment to be the first jurisdiction 
in North America to eliminate coal-fired generation, in part to meet our share of the 
Kyoto commitment, but there were certainly more pressing political imperatives at play 
than that … we had just experienced a major blackout [in August 2003], so the real 
political imperative was that we were going to become energy independent, we were not 
going to be reliant on a system where a squirrel could jump onto a wire in Ohio and our 
lights would go out. So there was a huge political imperative on that. … But the other 
thing that was happening is that urban Ontario was experiencing consistently increased 
numbers of smog days. And, of course, in a public health care system, in a jurisdiction 
like ours, we had cheap electricity because it was coal, but we were paying for the fact 
that the number one reason that children were being admitted to emergency rooms was 
  116 
because of asthma, and the number one reason for the asthma was poor air quality, and 
the number one reason for the poor air quality is that Ontario owned the largest single 
source of air pollution in North America, at Nanticoke, which was our massive, eight-
boiler coal-fired power plant in the Niagara peninsula, which, wouldn’t you know it, with 
prevailing winds, that pollution would always blow into the GTA-Golden Horseshoe, 
where the majority of people lived, so people were starting to get the connection that, yes, 
we had cheap power, but we were subsidizing it through the health care system. I mean, I 
remember one year we had 38 smog days. On a smog day, children are not supposed to go 
outside, old people are not supposed to go outside, people that are sick are not supposed 
to go outside. So, at the time, there was a huge demand to clean up the air, and getting rid 
of coal was seen as something that the government could actually do and that’s why we 
did it. We were responding to a real need that regular people perceived because they 
experienced the blackouts and the smog days (interview 6). 
The government’s commitment to eliminate coal required the replacement of about a 
quarter of the province’s electricity generation capacity. Rosenbloom and Meadowcroft (2014) 
assert that: 
This political decision, which was first taken in response to concerns over criterion air 
pollutants, was facilitated by: (1) the limited presence of coal within the generating mix; 
(2) the absence of coal production in Ontario (so no domestic jobs would be lost); (3) 
relatively quiescent demand growth (so the costs of new projects did not feed rapidly into 
retail power prices); and (4) the growing abundance and affordability of natural gas, 
which blunted calls for a continued reliance on coal (p. 676). 
An Environics poll conducted near the end of the 2003 election campaign reveals another key 
factor that facilitated the political decision to eliminate coal: public support. The poll results 
revealed that: 67 per cent of Ontarians believed that environmental problems had direct effects on 
their health; 78 per cent agreed with the statement that “the economy does not need to suffer to 
ensure a healthy environment;” and 59 per cent disagreed with the statement that “we worry too 
much about the environment and not enough about prices and jobs” (Smith, 2003).  
Despite many factors facilitating its political decision, the new government faced 
challenges implementing its coal-free agenda. A former cabinet minister states:  
In our first term of office, from 2003 to 2007, the government was stymied many, many 
times by the electricity sector who said, listen, your predecessors – and by the way you 
guys have formed government over the last 100 years, so you were part of that – have set 
up the laws to govern the electricity sector and, what you want to do now, we’re not going 
to do, because you’re going to have to change the regulations and the law to make it 
possible. … So there was a great deal of institutional resistance to what we wanted to do. 
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… And I think there was a naïveté on our part in terms of how many levers would have to 
be pulled in order to get to that coal-free system (interview 6). 
In the interests of self-preservation, the socio-technical regime resisted change and managed to 
somewhat thwart the efforts of a perhaps overly ambitious government. An expert in the 
electricity industry argues that the government was in too much of a hurry to get off coal: “I think 
their whole off-coal policy was a mistake in terms of, well, they were in such a hurry to do it, 
they wanted to do it so quickly that they didn’t understand all the implications of doing it” 
(interview 12). 
The government took several steps in its first term to achieve its objectives. In 2004, it 
shook up the electricity sector by introducing The Electricity Restructuring Act, which 
established the Ontario Power Authority (OPA) to oversee planning of the electricity system. The 
OPA was given a “legislated mandate to ensure a reliable, sustainable and cost-effective 
electricity system for the future of Ontario” (OPA, 2012). The government assumed powers of 
ministerial direction over the OPA, restoring a significant element of central planning to the 
electricity sector. As a result of this move, political actors had more direct control over the 
province’s electricity sector than ever before (Wyman, 2008).  
 In April 2005, yet another independent study was released that advanced the argument 
that coal-based electricity generation had profound public health consequences. The study 
estimated that, every single year, air pollution in Ontario led to 688 premature deaths, 928 
hospital admissions, 1,100 emergency room visits, and 333,660 minor illnesses, including 
headaches and coughing. The government cited these statistics as further evidence for why its 
plan to shut down coal power plants was the right policy direction (Ontario, 2005a).  
After undertaking the first comprehensive review of electricity supply in Ontario in 15 
years, the OPA released a 1,100 page report, entitled Supply Mix Advice and Recommendations, 
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in 2005. The report acknowledged that the electricity sector does not exist in isolation, but is 
heavily integrated with a variety of other systems:  
This supply mix exercise has convinced OPA that power system planning overlaps with a 
number of aspects of public policy in Ontario. While such overlap certainly makes power 
system planning more complex, at the same time it truly opens the door to smarter 
solutions that benefit Ontarians in more than one area [emphasis added] (OPA, 2005a, p. 
10). 
The OPA (2005b) pointed to several challenges facing the province’s electricity sector: 
The nature of the problem is clear: a lack of investment to expand electricity capacity in 
Ontario in the past decade. With supply already tight as a result of this under-investment, 
the sector faces the loss of a major part of its current supply mix as most units of its 
nuclear fleet reach the end of their design life over the next several years. The loss of 
nuclear generation would come immediately on the heels of replacement of coal-fired 
stations, scheduled for completion by 2009. Together, the combination of demand growth 
and generation retirements would create a gap of roughly 24,000 megawatts (MW) by 
2025, equivalent to about 80% of Ontario’s current capacity. 
The Supply Mix Advice and Recommendations report identified several elements of a solution, 
including: maximizing conservation and demand management; pursuing “an aggressive course 
for renewables within current restraints, while looking at ways to reduce these constraints;” 
“tak[ing] advantage of the benefits of natural gas-fired generation but limit[ing] exposure to its 
price and supply risks;” and continuing nuclear generation to meet the province’s base-load needs 
(OPA, 2005b). At the time of the report, Ontario’s electricity generation system relied on the 
following configuration: nuclear – 51 per cent; renewables – 23 per cent; coal – 19 per cent; and 
natural gas – seven per cent (OPA, 2005b). The OPA recommended that, by 2025, the province’s 
electricity generation consist of the following mix: nuclear – 50 per cent; renewables – 43 per 
cent; natural gas – six per cent; and gasification – one per cent (OPA, 2005b; Brennan & Spears 
2005). And the OPA (2005a) pointed out that, while the government would be active in both 
planning and directing, it would rely on fully commercial entities to actually do the 
implementation:  
The politics of power in Ontario have reached a new equilibrium in which both market 
forces and centralized planning co-exist. The new centralized planning, while it does not 
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have the command and control role of [the old] Ontario Hydro, nevertheless must develop 
plans based on the broad public good. The parties providing the new resources will, 
however, be fully commercial entities, not Crown agencies (p. 20).  
The provincial government unveiled the details of its Renewable Energy Standard Offer 
Program (RESOP) in March 2006. Ontario’s RESOP provided 20-year contracts to any business, 
organization, cooperative or homeowner that could connect their electricity generation project to 
the grid; and it paid 11 cents per kWh for electricity generated from wind, biomass and small-
scale hydro and 42 cents per kWh for electricity generated from solar (Hamilton, 2006). 
In 2007, the OPA produced its first 20-year energy plan, known as the Integrated Power 
Supply Plan (IPSP). The IPSP focused on creating “a sustainable energy supply and improv[ing] 
current natural gas and renewable assets at a sustainable and realistic cost” (Lilley, 2010). 
However, the following year, as the IPSP was still being reviewed by the Ontario Energy Board 
(OEB), the government intervened and asked the OPA to “to review and fine-tune the province’s 
20-year energy plan with the goal of accelerating conservation efforts and adding more renewable 
energy to the electricity mix” (Hamilton, 2008). 
Landscape-level pressure – primarily the growing awareness about the consequences of 
smog on human health, along with concerns about the stability and reliability of Ontario’s 
electricity grid in the wake of the August 2013 blackout – led government to take several 
important steps to rid the province’s electricity generation mix of coal and increase the province’s 
reliance on renewable power. But the economic crisis of 2008 and 2009 opened up another 
window of opportunity to further adjust the existing electricity socio-technical regime in the 
province. Ontario was particularly hard by the economic downturn, which led the government to 
develop new approaches in which it could use energy policy to subsidize businesses, create jobs 
and grow the province’s economy. 
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6.3 Introduction of the Feed-In Tariff in Ontario 
In 2009, the government’s introduction of The Green Energy and Green Economy Act 
(GEGEA) had an almost revolutionary effect on the province’s electricity sector (interviews 1, 3, 
6, 7, 8, 11, 13 and 14). The purpose of this new legislation was to “expand renewable energy 
generation, encourage energy conservation and promote the creation of clean energy jobs” 
(Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2010). Then Deputy Premier and Energy Minister George 
Smitherman said in a speech to the Toronto Board of Trade: 
Since 2003, the government of Ontario, with the re-affirmed support of Ontarians, has 
been moving forward with the most ambitious climate change initiative in North America 
– the elimination of coal. Our progress to date – a renaissance of our energy system, 
reflected by billions in new investments – has been so successful that today, Ontario is 
prepared to raise the bar on our collective ambitions (Ontario, 2009a). 
Smitherman went on to argue that this new legislation would “turbocharge the creation of 
renewable energy” in Ontario and “set the standard for green energy policy across this province” 
(Ontario, 2009a). 
The same rationale for the government’s initial pledge to eliminate coal, made five years 
earlier, served to motivate the government’s introduction of the GEGEA. The main argument was 
based on improved health outcomes, more jobs and a stronger economy (interviews 1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 
11, 13 and 14). Smitherman, who served as the province’s health minister from 2003 until 2008, 
before taking on the role of energy minister from 2008 to late 2009, introduced the GEGEA. 
Smitherman publicly acknowledges that the prospect of significant health benefits was a 
compelling argument for transitioning the electricity system to cleaner modes of generation: “I'm 
an asthmatic, and I'd been health minister for nearly five years. So the health benefits associated 
with the transformation of our electricity sector had a lot of appeal” (Spears, 2011). But it was 
not just population health arguments that propelled Ontario to continue transforming its 
electricity sector; investment and jobs were also increasingly important factors, especially 
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because the worldwide financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 was profoundly affecting Ontario’s 
economy. Smitherman publicly acknowledges that, in the midst of that economic crisis, “the 
government saw an opportunity for the promotion of renewable energy to be a source of new 
investment and new jobs” (Spears, 2011). In an interview for this dissertation, Smitherman, who 
waived anonymity, said,  
I think there were three factors which made the Green Energy Act possible. The first is 
that Premier McGuinty, before he was premier, had staked out the elimination of coal as 
an aspirational goal for Ontario. I consider that what I describe as the domino decision 
point. That set things in motion. The second factor was that predecessor ministers of 
energy in the same government I was in enjoyed quite a lot of success with two different 
renewable energy offerings – a large-scale, competitive procurement, and a smaller-scale 
RESOP program. … The third thing that contributed to it, and I say was a decided 
accelerant, was the risk to the future of the Ontario economy found in the dramatic 
uncertainty at that time about the future of the automotive sector at that time. So we saw it 
as an opportunity to fulfill our objectives related to cleaner energy, we knew there was 
capital available to be able to implement more renewable projects, and we had a lot of risk 
in Ontario to the manufacturing base and we saw this as an opportunity, certainly not to 
replace the automotive sector – it’s so big and important in Ontario – but at the same time 
renewable energy manufacturing relies upon many of the same skill sets that were found 
already in the Ontario economy. So I think it was a combination of those three things: we 
had the aspirational goal to do it, we had the demonstrated capacity to implement 
programs … and we saw the opportunity for some manufacturing response to the real risk 
and uncertainty that was being faced, especially in that time frame by the Ontario 
automotive sector. I think those three things combined created the environment for the 
Green Energy Act (interview 14). 
A former cabinet minister argues that this connection between energy policy and 
economic growth has been a hallmark of the province’s approach throughout its entire history:  
Energy policy is not just about creating energy; it’s always been viewed in Ontario as an 
enabler, a critical enabler of the economy, and Ontario governments and political actors of 
all stripes have accepted the notion that, through energy policy, government is essentially 
providing a business subsidy, a prudent one, but a subsidy nonetheless (interview 13). 
The GEGEA was an extension of that approach of using energy policy to subsidize business and 
encourage economic development, particularly with the introduction of the feed-in tariff (FIT) 
(interviews 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, and 13).  
Ontario looked to Europe for inspiration on the FIT (interviews 13 and 14). An expert on 
the electricity industry said: 
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Once the government was starting to move on the off-coal, there was a change in Energy 
Minister, George Smitherman spends a week in Germany and becomes an expert on 
renewable power, sees the feed-in tariff program, and from that trip he comes back and 
creates the Green Energy Act and implements a feed-in tariff program and talks about 
how we’re going to be like Germany (interview 12). 
In the Toronto Board of Trade speech in which he unveiled the details of the GEGEA, 
Smitherman said: 
The McGuinty government will create a best-in-class renewable energy feed-in tariff. A 
FIT that does not place artificial barriers on our ambitions. While the tariff is European-
inspired, it's engineered for Ontario. In layman's terms, it means Ontario will offer an 
attractive price for renewable power, including wind – on-shore and off-shore – as well as 
solar, hydro biomass and biogas ... and we'll guarantee that price for decades. With this 
single bold move, we join global green-power leaders like Denmark, Germany and Spain 
(Ontario, 2009a). 
In an interview for this dissertation, Smitherman, who waived anonymity, argued that Ontario’s 
FIT program was an extension of its RESOP program: 
The RESOP program was a feed-in tariff by another name. So it was a standard offer, and 
standard offer is kind of similar, pretty much the same principle to a feed-in tariff. So we 
had already done it in Ontario, and really it was my view that the conditions that we 
needed to create were about certainty for investors. And the feed-in tariff offered that. I 
think we could have achieved success in a variety of different ways, but we were anxious 
to make Ontario a leader, not just a participant, and accordingly we felt that the feed-in 
tariff offered Ontario the attributes which would provide greater certainty for investors 
(interview 14). 
Ontario’s initial FIT price schedule ranged from 10.3 cent per kWh for landfill gas projects, 12.2 
cents per kWh for hydro projects, and 13.5 cents per kWh for wind projects, all the way up to 
64.2 cents per kWh for solar groundmounts and 80.2 cents per kWh for solar rooftop projects 
(Ontario, 2012b). 
A number of other aspects of the GEGEA served to enhance the renewable electricity 
sector within the province: it established the right to connect to the electricity grid for all 
renewable power projects that were able to meet specified technical, economic and regulatory 
requirements; it established a ‘one-stop’ streamlined approvals process for small-scale projects; 
and it committed to implement a smart power grid to support the development of new renewable 
  123 
power projects (Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2010). The legislation also ensured that developers 
of renewable power projects received the necessary construction permits within a six-month 
timeframe, to facilitate quicker completion of such projects (Hamilton, 2009). And the GEGEA 
dealt a blow to NIMBYism – the not-in-my-backyard phenomenon, which had plagued many 
renewable power projects throughout the province – by stripping municipalities of the ability to 
decide how close wind power projects can be to residential and environmentally sensitive areas 
(Hamilton, 2009).  
Through the various elements of the GEGEA, and especially through the introduction of 
the FIT program, the government not only opened up space for new actors to participate in the 
electricity sector, but it also provided incentives for them to do so. The government asserts that, 
“the FIT program has helped create certainty in Ontario’s economy, attract new investment, spur 
jobs and economic benefits for communities, and support a healthier future for all Ontarians” 
(Ontario, 2012, p. 2). As of March 31, 2014, the first two FIT windows had brought projects 
generating 1,447.6 MW into commercial operation, with FIT projects currently under 
development amounting to an additional 3,353.6 MW (Ontario 2014). The most recent FIT 3 
application window saw 1,982 applications submitted, for a total of 493.71 MW of new 
renewable electricity generation capacity (OPA 2014).  
Outside groups and renewable energy advocates influenced the government’s direction in 
terms of the electricity sector. Rosenbloom and Meadowcroft (2014) note that: 
Renewable energy advocates organized around the electricity system and have been 
successful in lobbying for policy support. Starting in 2004, the Ontario Sustainable 
Energy Association and its membership emerged as important niche actors pressing for 
the development of a stable renewable energy policy. These actors launched several 
campaigns for a FIT. Campaigns gained traction with the Liberals, in part due to an 
ideological alignment and the promise of job creation, affording renewable energy 
advocates a central role in designing the RESOP, GEGEA and FIT (p. 675). 
An expert in the electricity industry argues that the government: 
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Listened to a number of special interest groups, such as the Ontario Clean Air Alliance, 
which had very simplistic modeling … and to some corporate people, those that stood to 
gain from new developments. … There were a lot of companies coming in and lobbying 
them on what they could do and they weren’t always telling the whole story either. I mean 
Smitherman didn’t always listen to what people who knew things told him, he could be 
selective at the same time, he had a lot of people coming in and telling stuff that only 
benefited them. ... You know, it is difficult when you’re in government to understand who 
is telling you what for what reason, but certainly they found enough of a support group 
that supported what they wanted to do that they just went ahead and did it and tended to 
ignore balanced arguments and understanding (interview 12). 
In response to landscape pressure and criticism from outside groups, the government reoriented 
the guiding principles of the electricity socio-technical regime and also reorganized the dominant 
actors, establishing the OPA as a powerful actor in the sector and giving its own Ministry of 
Energy and Infrastructure a much larger and more influential role than it had previously 
(Rosenbloom & Meadowcroft, 2014).  
 The government’s discourse surrounding the changes to Ontario’s electricity sector 
primarily focused on the benefits of shutting down coal power plants, especially in terms of 
population health, but also in terms of the economy. However, another key part of the 
government’s discourse focused on how it was taking a “balanced approach” that moved beyond 
the various pitfalls created as a result of the approaches of past administrations (Ontario, 2004). 
The government argued that: 
For more than a decade, previous governments have been hamstrung by indecision and 
ideology. They’ve clung to the old Ontario Hydro model, and tried moving to a fully 
competitive market, and neither has worked. And they’ve done virtually nothing to come 
to grips with our long-term supply needs. … We’ve chosen what we strongly believe to 
be the best approach, a balanced approach. It represents a real, positive change from the 
past, and a bright, more prosperous future (Ontario, 2004). 
The government also touted its leadership role within North America and proclaimed its approach 
to the electricity sector was ‘bold’ and ‘aggressive.’ For example, a 2005 news release entitled 
McGuinty Government Unveils Bold Plan to Clean Up Ontario’s Air included this snippet:  
The McGuinty government’s aggressive plan to replace coal-fired generation with cleaner 
sources of energy and conservation will clean up our air, improve the health of our 
citizens, and contribute to the sustainability of our environment while ensuring a reliable 
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supply of electricity, … We are leading the way as the first jurisdiction in North America 
to put the environment and health of our citizens first by saying ‘no’ to coal (Ontario, 
2005b). 
While the environment was part of the discussion, as demonstrated in the previous quote 
from the news release, it was mostly a tangential piece of the discourse and climate change 
specifically was peripheral to the discussion, especially in the earlier years. That is not surprising, 
given that it was not until 2007 that the Ontario government released its first climate change 
action plan. Prior to that, Premier McGuinty had largely contended that climate change was a 
federal responsibility (Tabuns, 2006). But, in the lead up to the 2007 provincial election, the 
government released Go Green: Ontario’s Action Plan on Climate Change, which included a 
focus on its plan to phase out coal-fired power plants and its target of doubling the amount of 
renewable power by 2025 to 10,700 MW. In the plan, the government committed to reduce 
Ontario’s GHG emissions by six per cent below 1990 levels by 2014 and 15 per cent below 1990 
levels by 2020 (Ontario, 2007). The government anticipated that nearly 30 per cent of its 2020 
target would be achieved through phasing out coal, ramping up renewables, and “other electricity 
policies” (Ontario 2007: 8). While the government’s electricity-sector reforms were crucial to its 
climate change strategy, climate change did not play a big part in the government’s publicly 
communicated rationale for phasing out its coal power plants. That changed somewhat with the 
introduction of the GEGEA, when the government started to rely a bit more on the argument that 
its off-coal agenda was “the most ambitious climate change initiative in North America” 
(Ontario, 2009a), but the discourse was still primarily dominated by discussion about how getting 
rid of coal would clean up the air, improve the health of Ontarians, create good jobs, and grow 
the economy.  
In many ways that dominant discourse has solidified into institutions and organizational 
practices, what Hajer calls discourse institutionalization. Through a variety of mechanisms, the 
province has set itself firmly on the path toward elimination of coal and increased reliance on 
  126 
renewable sources of electricity, generated by IPPs. The OPA acknowledges the shift of the 
socio-technical regime to distributed generation: 
Ontario is … planning for future energy generation that will focus on efficient, localized 
generation from smaller, cleaner sources of electricity rather than exclusively from large, 
centralized power plants transmitting power over long distances. This strategy is known 
as ‘distributed generation’. Distributed generation also opens up opportunities for smaller 
power producers, allowing individuals, Aboriginal communities and small co-operatives 
or partnerships to become generators (OPA, 2010). 
In 2013, the government also introduced The Ending Coal for Cleaner Air Act, which explicitly 
prohibits new standalone coal-fired generating facilities (Ontario, 2014c). 
In its 2014 progress report on health care initiatives, the government pointed to progress 
on its off-coal agenda as a health-related issue:  
As a result of Ontario’s coal replacement strategy, in 2013 coal-fired electricity 
generation was down 91% from 2003 levels, with a corresponding reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions from coal-fired electricity generation. By the end of 2014, 
Ontario will be the first jurisdiction in North America to eliminate coal as a source of 
electricity (Ontario, 2014c). 
Environmentalist Tim Weis (2013) says:  
Coal-fired electricity is a thing of the past in Ontario. … The scale of this accomplishment 
bears repeating. In 2002, close to half of all the coal burned in Canada was burned in 
Ontario, and the province had a coal fleet comparable to Alberta’s existing one. Those 
days are over. … Taken together, nearly half of Ontario’s power is projected to come 
from renewables by 2025. That’s up from 28 per cent today. 
The dominant discourse of cleaning up the air, improving the health of Ontarians, creating good 
jobs, and growing the economy by phasing out coal and ramping up renewables has indeed 
become largely institutionalized in Ontario. The discourse coalition – the various actors that 
produced and used this storyline – included a loose blend of government, the Ontario Medical 
Association, cottagers’ groups, the Ontario Clean Air Alliance, and the Ontario Sustainable 
Energy Association. The coordinative, behind-the-scenes discourse focused on a variety of 
factors, including: the need to find the most effective means to achieve the policy objective of 
phasing out coal; the need to create a more resilient electricity system; the need to challenge 
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NIMBYism, the not-in-my-backyard phenomena that often plagues renewable electricity 
developments; and the need to use energy policy to confront the economic downturn, subsidize 
businesses, create jobs, and get the economy growing again (interviews 1, 3, 6, 7, 13 and 14). The 
communicative discourse, which takes place in the public, focused primarily on how replacing 
dirty coal with renewable power would mean cleaner air, better health, more jobs and 
investments, and a more resilient and reliable system. This dominant discourse solidified into 
institutions and organizational practices and served to facilitate transformation of the socio-
technical regime. 
While several of the TIS functions – primarily entrepreneurial experimentation, 
knowledge development, and knowledge diffusion – are not relevant to this consideration of 
renewable power in Ontario, just as they were not relevant in the Nova Scotia case, because the 
technologies under consideration are already well-established and proven, the remaining TIS 
functions are relevant: 
• Guidance of the search – the government provided positive signals, through initiatives 
like the RESOP and FIT, to support increased use of renewable electricity generation 
technologies; the government has also provided negative signals through policy 
directives, such as The Ending Coal for Cleaner Air Act, which prohibits ongoing use of 
coal-fired electricity generation; 
• Market formation – with significant increases in the volume of renewable energy and the 
number of actors involved in the sector, Ontario has moved beyond a ‘nursing market’ 
and developed a ‘bridging market;’ it would not be accurate to represent Ontario as 
having a ‘mature market’ quite yet, but it is on its way; 
• Resource mobilization – Ontario has made a rigorous effort to distribute needed financial, 
material and human capital to support the deployment of renewable electricity generation, 
through initiatives such as the RESOP, FIT, and a variety of Aboriginal-specific 
initiatives, including the Aboriginal Energy Partnerships Program, Aboriginal Renewable 
Energy Fund, Aboriginal Loan Guarantee Program, and Aboriginal Renewable Energy 
Network; and 
• Support from advocacy coalitions – support from advocacy groups is increasingly less 
crucial because government policy is well entrenched, the key elements of which are 
largely supported by all three main political parties.  
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As a result of its fulfillment of those functions, Ontario appears to have developed several TIS 
motors, as specified in Suurs’ (2009) typology of motors: 
• Entrepreneurial motor – government responded to landscape pressures with project-
specific subsidies, primarily in the form of the RESOP and then the FIT; government 
regulation guaranteed a sizeable commercial environment and enactor support for specific 
technologies; 
• System building motor – government directives significantly increased the number of 
renewable electricity enactors and government also undertook a $2.3 billion makeover of 
the transmission grid, in significant part to be able to integrated more IPPs; and 
• A (promising) market motor – support from advocacy coalitions is increasingly less 
crucial because, for the most part, the trajectory has been set and government policy is 
clearly entrenched within legislation and the key components are not disputed by other 
political parties. 
This analysis, taking into account the perspective of TIS functions and motors, provides insight 
into the progress Ontario had made along the transformation pathway. 
6.4 Involvement of First Nations in the Electricity Sector in Ontario 
 Ontario is home to 133 First Nations, the majority of which are Anishinaabek, 
Mushkegowuk, Onkwehonwe, and Lenape peoples (Chiefs of Ontario, 2014). There are roughly 
243,000 First Nations individuals living in Ontario, almost half of whom live on reserve 
(AANDC, 2014). A series of treaties were signed between the newcomers and First Nations in 
what would become Ontario, with the Treaties of Fort Niagara and the Crawford Purchases, in 
southern Ontario, beginning in 1781; the Robinson Treaties followed in 1850 along the north 
shores of Lakes Huron and Superior; then Treaties 3, 5 and 9 between 1873 and 1930 in northern 
Ontario; and the Williams Treaties in 1923 with the Chippewas of Lake Simcoe, Lake Huron and 
the Mississaugas of Rice Lake, Curve Lake and Alderville (Ontario, 2014b).  
Throughout most of Ontario’s history, First Nations have been poorly treated when it 
comes to policies related to electricity development (interviews 1, 3, 6, 7, 8 and 13). A former 
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Ontario Hydro employee says First Nations began asserting demands for better treatment as early 
as the 1980s:  
The first build cycle that I was really part of was back in the 1980s. At that time we were 
looking at doing new developments and we went out and consulted with First Nations and 
we got a very clear message from them and it was this: if you think you’re going to go out 
and do development in the way you did in the 40s, 50s and 60s, we’re going to fight that 
all the way, we’re going to object to it, and it’s not going to happen. We need to be a part 
of the solution and we need to benefit from it (interview 1).  
In 1991, Premier Bob Rae signed a Statement of Political Relationship, which recognized 
that First Nations “exist in Ontario as distinct nations, with their governments, culture, languages, 
traditions, customs and territories” (Hodgins et al., 1992, p. x). Hodgins et al. (1992) assert that:  
This recognition, the pledge of respectful, cooperative co-existence within a shared land 
and the province’s apparent determination to push forward the First Nations’ claim to 
self-government in the ongoing process of constitutional reform, may well represent a 
historic moment in Aboriginal-white relationship in the province of Ontario (p. x). 
A former Ontario Hydro employee identifies this as a turning point in the Crown corporation’s 
approach to dealing with First Nations people: “In the early 1990s, under the Rae government, 
we actually really started our conversation with Aboriginal communities and that conversation 
and attempt to reconcile was led and directed by government policy” (interview 1). Ontario 
Hydro started with a formal assessment of the impacts of its past actions on First Nations and 
found that the negative effects of its past actions had been an extensive: “We did an assessment 
in the early ’90s and of the 133 First Nations we had directly impacted 99 of them. … So we 
initiated a program of trying to address those past grievances” (interview 1). But this type of 
activity was put on the back burner when the government changed a few years later:  
In 1996, the NDP government – for which First Nations were quite a big priority – lost 
the election and the Mike Harris government came in, really only focusing on fiscal 
elements and First Nations really weren’t part of their agenda and there wasn’t a lot done 
at that point in time with First Nations both at the political level with the government and 
even at the industry level. So the function really collapsed down to almost nothing within 
Ontario Hydro (interview 1). 
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The 2003 election included a focus on outstanding issues from the Ipperwash Crisis of 
1995, in which the Ontario Provincial Police killed an unarmed First Nations protestor named 
Dudley George (interviews 1, 6, and 7). After winning the election, Premier Dalton McGuinty 
promptly announced an official inquiry into the events at Ipperwash. A former Ontario Hydro 
employee says that: “McGuinty put himself up as a defender of Aboriginal rights … So, you have 
the Conservatives leaving and the Liberals coming in. There was really a shift in philosophy and 
policy right at that point” (interview 1). A former cabinet minister from the McGuinty era agrees, 
asserting that the Liberals “had been elected to actually improve First Nations relations” 
(interview 6). 
 Not everything can be attributed to Liberal altruism, however. Decisions from the 
Supreme Court of Canada played a significant role in changing the nature of the relationship 
between governments, industry and First Nations: 
You have those seminal court cases that happened in 2004 and 2005, the Haida-Taku and 
Mikisew Cree decisions, those are key, those are game changers. Governments not being 
that nimble say, okay, really what we need to do is partnerships as one response to that. 
And I think this is another key piece here to why government responded the way they did 
(interview 1). 
A former cabinet minister agrees with that, and adds in a few other key dynamics as well:  
So we not only have a very strong environmental movement, but we also have a new 
Aboriginal consciousness, we have all kinds of jurisprudence that says Aboriginal title 
matters and the reality is that you’re not going to get any social licence north of much of 
southern Ontario now if you do not involve and seriously engage the Aboriginal 
communities, those things have all made governments and the political actors understand 
that it’s not like it was in the 1950s or 1920s (interview 13). 
A former OPG employee argues that ideology played an important role as well: 
A lot of it has to do with the minister and the government. I don’t think that a 
Conservative government would care that much about First Nations involvement, but a 
Liberal or NDP or, as implausible as it may be, a Green government would tend to push 
those issues up the importance chain, so to speak. So why they did it, I think a lot of it has 
to do with ideology and political affiliation. I can’t really think of another plausible 
explanation (interview 11). 
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While the specific causes of the increasing focus on partnering with First Nations on 
energy projects are a source of dispute, there can be little disagreement that there was indeed an 
increasing focus. An OPG employee says:  
It picked up in ’05-06. We needed new build stuff. And part of that stuff was looking at 
hydro-electric development in the north, so you have the Minister of Natural Resources 
issuing a site-release policy, with respect to new hydro sites, and as part of that criteria 
they had within that huge weightings with respect to Aboriginal partnerships, and that’s 
really the first time you start seeing that kind of approach, and I think it’s really a 
response to all the things like Ipperwash, Caledonia, days of action, blockades and 
especially the court cases (interview 1). 
 When the government launched its FIT program, it built in incentives for the participation 
of First Nations. In particular, it established price adders for Aboriginal participation, defined as 
equity. Between September 2009 and April 2012, the price adder amounted to 1.5 cents per kWh 
for wind and ground-mounted solar photovoltaic; 0.9 cents per kWh for water; and 0.6 cents per 
kWh for biogas, biomass, and landfill gas (OPA, 2009; OPA, 2010b). In April 2012, the price 
adder was refined as follows: if Aboriginal participation in any renewable project, with the 
exception of rooftop solar, exceeds 15 per cent, the project can qualify for 0.75 cents per kWh; if 
Aboriginal participation exceeds 50 per cent for any renewable project, except rooftop solar, the 
project can qualify for a price adder of 1.5 cents per kWh (OPA, 2012). An energy advisor for an 
Ontario First Nation points to the Aboriginal adder as the most significant contributing factor to 
Aboriginal success:  
I think the greatest role that it’s had is convincing proponents that want to develop these 
type of projects that it’s beneficial to have First Nation partners. So things like the FIT 
Aboriginal adder is a good example of that. Because of that, companies realize they can 
get just that much more for their power if they have a First Nation partner. … They’re 
incentivizing partnerships, which are so critical to the success of First Nations energy 
projects (interview 3). 
The government also launched other programs to assist First Nations and Métis 
communities interested in participating in renewable energy projects. One such measure was the 
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Aboriginal Loan Guarantee Program (ALGP) that allows communities to take on equity 
participation in such projects. MacLaren (2013) asserts that: 
The Aboriginal Loan Guarantee Program is a phenomenal tool to allow Aboriginal 
communities to partner in project development within their traditional territories. For 
those communities interested in renewable energy, the ALGP has been a rare and 
welcome aligning of governmental policy and Aboriginal self-determination … The 
ALGP is such a welcome change because it signifies a committed policy of supported 
inclusion, and recognizes that Ontario’s growth must not come at the expense of the 
livelihoods of its First Nations (para. 2). 
The ALGP started in 2009 as a $250 million fund (Ontario, 2009b), but was increased to $650 
million in the 2014 provincial budget (Ontario, 2014d). 
Another important program launched by the government in 2009 was the Aboriginal 
Energy Partnerships Program, which includes: 
• The Aboriginal Renewable Energy Network (AREN) – an online-based centre “for 
sharing of knowledge and best practices related to First Nation and Métis green energy 
projects” (Ontario, 2009c). 
• The Aboriginal Renewable Energy Fund (AREF) – a fund established to assist with initial 
project development costs, including: 80 per cent of actual costs in the pre-feasibilty 
phase; 60 per cent of actual costs for the design and development phase; and 40 percent of 
actual costs for the regulatory approvals phase;  
• Aboriginal Community Energy Plans (ACEP) – assistance with planning to help 
communities identify and benefit from their renewable power development opportunities; 
and  
• The Aboriginal Advisory Committee – a group established to provide advice and 
guidance to First Nations and Métis communities interested in participating in the 
electricity sector (Ontario, 2012a). 
Because of the breadth of this suite of programs, a former OPG employee argues that the 
government has clearly made First Nations participation in the electricity a significant priority: 
It’s a pretty impressively big priority. You have to remember that First Nations constitute 
less than two per cent of the population in Ontario. Given the extremely limited voting 
sway they hold, I think governments to a large extent have done a really good job of 
recognizing that First Nations require special accommodation and consultation, they have 
a constitutionally protected duty to consult on new developments, so they recognize that 
First Nations are not just some other minority or stakeholder and I think Ontario has done 
a good job of involving First Nations and listening to their concerns and desires 
(interview 4). 
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An energy advisor with a First Nation largely agrees: 
I would say that the Ontario government has done a lot to help, but they have done stuff 
to frustrate, I mean I don’t want to paint this rosy picture of everything being perfect, but 
on the balance of everything they’re working on and the fact that Ontario has a very 
complex, large electricity system, I mean we’re talking about an electricity system with 
large manufacturing load, albeit declining manufacturing load, a large residential and 
commercial bases, we have Canada’s biggest economy, 13-14 million people, they’ve got 
a lot going on in Ontario and they’re trying to balance a lot of factors and I think they’ve 
done a pretty good job of ensuring First Nations can participate in the electricity sector 
(interview 11). 
But, according to Grant Taibossigai of M’Chigeeng First Nation, the government did not act 
without pressure: 
We urged the Ontario government to create programs specific to our needs. Finally, with 
the assistance of the Ontario Sustainable Energy Association and the First Nations Energy 
Alliance (FNEA), M’Chigeeng First Nation along with other Ontario First Nations 
convinced the Premier of Ontario and the Ministry of Energy to support the development 
of the Aboriginal Renewable Energy Fund, a fund that assists aboriginal proponents of 
generation projects, as well as the Aboriginal Loan Guarantee Program (AOPP, 2011). 
By the end of the first quarter of 2014, First Nations were participating in 243 FIT program 
projects throughout Ontario. This included 534 MW of wind, 80 MW of hydroelectric, and 76 
MW of solar projects (Ontario, 2014d). That amounts to 11 per cent of total FIT-related MW 
(Ontario, 2014a). 
This research reveals that most of the key elements identified in the literature as necessary 
for successful First Nations participation in the electricity sector (Krupa, 2012; Henderson, 2013) 
were fulfilled in Ontario (interviews 2, 3, 4, 5, 9 and 10). Government embraced clean energy 
projects; chose to foster participation of new actors through mechanisms that facilitate the sale of 
electricity to the grid; and provided a degree of long-term clarity regarding the electricity sector. 
On a number of First Nations, there are also committed and capable local leaders serving as 
project champions, and strong governance to support the projects and ensure accountable and 
transparent financial management. Partnerships with private sector companies have been crucial 
to most of the renewable electricity projects, which have increased the capacity, capability and 
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confidence of First Nations. And, amongst those First Nation communities that have chosen to 
participate in the electricity sector, there has been a significant focus on delivering benefits to 
their entire community, which has increased the level of buy-in on the part of community 
members. 
6.5 Conclusion 
Ontario faced a variety of landscape-level dynamics, including pressure to respond to the 
impact of coal-related smog on population health; pressure to help mitigate climate change; 
pressure to create a more resilient electricity system in the wake of the August 2003 blackout; 
and pressure to use energy policy to help confront the economic downturn of 2008 and 2009 by 
subsidizing businesses, creating jobs and growing the province’s economy. Ontario responded to 
these pressures by adjusting its regime rules, taking steps to incorporate proven niche 
technologies, and opening up space for new actors to participate in the system, without 
substantially disrupting the existing socio-technical regime. Ontario’s progress along this 
transformation pathway is related to its fulfillment of various TIS functions, specifically: 
guidance of the search, with positive and negative signals through policy directives; market 
formation, with the creation of a ‘bridging market’ through increases in the volume of renewable 
electricity and in the number of actors involved in the sector; resource mobilization, through 
providing incentives for participation in the electricity sector and offering assistance with 
capacity enhancement and project planning; and support from advocacy coalitions, which was 
important but is increasingly less crucial because government policy is quite well-entrenched. As 
a result of the interplay of these TIS functions, Ontario has developed several TIS motors – an 
entrepreneurial motor, a system building motor and a promising market motor – all of which help 
to explain its progress along the transformation pathway. 
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Political dynamics have been crucial in the ongoing transition of Ontario’s electricity 
sector. The government and a variety of influential groups produced and used the dominant 
storyline that focused on the following elements: phasing out dirty coal-fired power plants means 
cleaner air and better health for Ontarians; more renewable energy means new investments in the 
province’s economy and more jobs for Ontarians; by doing this, Ontario is leading North 
America; and, Ontario is delivering a more reliable and resilient electricity system and more 
opportunities for smaller power producers by focusing on distributed generation using sources 
that are smaller and cleaner, instead of exclusively relying on large, centralized power plants. The 
discourse coalition – the various actors that produced and used this storyline – included a loose 
blend of government, the Ontario Medical Association, cottagers’ groups, the Ontario Clean Air 
Alliance, and the Ontario Sustainable Energy Association. The coordinative discourse focused on 
the need to find the most effective means to achieve the policy objective of phasing out coal; the 
need to create a more resilient electricity system; the need to challenge NIMBYism; and the need 
to use energy policy to confront the economic downturn, subsidize businesses, create jobs, and 
get the economy growing again (interviews 1, 3, 6, 7, 13 and 14). The communicative discourse 
focused primarily on how replacing dirty coal with renewable power would mean cleaner air, 
better health, more jobs and investments, and a more resilient and reliable system. Clearly, this 
discourse has already solidified into institutions and organizational practices, by fueling the TIS 
motors and leading to adjustments in the socio-technical regime. 
A crucial aspect of those adjustments in the socio-technical regime involved opening up 
space for First Nations to participate in the electricity sector. As a result of the FIT initiative, and 
the full suite of related government programs, 26 per cent of Ontario’s First Nations are involved 
in renewable electricity generation projects. These 35 First Nations are not only benefiting from 
their participation in the renewable electricity sector, but are also helping Ontario move further 
along the transformation path, as it seeks to build an electricity sector that is more sustainable. 
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Table 6-2 outlines the operationalization of the analytical framework in Ontario. 
Table 6-2.  Operationalization of analytical framework in Ontario  
Concept Key dimensions Ontario case 
Socio-technical 
regime 
Various components 
(policy, science, 
technology, industry, 
markets/user 
preferences and culture) 
that serve to stabilize 
and support the existing 
institutions 
- Centralized power plants, utilizing mixed 
generation (primarily nuclear, hydro, coal and 
natural gas) and mixed ownership, in a market that 
has both competitive and regulated elements 
Niche-level 
innovations 
Different technologies, 
actors, networks and 
institutions than those 
stabilizing and 
supporting the existing 
institutions 
- Technologies: Renewables (primarily wind and 
hydroelectric) 
- Actors: Ontario Power Authority, established in 
2004 to oversee planning of the electricity system 
and procure private electricity generation; IPPs 
- Networks: Ontario Clean Air Alliance; Ontario 
Sustainable Electricity Association; Ontario 
Medical Association; cottagers associations; First 
Nations Energy Alliance 
- Institutions: Various renewable energy support 
mechanisms, including a standing-offer program 
and a feed-in tariff; new legislation and 
regulations setting renewable-portfolio standards 
and emission reductions, in 2004, 2009 and 2012 
Landscape Natural environment, 
macro-economy, 
political culture, 
demographic 
characteristics and 
worldviews 
- Significant public pressure regarding population 
health concerns related to heavy smog, caused in 
part by coal-fired electricity generation 
- The worldwide financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 
hit the province’s economy particularly hard, and 
government saw this as an opportunity to promote 
renewable energy as a source of investment and 
jobs 
- The August 2003 blackout created significant 
pressure to make the system more resilient 
- Increasing calls to mitigate climate change 
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Concept Key dimensions Ontario case 
TIS Functions TIS functions: (1) 
entrepreneurial 
experimentation; (2) 
knowledge 
development; (3) 
knowledge diffusion; 
(4) guidance of the 
search; (5) market 
formation; (6) resource 
mobilization; and (7) 
support from advocacy 
coalitions 
TIS motors: (1) science 
and technology push 
(STP) motor; (2) 
entrepreneurial motor; 
(3) system building 
motor; and (4) market 
motor 
- Entrepreneurial experimentation, knowledge 
development and knowledge diffusion not crucial. 
- Each of the following functions fulfilled: guidance 
of the search (with positive and negative signals 
established through policy directives); market 
formation (with a bridging market); resource 
mobilization, with incentives and support 
programs; and support from advocacy coalitions. 
- Ontario has developed several TIS motors: an 
entrepreneurial motor, a system building motor 
and a promising market motor. 
Storyline Narratives, structuring 
ideas and themes, 
problem framing, 
metaphors, analogies, 
historical references, 
appeals to fear or guilt, 
cognitive and normative 
ideas 
- Phasing out dirty coal-fired power plants means 
cleaner air and better health for Ontarians 
- More renewable energy means new investments in 
our economy and more jobs for Ontarians 
- Ontario is leading North America 
- Focusing on distributed generation using sources 
that are smaller and cleaner, instead of exclusively 
relying on large, centralized power plants means a 
more reliable system and more opportunities for 
smaller power producers, communities, First 
Nations, and others to become generators 
 
Coordinative 
discourse 
Behind-the-scenes 
discussions and 
negotiations involving 
elected officials, civil 
servants, experts and 
interest groups 
- Challenging NIMBYism 
- Creating a more resilient electricity system 
- Finding the most effective means to achieve the 
policy objective of phasing out coal 
Communicative 
discourse 
Public discussion of 
ideas and public 
announcements of 
decisions 
- Replacing coal with renewable power will mean 
cleaner air, better health, and more jobs and 
investments 
 
  138 
Concept Key dimensions Ontario case 
Discourse 
coalitions 
The coalition of actors 
producing and using a 
particular storyline 
- Government 
- Ontario Medical Association 
- Cottagers’ groups, including the Greater Bay Area 
Foundation and the Muskoka Lakes Association 
- Ontario Sustainable Energy Association 
- Ontario Clean Air Association 
- First Nations Energy Alliance 
 
Effects of 
discourse 
Key actors’ use of 
ideas, concepts and 
categories 
- General embrace of storyline by main political 
actors (with some disagreement over pace or 
relatively minor elements) 
 
 Effects on government 
policy and 
organizational practice 
- The FIT has brought 1,447.6 MW into 
commercial operation, with an additional 3,353.6 
MW currently under development, and an 
additional 493.7 MW under review 
- First Nations are participating in 243 FIT program 
projects, including 534 MW of wind, 80 MW of 
hydroelectric, and 76 MW of solar projects, 
amounting to 11 per cent of total FIT-related MW 
- 26 per cent of First Nations involved in transition 
 
Transition 
dynamics 
Changes in the regime - Coal has almost been eliminated from the 
electricity generation mix 
- Increased reliance on renewable power 
- Generation of electricity opened up to new actors  
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CHAPTER 7 
SASKATCHEWAN 
 
Two of the most significant challenges facing Saskatchewan’s electricity socio-technical 
regime are aging infrastructure and demand growth. SaskPower (2014b) acknowledges that, “our 
generation, transmission, and distribution infrastructure is aging, and will require us to rebuild, 
replace, or renew it in its entirety over the next 40 years” (p. 19). In 2013, demand for power 
increased by 6.4 per cent, which was the highest annual growth in two decades (SaskPower, 
2014b). SaskPower (2014b) anticipates that, by 2050, demand for electricity in the province will 
nearly double. But, according to SaskPower itself, the most significant landscape pressure it faces 
is the external climate change policy agenda. SaskPower (2014b) acknowledges that: 
Climate change continues to represent the single most influential factor associated with 
the future of electricity generation in Saskatchewan. New federal regulations concerning 
CO2 have eliminated conventional coal-fired generation – SaskPower’s primary baseload 
electricity source – as a generation option for the future (p. 43). 
However, unlike in Nova Scotia and Ontario, where the socio-technical regime could not 
withstand the landscape pressure and outside criticism and responded to it by making significant 
adjustments to their electricity socio-technical regime, Saskatchewan’s electricity socio-technical 
regime has largely been able to endure the landscape pressure and has faced minimal outside 
criticism. 
Saskatchewan is an energy-producing province with an abundant supply of domestic coal 
that can be used for relatively cheap electricity generation. As a result, it would be expected that 
concerns about climate change and environmental sustainability would not be as pervasive in 
Saskatchewan as in other jurisdictions. This has resulted in minimal criticism of the existing 
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socio-technical regime. Disruption from exogenous pressures, such as the federal environmental 
policy agenda, is generally quite minor, with significant allowance for continued reliance on 
fossil fuel-based electricity generation. As a result, Saskatchewan has largely invested in 
technology that reinforces its existing regime. While there has been some investment in projects 
for wind power, geothermal and biomass, this has paled in comparison to the amount of funding 
the province has poured into carbon capture-and-sequestration (CCS) technology, a regime-
reinforcing innovation.  
Saskatchewan has primarily taken a reproduction pathway and, in the absence of 
significant new pressure, will likely pursue a path of very gradual transformation in which it 
adopts some symbiotic niche innovations and makes some minor adjustments to the regime rules 
while keeping the existing socio-technical regime mostly intact. The minimal progress 
Saskatchewan has made along the transformation pathway can be explained by the weak 
fulfillment of the TIS functions. Entrepreneurial experimentation, knowledge development, 
knowledge diffusion, guidance of the search, and resource mobilization are all heavily focused on 
regime-reinforcing CCS technology. Market formation is almost non-existent and support from 
advocacy coalitions is relatively weak and scattered. As a result, Saskatchewan has only 
developed the most immature TIS motor, the science and technology push motor. 
Political dynamics have played a significant role in the trajectory of Saskatchewan’s 
electricity system. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Saskatchewan resisted and criticized the 
Kyoto protocol (Harding, 2002), but by 2007, the premier was saying that “climate change is a 
moral issue, not just a political issue” (Saskatchewan, 2007g) as he invited former American Vice 
President Al Gore to deliver a keynote address in the province, with SaskPower as the presenting 
sponsor. In the early 2000s, the government started off with relatively meager steps, mainly pilot 
and demonstration projects, as well as the Green Power program and Environmentally Preferred 
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Power program. But, in 2006 and 2007, the government laid out a more comprehensive climate 
change and energy strategy, including a commitment to significantly increase the province’s 
reliance on renewable sources of electricity generation. The government also pursued regime-
reinforcing CCS technology as a supply option, but not in the short-term, because of the immense 
costs associated with it. In late 2007 the government changed, with the election of the 
conservative-leaning Saskatchewan Party. The new government decided to invest heavily in CCS 
technology and worked with the federal government to minimize the effect that the federal policy 
agenda would have on Saskatchewan’s electricity system.  
For most of this time, the dominant storyline in Saskatchewan has focused on reinforcing 
the existing socio-technical regime. However, in 2006 and 2007, in the last two years of its 
mandate, the New Democrat government used a storyline that focused on making Saskatchewan 
a model of innovative and sustainable energy; living up to the responsibilities of being an energy 
powerhouse; addressing climate change; and securing benefits for Saskatchewan families well 
into the future. When the government changed at the end of 2007, the storyline reverted to a 
focus on reinforcing the existing regime: Saskatchewan has a 300-year supply of coal, which can 
be used to generate affordable electricity and fuel economic growth in the province, so it just 
makes good sense to continue relying on coal; by investing in CCS technology, Saskatchewan is 
leading the world and will be able to benefit from that by commercializing the technology and 
knowledge; SaskPower already has a diverse generation mix and it will continue to rely on a 
variety of sources, including affordable renewable options, well into the future. The 
Saskatchewan Party government briefly adjusted its electricity-generation storyline while it 
flirted with the notion of embracing nuclear power, but, when that proved publicly unpalatable, it 
quickly reverted to the long-standing dominant storyline that focused on reinforcing the existing 
socio-technical regime. Despite two relatively brief deviations from the dominant storyline – 
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first, to ramp up renewables, under the New Democrat government; second, to embrace nuclear 
power, under the Saskatchewan Party government – the dominant storyline remained deeply 
entrenched. This helps to explain why Saskatchewan’s electricity socio-technical regime has 
largely taken a reproduction pathway. 
This chapter delves into the dynamics at play in Saskatchewan’s electricity system. It 
explores the broader context, including a brief overview of the history of electricity generation in 
Saskatchewan. It then outlines the province’s initial exploration of various options for a more 
sustainable electricity system and its ultimate decision to try to clean up coal-fired electricity 
generation. This chapter also explores the steps taken to involve First Nations in the province’s 
electricity sector. 
7.1 History of Power Generation in Saskatchewan 
Municipal power utilities initially dominated the electricity sector in Saskatchewan. When 
it achieved provincial status in 1905, the three central generating stations within Saskatchewan 
were municipally owned. Between 1906 and 1926, approximately 70 small, privately owned 
power systems were established in communities which could not afford to establish their own 
municipal utilities, or which chose to prioritize other municipal infrastructure projects (White, 
1976). Both municipal utilities and private operators placed a high priority on generating 
revenues, so it made little difference to Saskatchewan residents whether the public or private 
sectors served them (White, 1976). 
In 1927, the government established the Saskatchewan Power Resources Commission “to 
inquire into and report upon the economic practicability of generating power at central power 
plants and water power sites in the province and the distribution of same throughout the 
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province” (White, 1976, p. 32). A year later, the government created the Department of Railways, 
Labour and Industries, which it empowered to operate electrical utilities: 
By the terms of the Act, [the new department] could manufacture, distribute and supply 
electrical energy; acquire, lease, construct, maintain and operate works for generating 
electricity through the use of fuels or waterpower; obtain by purchase, lease, 
expropriation or otherwise land for power station or substation sites and for electrical 
transmission on distribution lines. It could also purchase, lease or expropriate plants, 
buildings and machinery used in the production, transmission, distribution and supply of 
power. By these clauses the Province might take over any electrical utility and incorporate 
it into any system it might see fit to establish (White, 1976, p. 34). 
In 1929, the government created the Saskatchewan Power Commission, with the explicit 
purpose of coordinating the province’s electrical systems and moving toward increased 
centralization and integration. However, it was not until 1949 that the centralization-and-
integration project really gained steam. That year, the government turned the Saskatchewan 
Power Commission into a Crown corporation, the Saskatchewan Power Corporation 
(SaskPower), and tasked it with an ambitious expansion and rural electrification agenda (White, 
1976). Around 1964, with the rural electrification project achieved, and with a new government 
in place, SaskPower’s guiding principals shifted to serving its customers and generating 
revenues, a portion of which were frequently shared with the provincial government in the form 
of an annual dividend. Essentially, the utility has remained the same since then: focused on 
serving citizens and generating revenues; with centralized planning and system organization; with 
a general technological preference for coal-fired thermal electricity generation; and largely 
resistant to any significant change. A former senior manager with SaskPower says:  
You have to remember that in Saskatchewan here what do we have? We have a lot of 
lignite coal, in the south, and during the ’60s, ’70s and ’80s, Saskatchewan exploited that, 
ultimately the last project for that was the Shand Power Station down in Estevan. So you 
come with a culture. A lot of electrical utilities in Canada have a culture. The culture here 
was build big coal. So very slow to change in that way (interview 1). 
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As a result of this resistance to change, a wind power proponent argues that, “the viewpoint about 
electricity in this province is still rooted firmly in the mid-20th century” (interview 3). 
SaskPower remains the primary electricity provider in the province. The Crown 
corporation’s available generating capacity is 4,291 MW. In 2013, the fuel sources of electricity 
supplied broke down as follows: coal – 47 per cent; gas – 28 per cent; hydro – 19 per cent; wind 
– 3 per cent; imports 2 per cent; and other sources – 1 per cent. 853 MW of SaskPower’s 
generating capacity is accessed through long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs) with 
private companies, including four gas-fired generation projects, two wind power facilities, and 
four heat recovery facilities (SaskPower, 2014). 
Table 7-1 outlines the history of electricity generation in Nova Scotia. 
Table 7-1.  History of electricity generation in Saskatchewan 
 Pre-1949 1949-1964 1964- 
Ownership Municipally owned and 
private 
Public Public 
Guiding 
principles 
Revenue generation 
(municipal) and profit 
maximization (private) 
Expansion, rural 
electrification and 
industrial development 
Service to citizens and 
revenue generation 
Planning Market directed Central command and 
control 
Central command and 
control 
Market Free market Non-market Non-market 
System 
organization 
Decentralized, with 
fragmented grid 
Centralized Centralized 
Technology 
preference 
Coal-fired thermal and 
kerosene-burning 
engines 
Coal-fired thermal Coal-fired thermal 
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7.2 Exploring Options for a More Sustainable Electricity System in Saskatchewan 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, landscape-level pressure on Saskatchewan’s electricity 
socio-technical regime, led the government to explore a variety of options to improve the 
sustainability of the province’s electricity system. A former senior manager of SaskPower argues 
that:  
The culture of SaskPower really only started to break at basically the turn of the century 
in 2000. … At the turn of the century, there was a bit of a look-see, basically saying, look, 
Saskatchewan, we hear you about coal, but there is also this climate change issue, and we 
need to begin to change who we are, what we are, and begin to take a look at different 
forms of generation. … It was quite clear in the early 2000s that the federal government 
would at some point get around to saying, hey, no more coal, and they were looking at (a) 
limits on building new plants and (b) refurbishments not being allowed at a certain point 
in time. So we’re sitting there at the time going, wait a second, if we’re, into the future, 
not going to be allowed to develop coal, what else are we going to do, and what are the 
alternatives here in Saskatchewan to do that? (interview 1). 
In response to this landscape-level pressure, the government supported pilot projects and took 
several small but important steps to embrace niche innovations:  
• In 1998, the government announced a Small Power Producers Program, allowing 
customers who “wish to generate up to 100 kW of electricity for the purpose of offsetting 
power that would otherwise be purchased from SaskPower or for selling all of the power 
generated to SaskPower” (SaskPower, 2012);  
• In 2001, the government announced a 5.3 MW wind power project (Saskatchewan, 
2001a);  
• Also in 2001, the government also announced that SaskPower and SaskEnergy would 
partner with Flatland Exploration Ltd. for a pilot project using flare gas – a byproduct 
from the process of extracting and processing oil that is normally wasted – to generate 
electricity (Saskatchewan, 2001b); 
• In 2002, the government announced its Green Power program, which allowed customers 
to pay extra to buy blocks of wind-generated electricity (Saskatchewan, 2002a); 
• In 2002, the government announced a natural gas co-generation pilot project at the Regina 
General Hospital (Saskatchewan, 2002b); 
• In 2003, it announced 150 MW of wind power, which was a partnership between 
SaskPower and ATCO Power (Saskatchewan, 2003a);  
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• In 2003, the government announced a partnership with Clear-Green Environmental Inc. 
for a two-year demonstration project using animal manure to generate heat and electricity 
(Saskatchewan, 2003b); 
• Also in 2003, the government announced a partnership between SaskPower, 
Saskatchewan Research Council and Ecology Energy for a two-year demonstration 
project using wood residue to generate electricity and heat (Saskatchewan, 2003c); and 
• In 2004, SaskPower launched the Environmentally Preferred Power Program to “create 
the opportunity for SaskPower to partner with IPPs to build and operate small-scale 
generation projects, with up to 5 MW of capacity” (Saskatchewan 2004).  
With regard to the 2002 Green Power program, a former Minister responsible for SaskPower 
says:  
The objective was to generate five per cent of SaskPower’s electricity from renewable 
based sources – preferably wind. It was generally the view that the decision to move to 
emphasize renewables was a political, as opposed to commercial, venture. As such, there 
was a large amount of discussion about how to implement this policy. Ultimately, it was 
decided, through accommodation, as opposed to regulation or legislation, that the targets 
would remain soft, would be driven by consumer demand, and would be priced 
differently – at a two or two-and-a-half cents per kilowatt hour premium – from the base 
load that was fossil-fuel generated, and that consumers would be able to opt into the 
solution. This particular policy showed the desire of the government to drive policy 
changes at SaskPower, but to do so in a way that did not distort the commercial business 
of the company (interview 4). 
The rationale for all of these moves was primarily to fulfill the demands of the federal 
government’s climate change policy agenda, with an acknowledgement as well of the need to 
protect the environment. Premier Lorne Calvert said, “Our commitment to renewable resources 
will have a long-term benefit to Saskatchewan people, helping to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions and improve our environment as we work to meet the challenging targets that Canada 
has set out [emphasis added]” (Saskatchewan, 2001). The impact of SaskPower’s 
Environmentally Preferred Power Program was particularly notable. Then-SaskPower president 
Pat Youzwa publicly said: 
The EPP program is not only helping to fulfill our objective to meet projected load 
requirements in an environmentally responsible way without adding additional 
greenhouse gases, it is proving that we can diversify our generation mix, incorporating 
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smaller and privately owned projects. The knowledge and experience gained through this 
program will benefit SaskPower greatly as we look to the future (Saskatchewan, 2005). 
 In its 2006 Speech from the Throne, the government committed to a “long-term goal of 
meeting one-third of our energy requirements through renewable resources” and it pledged to 
“work in partnership to research the feasibility of the world’s first, Saskatchewan-designed, 
utility-scale clean coal generating facility” (Saskatchewan, 2006a, p. 7). With regard to clean 
coal, the government proclaimed: 
This project will enhance the quality of life for all Saskatchewan residents. The 
environmental and economic implications of the project extend beyond our borders, to the 
national and international stages. … This may be the world's first near-zero emissions 
pulverized coal unit. This unit would help meet emerging regulatory requirements while 
adding much needed baseload generating capacity while effectively using our 300-year 
supply of low-cost lignite coal (Saskatchewan, 2006b). 
 In 2007, the government significantly increased its focus on making the province’s 
electricity system more sustainable. It did so in large part because of the increased awareness of 
the impacts of climate change. Premier Calvert proclaimed that “climate change is a moral issue, 
not just a political issue” (Saskatchewan, 2007g) and the government invited former American 
Vice President Al Gore to deliver a keynote address on climate change in the province, with 
SaskPower as the presenting sponsor. In 2007, the government released Saskatchewan’s Strategy 
for a Green and Prosperous Economy, outlining the following goal: “to significantly reduce 
Saskatchewan’s greenhouse gas emissions with specific and measurable targets demonstrating 
national and international leadership within a green and prosperous economy” (Saskatchewan, 
2007a). The strategy included the following targets for reducing GHG emissions: stabilization of 
emissions by 2010; reducing emissions by 32 per cent below 2004 levels by 2020; and reducing 
emissions by 80 per cent below 2004 levels by 2050. The strategy also said the government 
would “ensure all of SaskPower’s new and replacement electricity generation facilities are either 
emissions-free or fully offset by emissions credits” and that it would “develop a conservation 
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program to reduce SaskPower’s electricity load by 300 megawatts by 2017” (Saskatchewan, 
2007a). That same year, the government released Saskatchewan’s Energy and Climate Change 
Plan, which built on the previously released Green Strategy, and outlined tangible actions based 
on five “emission reduction wedges,” one of which focused on increased use of renewable energy 
(Saskatchewan, 2007c; 2007d). The government also unveiled a $320 million Green Future Fund, 
consisting of proceeds from the sale of the government’s stake in a heavy oil upgrader in Regina 
(Saskatchewan, 2007b). And it established a Climate Change Secretariat to coordinate and 
oversee the province’s climate change policy agenda (Saskatchewan, 2007b).  
In 2007, the New Democrat government also announced a net metering program, which 
would allow customers that generate their own electricity to send any excess power back to the 
province’s electricity grid for a credit on their SaskPower bills (Saskatchewan, 2007e). In order 
to “position the electrical grid for additional wind, biomass and other renewable generation 
projects,” the government also announced that SaskPower would spend $525 million installing 
up to 400 MW of simple cycle natural gas turbines (Saskatchewan, 2007f). And the government 
announced that it would continue to pursue its clean coal project, but only through study at this 
point, and not yet through construction. SaskPower president Pat Youzwa was publicly quoted as 
saying: 
We remain fully committed to exploring clean coal as a supply option in the longer-term. 
Over the last year, our feasibility work has given us a great deal of confidence in clean 
coal from a technology perspective. But, given the need for new supply by 2010, and 
given the costs of clean coal at this early stage in its development, it would have been 
premature to proceed to the construction phase at this time (Saskatchewan, 2007f). 
In 2007, the government’s stated goal was to have 30 per cent of the province’s electricity 
generated using renewable sources by 2020 (Saskatchewan, 2007e). 
Just several years after it resisted and criticized the Kyoto protocol (Harding, 2002), and 
after taking rather meager steps in the first part of the decade, by 2006 and 2007, the government 
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had in place a comprehensive climate change and energy strategy, including a commitment to 
significantly increase the province’s reliance on renewable sources of electricity generation. The 
government’s discourse had noticeably shifted from earlier in the decade, when it talked about 
having to meet the “challenging targets that Canada has set out” (Saskatchewan, 2001). By 2006, 
the discourse focused on making Saskatchewan a model of innovative and sustainable energy, 
living up to the responsibilities of being an energy powerhouse, addressing climate change, and 
securing benefits for Saskatchewan families well into the future. Premier Calvert said:  
Our vision is of a province that is a model of innovative and sustainable energy. In 
realizing that vision, we recognize the current strengths we have as an energy powerhouse 
and the responsibilities that come with that strength. While contributing to our economic 
prosperity and quality of life, our energy industries also generate the majority of our 
greenhouse gas emissions. Change has to occur and this plan demonstrates our 
commitment to addressing climate change, and continuing to make Saskatchewan a great 
place for families today and building a stronger future here for our young people 
(Saskatchewan, 2007a). 
However, this discourse did not have time to solidify into durable institutions – to achieve 
discursive hegemony, as Hajer (1993) would call it – and to move Saskatchewan’s electricity 
socio-technical regime from a reproduction pathway to a transformation pathway, because the 
government changed near the end of 2007. 
7.3 Focusing on Cleaning Up Coal in Saskatchewan 
In November 2007, the conservative-leaning Saskatchewan Party was elected as the new 
government. In the lead-up to that election, the Saskatchewan Party pledged to uphold the New 
Democrat government’s GHG reduction targets (Wood, 2008), but it scaled those targets back in 
2009 to match the targets established by the federal government instead (Wood, 2009). While it 
watered down the previous government’s GHG reduction targets, it ramped up the previous 
government’s focus on cleaning up coal-fired electricity generation. CCS became the new 
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government’s primary focus when it came to the province’s electricity system. In 2008, the new 
government announced a partnership with the federal government to develop one of the world’s 
first and largest commercial-scale CCS demonstration projects at the Boundary Dam Power 
Station, at an initially estimated cost of $1 billion (Canada, 2008). The Minister Responsible for 
SaskPower articulated the rationale: 
We have some two or 300 years of supply of coal here in Saskatchewan, and of course 
that why the public policy decision was made to look at carbon capture and sequestration 
at the Boundary Dam facility. … Now we have, I think, frankly, the world is beating a 
path to our doorstep to take a look at the project down there and see what’s being done, 
see the very valuable work that is being done by the SaskPower folks with respect to it. 
And yes, there is a cost to it. There’s no question about it. We have clearly indicated that 
there is a cost associated with it. But we have some two or 300 years of supply of coal 
that we are interested in continuing to use here in Saskatchewan to provide baseload 
power (Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan, 2013, p. 382). 
SaskPower (2014b) asserts that this “will be the world’s first commercially viable large-scale 
carbon capture and storage project at a coal-fired power station. The project will produce 110 
MW of baseload electricity and reduce greenhouse gas emissions by one million tonnes of CO2 
each year” (p. 43). SaskPower is also collaborating with Hitachi Ltd. to complete a carbon 
capture test facility, which “will offer a neutral platform for international vendors to verify and 
improve post-combustion technologies in a commercial setting” (SaskPower, 2014a, p. 44). 
A former senior manager with SaskPower is highly critical of the province’s heavy focus 
on CCS and lays responsibility at the feet of politicians: 
People are brain dead. … Now remember it’s only a million people. SaskPower is 
relatively small by North American standards. Yet what they did is went ahead with a 
project for carbon capture-and-sequestration that they were going to be the leaders of the 
pack worldwide. Now, hold on, a million people will be the leaders of the pack 
worldwide, but we don’t know if it will work. We put in $1.4 billion, they put it in, they 
think it’s going to work. The ratepayers of this province have to pick up the tab. I’m not a 
fan of it. They should have walked away from it. But the problem is occasionally the 
politicians got a little too hyped on this thing and nobody really had the guts to tell them 
that this is a bad economic project for a million people (interview 1). 
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The province’s political leaders made it a priority to preserve coal-fired electricity generation as 
part of Saskatchewan’s electricity socio-technical regime. The rationale for continuing to 
prioritize coal-fired electricity generation is based on the province’s 300-year supply of coal, 
which can be used to generate affordable electricity for Saskatchewan people. By investing 
heavily in unproven CCS technology, politicians sought to position Saskatchewan as an 
innovative world-leader (interviews 1, 3 and 6). 
When the federal government began drafting new regulations with respect to GHG 
emissions from coal-fired power plants, SaskPower and the provincial government took a keen 
interest (interview 1). According to SaskPower’s former CEO, the Crown corporation had 
discussions with the federal government about the new federal regulations for greenhouse gas 
emissions for coal-burning power plants throughout much of 2010 and 2011. Despite this 
dialogue, the former SaskPower CEO says the corporation was caught off guard when the initial 
draft of the federal regulations was released, because they were “considerably different than we 
thought the dialogue had carried on with. We heard that the regulation was coming out going for 
as low as 375 tonnes per gigawatt hour and a coal-burning plant would be 45 years end-of-life” 
(Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan, 2013, p. 387). The former SaskPower CEO noted that 
such a standard would have gone even further than California and the United Kingdom. As a 
result, together with the CEOs of the other coal-burning power utilities in Canada – ATCO, 
TransAlta, New Brunswick Power, and Nova Scotia Power – SaskPower “put together a 
program, a commitment quite frankly, and went down to see the federal government, not only the 
Canadian Environment ministry, but also the Prime Minister’s Office” (Legislative Assembly of 
Saskatchewan, 2013, p. 387): 
SaskPower of course, working very close with our provincial government and 
counterparts, worked on a joint recommendation and in fact a joint commitment that we 
would commit that once a coal-burning plant hit 50 years, then it would either have to 
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convert to get CO2 emissions to 420 tonnes per gigawatt hour or you’d have to shut it 
down. Generally, that’s it. There’s some other nuances built into it, but that’s generally it. 
We concurred with that. … So as a result of that, SaskPower will be able to, quite frankly 
in our view for the long-term, keep the existing coal fleet in production: that’s the four 
Boundary Dam units, 3, 4, 5, and 6; the unit at Shand; and then the two units at Poplar 
River (Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan, 2013, p. 387). 
Preserving coal-fired electricity generation as part of the province’s electricity socio-technical 
regime was clearly a key priority for the government (interviews 1, 3 and 6). 
The government also briefly flirted with nuclear power, but quickly moved away from 
that option (Hurlbert et al., 2010; McNutt et al., 2011). In 2008, it launched the Uranium 
Development Partnership (UDP), which was tasked with identifying, evaluating, and making 
specific recommendations concerning Saskatchewan-based value-added opportunities to further 
develop the province’s uranium industry (Saskatchewan, 2008). Ontario-based Bruce Power even 
pitched a 1,000 MW nuclear power plant (Bruce Power, 2008). However, after the UDP 
consultation process, the government announced it would not endorse Bruce Power’s proposal 
for a large-scale nuclear power plant in Saskatchewan and said that public consultations and 
additional information and consultation would be required before any future decision to pursue 
nuclear power in the province (Saskatchewan, 2009a). 
The government has also taken relatively small steps to increase the province’s reliance 
on renewable power. In 2009, it launched two new programs, the Green Options Plan and the 
Green Options Partners Program, which it said would enable SaskPower to “more than double 
wind power production in the province” (Saskatchewan, 2009b). Under the Green Options Plan, 
SaskPower undertook a competitive process to obtain up to 175 MW of wind power from IPPs; 
and, under the Green Options Partners Program, SaskPower introduced a Standing Offer Program 
to procure up to 50 MW of renewable power from IPPs (Saskatchewan, 2009b). The Green 
Options Partners Program focused on projects between 100 kW and 10 MW in size (SaskPower 
  153 
2014a). Investments in renewable technologies paled in comparison to the resources devoted to 
CCS technology. 
 In 2009, the government tasked the Legislative Assembly’s Standing Committee on 
Crown and Central Agencies with conducting public consultations on the future of the province’s 
electricity sector. In particular, the committee focused on the following question: 
How should the government best meet the growing energy needs of the province, in a 
manner that is safe, reliable, and environmentally sustainable, while meeting any current 
and expected federal environmental standards and regulations, and maintaining a focus on 
affordability for Saskatchewan residents today and into the future? (Legislative Assembly 
of Saskatchewan, 2010, p. i). 
The Standing Committee’s final report summarized the themes that emerged during the public 
hearings:  
There were several themes that emerged from the presentations and written submissions 
during the public hearings. A prominent issue that became apparent was the cost and who 
was to bear the cost of upgrading, expanding and modernizing the electrical generation 
system. Many expressed a desire for conservation and efficiency measures because they 
are a means to mitigate growing energy needs and costs. A number of presenters and 
written submissions also detailed the desire for a decentralized mix of renewable energy 
sources to meet the expected growth and many wanted the ability to sell excess energy 
back to the grid for a profit. Some industry representatives noted the need for transitional 
sources of energy such as natural gas because it burns cleaner than other fossil fuels and is 
a flexible source of energy. Businesses, communities and representative organizations 
wanted to see an investment in baseload energy to ensure there is a reliable and stable 
energy supply for industry. Further, a number of presenters emphasized the need for 
reliable generation in the North which could be done in partnership with First Nation and 
Métis groups (Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan, 2010, p. i). 
The Standing Committee’s final recommendations largely told SaskPower to carry on, with 
language like “continue to invest in generation, transmission and distribution infrastructure;” 
“continue to ensure that a consistent and reliable amount of baseload energy is made available;” 
“continue to evaluate carbon capture and sequestration options;” “continue to work with 
neighbouring provinces and states to establish and strengthen interties and connections;” and 
“continue to add renewable energy sources to the generation mix” (Legislative Assembly of 
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Saskatchewan, 2010, p. 35-6). The Opposition members on the Standing Committee on Crown 
and Central Agencies refused to fully endorse the report, providing a minority opinion that 
argued:  
As can be seen from the finished report, the recommendations call primarily for 
SaskPower to continue doing what it has been doing, and fails to provide significant 
direction to either the Crown corporation or the Government of Saskatchewan which we 
maintain must play a significant role in supporting and encouraging alternative practices 
in producing power and getting it to the consumer (Legislative Assembly of 
Saskatchewan, 2010, p. 53). 
While SaskPower is working to somewhat increase its reliance on renewable sources of 
energy, it has every intention of continuing to rely heavily on coal and natural gas. During a 
legislative hearing, the Opposition’s critic for SaskPower asked, “In terms of a mix that 
SaskPower thinks would be the best mix, using non-renewable and renewable energy sources, 
what is the mix, the optimal mix at this point in time?” Then-SaskPower CEO Robert Watson 
responded by saying: 
That’s a fairly dynamic question and it probably changes every day and every year for 
sure. Certainly our recommendation is to keep the model de-risked. In other words, don’t 
go too far dependent upon one technology in that gas-burning plants seem to be the 
flavour of the day because gas is so cheap today. We firmly believe that it’s not going to 
be cheap for the long term but also we shouldn’t depend on gas, you know. … Over the 
next 40 years, gas will go up to about 40 per cent of the total of the fleet. Coal will drop to 
about 30 per cent just by protecting the fleet, and then we’ll make the rest up with, you 
know, arguably renewables” (Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan, 2013p. 383). 
SaskPower’s 2013 Annual Report states that it has a target of having nearly 30 per cent of its 
overall generation capacity consist of non-thermal fuel sources by 2016 (SaskPower, 2014b). 
However, SaskPower insists that, “it’s not practical for us to go, business-wise, for us to go 
[beyond 10 per cent wind power], now if somebody wants to tell us to do something different, 
that’s fine. But practically, business-wise, it’s not practical above 10 per cent” (Legislative 
Assembly of Saskatchewan, 2013p. 383). 
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About 80 per cent of SaskPower’s current generation capacity is supplied by its own 
assets – three coal-fired stations, seven hydroelectric stations, six natural gas stations and two 
wind facilities (SaskPower 2014b). SaskPower also has long-term power purchase agreements 
(PPAs) with several IPPs amounting to an additional 840 MW of capacity:  
• NRGreen Power Limited Partnership, for 20 MW from four heat recovery facilities;  
• ATCO Power Canada Ltd., in a joint partnership for the 228 MW natural gas-fired Cory 
Cogeneration Station near Saskatoon; 
• TransAlta and Husky Energy, for the 210 MW natural gas-fired Meridian Cogeneration 
Station near Lloydminster; 
• Northland Power Inc., for an 86 MW natural gas peaking facility in Esterhazy and a 260 
MW combined cycle natural gas facility in North Battleford;  
• Concord Pacific Group, for the 26.4 MW Red Lily Wind Energy Facility near Moosomin; 
and 
• Suncor Energy Inc. and Enbridge Inc., for the 11.2 MW SunBridge Wind Power Facility 
near Gull Lake.  
The government has also approved twenty-six environmentally friendly power projects, 
amounting to about 83 MW of capacity, through SaskPower’s Green Options Partners Program. 
The most recently available information regarding SaskPower’s Small Power Producers Program 
shows that there are just 10 participants in the program operating 12 projects – nine wind, one 
waste heat, one solar photovoltaic, and one combined heat and power. These projects receive 
$0.09802 per kWh, escalating at two per cent per year over a 20-year contract (Kozoriz, 2012). 
SaskPower also operates a net metering program. In 2013, there were just 362 customers in the 
program. SaskPower’s former CEO attributes the low uptake to the lack of subsidy:  
We don’t subsidize it like other jurisdictions do. Like there’s no feed-in tariff or anything 
like that. We don’t subsidize that for net metering, but it is a benefit to people who have 
particularly varying loads and stuff like that. … We are particularly looking at what went 
wrong elsewhere, that certainly in our humble view there’s other jurisdictions that put in a 
feed-in tariff that made the wrong people profit. … And what it did is concentrated the 
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benefits to a select few, quite frankly, in other jurisdictions (Legislative Assembly of 
Saskatchewan, 2013, p. 380-1). 
The government also established the SaskPower Self-Generated Electricity Demonstration 
Project for Rinks in 2011, installing wind turbines at municipal ice rinks in Central Butte, 
Eatonia, Shaunavon and Strasbourg. The government says that, “the data SaskPower obtains will 
help guide future programming decisions around customer self-generation and energy efficiency, 
for ice rinks and other commercial operations” (SaskPower, 2011). SaskPower’s current 10-year 
plan includes adding 1,450 MW of new generation by 2023, 70 per cent of which will be owned 
by IPPs, including natural gas, coal with CCS technology, wind, hydro and biomass (SaskPower, 
2014b). 
Advocates for the protection of Crown corporations in Saskatchewan have fought against 
power-purchase agreements (PPAs). The advocacy group Save Our Saskatchewan Crowns (2012) 
says: 
Rather than encouraging investment in new power infrastructure and power generation, 
the government is looking to shift money and control of our electricity to private out-of-
province companies. … As SaskPower customers, the owners and shareholders of the 
Crown Corporation, why are we on the hook for rate increases while private producers are 
reaping all the benefits? As the Saskatchewan government continues to sell off the 
province’s power, one PPA at a time, we must ask ourselves what the future will hold 20 
years from now. Will we be paying private out-of-province companies five times more 
than what it would cost to produce power ourselves and has that process already begun? 
Save Our Saskatchewan Crowns (2013) also says: 
Nearly 20 per cent of the power produced in the province in the coming years has been 
privatized through Power Purchase Agreements that take money away from the Crown 
and into profits for non-Saskatchewan-based companies like Northland and Algonquin 
Power of Ontario. … The government is taking away precious resources from SaskPower 
and is making the ideological decision to divert revenue from power rates to pad private 
corporate profits instead of improving the public grid. 
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However, despite this relatively limited criticism, a renewable energy lawyer says the move 
toward increased use of PPAs and IPPs has been an evolution that has largely occurred without a 
lot of public attention or even interest: 
If we look at public policy 10 years ago, there was a lot of talk about the benefits and 
opportunities surrounding renewable energy, but nothing really happened. ... This all 
changed about maybe seven or eight years ago with SaskPower looking at different ways 
to procure power. And it was at that time, the monopoly utility in Saskatchewan said, 
look, what we’re going to do is we’re going to go out to the market, we’re going to run 
RFPs, and we’re actually going to let independent power producers design, build and 
operate generation facilities here in the province and we’re just going to buy power from 
them at an agreed rate. ... So it’s just been a rather slow evolution over the last few years 
where there’s been more and more independent power producers doing more and different 
projects in the province (interview 8). 
The discourse coalition challenging the increased reliance on PPAs and IPPs has failed to 
effectively advance their storyline, so the dominant storyline and the broad political approach has 
remained largely unchallenged. 
The dominant storyline around the general policy direction with regard to the province’s 
electricity sector has been as follows: Saskatchewan has a 300-year supply of coal, which can be 
used to generate affordable electricity and fuel economic growth in the province, so it just makes 
good sense to continue relying on coal; by investing in CCS technology, Saskatchewan is leading 
the world and will be able to benefit from that by selling our technology and knowledge; 
SaskPower already has a diverse generation mix and will continue to rely on a variety of sources, 
including affordable renewable options, well into the future. The discourse coalition – the various 
actors that produced and used this storyline – consisted of the government and SaskPower. The 
coordinative, behind-the-scenes discourse focused on a variety of factors, including: minimizing 
the impact of the federal government’s new regulations respecting coal-fired power plants; 
delivering affordable power to Saskatchewan families and businesses; and using energy policy to 
achieve other policy objectives, such as increased investment (interviews 1, 4, 5 and 9). The 
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communicative discourse, which takes place in the public, focused primarily on delivering a high 
quality of life and a prosperous economy by providing reliable electricity at an affordable rate for 
Saskatchewan families and businesses. This dominant discourse served to restrict transformation 
of the socio-technical regime and led to $1.4 billion being poured into a single, regime-
reinforcing CCS project. 
Several of the early TIS functions are relevant to the Saskatchewan case: 
• Entrepreneurial experimentation – the province is still heavily engaged in experiments 
and demonstrations to prove the usefulness of niche innovations, mainly CCS, but also 
wind power through projects like its ice-rink pilot project; 
• Knowledge development – Saskatchewan is pouring a lot of resources into developing 
knowledge, primarily around CCS, with a small amount of resources going toward 
developing knowledge about other technologies; 
• Knowledge diffusion – the majority of Saskatchewan’s efforts on knowledge diffusion are 
focused on CCS; in 2012 alone, the VP of CCS spent $80,000 on out-of-province travel to 
workshops and conferences. SaskPower’s former CEO said, “what we’re really trying to 
do is monetize and materialize the lessons learned. So you have to go to conferences and 
you have to actually see suppliers” (Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan, 2013, p. 
395). 
The remaining TIS functions are not particularly well fulfilled in the Saskatchewan context. 
Guidance of the search and resource mobilization are almost exclusively focused on CCS 
technology; market formation is extremely minimal; and support from advocacy coalitions is 
relatively weak and scattered (interview 6), with some advocacy groups focusing on protecting 
SaskPower from any perceived privatization, including any PPAs with private corporations, and 
other advocacy groups focused on ensuring SaskPower never pursues nuclear power generation. 
As a result, Saskatchewan appears to have developed only one of the TIS motors, as specified in 
Suurs’ (2009) typology of motors, the science and technology push motor, which explains the 
very minimal progress it has made along the transformation pathway. 
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7.4 Involvement of First Nations in the Electricity Sector in Saskatchewan 
Saskatchewan is home to 74 First Nations consisting of five groups: Nêhiyawak 
(Woodland Cree, Swampy Cree and Plains Cree peoples), Nahkawininiwak (Saulteaux or 
Anishnaabe peoples), Denesuline (Dene or Chipewyan peoples) and the Dakota, Lakota and 
Nakota (Sioux) peoples. There are roughly 110,000 First Nations individuals in the province 
(AANDC, 2013). Treaties 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 10 cover the province, and were signed between 1871 
and 1907 (AANDC, 2010b). 
The history of Saskatchewan’s electricity development is marred by abuses of First 
Nations (Rude, 2013; interviews 1, 2, 5, 7, 9 and 10). For example, referring to the Island Falls 
hydroelectric development, which was discussed in the introductory chapter, Rude (2013) asserts 
that: 
They see this power plant as being their residential school. They see a lot of their 
challenges flowing from that, the loss of their status because of the construction of the 
plant, the marginalization by the company at the time, the marginalization by other First 
Nations as kind of secondary citizens, because though they reclaimed their status in 1985 
under Bill C-31, but they’re treated differently than other in Peter Ballantyne Cree Nation, 
so these are the things that they raise constantly with us. 
However, the legacy of poor treatment has primarily been limited to a few First Nations in 
northern Saskatchewan, and mainly due to hydro development; unlike other provinces, there have 
not been significant, lasting conflicts over transmission projects (interview 9). 
The Legislative Standing Committee on Crown and Central Agencies, as part of the 
recommendations coming out of its inquiry into the future of the province’s electricity sector, 
specifically recommended that “the Government of Saskatchewan ensure First Nation and Métis 
peoples continue to be involve in evaluating and participating in future energy options” 
(Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan, 2010, p. 37). During the committee’s public hearings, 
several witnesses emphasized the need to open up space for First Nations to participate in the 
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province’s electricity sector. Trent Blind, the CEO of George Gordon First Nation Holdings Inc. 
said, “First Nations want to be part of the solution as the sustainable nature of wind aligns with 
our beliefs about stewardship of the land and our relationship with Mother Nature” (Legislative 
Assembly of Saskatchewan, 2010, p. 11). Councilor Nataweyes of Peter Ballantyne Cree Nation 
said:  
We should be given priority status in becoming hydro development partners with 
SaskPower and Saskatchewan in the northeastern region. … We could provide the 
stimulus to move the projects forward and help meet the rural electrical demand in 
northeastern Saskatchewan and elsewhere. We are ready to enter a new era of co-
operation and partnership with SaskPower and Saskatchewan to work towards a positive 
energy future (Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan, 2010, p. 20). 
The committee’s final report recognized that, during public hearings, “First Nations and Métis 
involvement in power production was seen as a great opportunity for economic development in 
their communities and for a strong, provincial economy” (Legislative Assembly of 
Saskatchewan, 2010, p. 20). 
Around this time, the Meadow Lake Tribal Council and the Black Lake First Nation 
managed to negotiate tentative long-term power purchase agreements with SaskPower, for a 
biomass project and a hydroelectric project, respectively (interviews 1, 2, 5, 7 and 10). Both 
projects are still in progress, however the initial success of these projects sparked an increased 
appetite amongst other First Nations in the province (interview 7). A former chief of the 
Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations (FSIN) says that, “probably 100 per cent or maybe 
95 per cent of [First Nations in Saskatchewan] would want in on a power intiative” (interview 7). 
Because of this strong appetite to be involved in the electricity sector, the former FSIN chief also 
says: 
What we really wanted to do is to change the relationship with our stakeholders in 
government. Instead of continually kind of pointing the finger back at one another for not 
doing enough, we really had to take a look at what our strengths were. And some of those 
strengths were in collaboration, in a unified group of First Nations, and so we wanted to 
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look and learn from some of the examples from around the province that we had already 
established, and building of institutions like the Saskatchewan Indian Federated College, 
back in the 1970s, the establishment of the Saskatchewan Indian Gaming Authority, back 
in the 1990s. We said we need another economic development opportunity similar to the 
Indian Gaming Authority, which was a big boost in terms of employment opportunities 
for First Nations in Saskatchewan. … One area that the government had identified, and 
we identified, at least in previous conversations I had had with former leaders, is what if 
First Nations were to establish a SIGA-like entity, except looking at opportunities in 
alternative energies and power generation. … We felt that this was a way to create wealth 
and opportunity, not only for contracting and construction of these things, but also for 
long-term, steady revenue streams besides gaming revenue streams. We were looking at 
the resource sector as the next great opportunity for us to benefit from. Unless there’s a 
unified group similar to the gaming authority, with real human capacity at the helm of it, 
one-offing each project might have also been too costly and too time-consuming. And 
when you’re getting behind something like this, you really have to hit the ground running 
and get out of the gates early. … So the province thought, okay, we need a partner that 
can help to deliver and bring these groups under an umbrella. That umbrella eventually 
became the First Nations Power Authority (interview 7). 
In spring 2011, the provincial government, SaskPower, and the newly established First Nations 
Power Authority (FNPA) signed a memorandum of understanding intended to “help the 
province’s First Nations advance their power generation projects” (Saskatchewan, 2011). The 
provincial government proclaimed: 
Many Saskatchewan First Nations are already pursuing economic development 
opportunities through potentially owning and operating power generation projects … This 
will result in a higher probability of viable, long-term sustainable First Nation economic 
development opportunities while helping SaskPower meet the province’s electricity 
supply needs” (Saskatchewan, 2011).  
Leah Nelson-Guay, FNPA CEO, says,  
We arose out of a need, of growing interest among First Nations and IPPs to work to 
develop power projects here for SaskPower, and our role here is to facilitate the 
development process. We’re looking primarily to ensure full disclosure to First Nations 
on the project development process, the requirements, the timelines, the investments, to 
keep them in alignment with what the needs are (Nelson-Guay, 2013). 
An FNPA representative says that: 
The biomass project at Meadow Lake was essentially the impetus for FNPA. As they 
began that development process, they recognized that, not only for First Nations, but for 
any new entrants into the power sector, it’s a very difficult industry to enter. There’s a 
steep learning curve, there’s a lot of regulation, and there’s a lot of expertise and 
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knowledge that’s needed to properly navigate that whole process. So it was recognized, as 
Meadow Lake was doing its work, that a provincial entity would be very useful (interview 
10).  
The provincial government saw an organization like the FNPA as an opportunity to better 
coordinate the potential First Nations electricity projects (interview 7). 
In 2009, the Honourable Bill Boyd, Minister of Energy and Resources, noticed a 
revolving door at his office, whereby many Aboriginal businesses were professing that 
their ideas for energy generation were not being addressed by SaskPower. Mr. Boyd had 
the idea to consolidate these ideas for energy generation by the First Nations businesses. 
At first, the Meadow Lake Tribal Council was put in place as this intermediary, and they 
immediately recognized the opportunity of this. This would be one place, a depot of sorts, 
where the First Nations businesses could bring their concepts and where they could be 
professionally addressed and, if feasible, brought forth to SaskPower. MLTC carried this 
responsibility for a while, yet since the MLTC had vested interests of their own, the 
formation of the First Nations Power Authority became the inevitable solution (EHRC, 
2012). 
According to Minister Boyd, a key motivating factor for the establishment of the FNPA was to 
spur increased First Nations investment and employment: 
Well, I think the economics drive the discussion [around planning for the electricity 
sector, but] I think there’s also some public policy questions around that. I think that was 
part of the discussion around the First Nations Power Authority, was driven as not just 
about economics but about initiatives in terms of First Nations investment and 
employment. That was a part of the discussion. I don’t think it’s always just simply 
economics. I think there’s a number of things that go into that discussion and then you 
sort of try and, you know, prioritize them from there (Legislative Assembly of 
Saskatchewan, 2013p. 385). 
SaskPower says its relationship with the FNPA “is critical in aligning First Nations’ interest in 
developing power generation projects with SaskPower’s need to establish new generation 
supply” (SaskPower, 2013a, 26). SaskPower CEO Robert Watson says:  
We signed a memorandum of understanding with the First Nations Power Authority. This 
is a body that is now going out and with a standard to look for particular power 
opportunities throughout the First Nations in the province. We have allocated them an 
initial 10 megawatts that we will guarantee that we’ll develop for them, if under the right 
economic terms, and then future considerations. So we actually at SaskPower have funded 
them for $100,000 a year for three years in order to get them going. They are to be 
consultation, administration, and support for First Nations across the province in order to 
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identify and bring forward power opportunities. We think that’s a significant step forward 
(Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan, 2013p. 386). 
An interview participant who wears several hats related to this research, and who brings a 
First Nations perspective to the discussion, says that: 
The province, through the FNPA and SaskPower, made a concerted effort to begin to 
work with First Nations in power generation and on a number of different fronts. … So 
what happened is that the province began to change policy, with respect to SaskPower, 
and engaging First Nations in power generation projects. Previously, decades ago, 
SaskPower was the only agency that developed power generation in this province. When 
the Sask. Party came in, they said, no, no, we want to be more industry friendly, so they 
mandated that, in the future, all new power generation projects would be done by the 
private sector. … And, you know, what SaskPower recognizes is the new reality of today 
concerning the Duty to Consult and Accommodate, it’s highly unlikely that any major 
power generation project in this province would come about without impinging on some 
First Nation territories. … So realizing that they passed two policies – the Aboriginal 
procurement policy and the Aboriginal investment policy – which opened the door for 
them to begin to meaningfully engage First Nations in the development of power projects 
(interview 5). 
There is not a significant degree of consensus about this approach and the efficacy of the FNPA 
is certainly under dispute. For example, a wind power proponent says, “I basically think the 
FNPA is a clever little rouse by SaskPower to stick all the First Nations in a box and manage 
them” (interview 3). On the other hand, a SaskPower employee disagrees: “No, I wouldn’t say 
it’s to put them into a box, I think what we’re trying to do is build knowledge and capacity in 
First Nations communities about power generation projects” (interview 9). 
 In terms of the overlap of its own strategic interests and First Nations’ ability to 
participate in the sector, SaskPower identifies that the main focus is on hydro, wind, forestry 
biomass, heat recovery, and natural gas (Rude, 2013) (Figure 7-1). 
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Figure 7-1.  SaskPower’s assessment of First Nations participation (Rude, 2013) 
Currently, no First Nations are generating electricity in Saskatchewan. There is one 36-
MW biomass project under development, which is owned by nine First Nations, through their 
tribal council. A 50-MW hydroelectric project, which would be a partnership between SaskPower 
and one First Nation, is in the final stages of approval. And one 800-kW energy storage 
demonstration project, which is a partnership between one First Nation and the Saskatchewan 
Research Council, is under development. 
In October 2011, the provincial government and SaskPower announced approval of a 25-
year PPA with the Meadow Lake Bioenergy Centre, a 36-MW biomass project led by the 
Meadow Lake Tribal Council (MLTC). The Minister Responsible for SaskPower said:  
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This is the first project to come through the support of FNPA, which reflects the vision of 
the Government of Saskatchewan to actively engage First Nations in the province’s 
growing economy. The project will have a direct and positive impact on the local 
community and surrounding area, while adding greener and cleaner energy to 
Saskatchewan’s power grid (SaskPower, 2011). 
In 2011, Black Lake First Nation in the far north of the province invited SaskPower to 
partner with it in the Tazi Twé Hydroelectric Project. In February 2013, SaskPower signed an 
agreement-in-principle to proceed with the project, which is expected to generate 50 MW of 
electricity beginning in December 2017. This would be the first power production facility built 
entirely on First Nations land within Saskatchewan (SaskPower, 2013b). 
In 2012, SaskPower signed a 20-year PPA with Cowessess First Nation for the 800-kW 
wind storage demonstration project near Regina, on which it is partnering with the Saskatchewan 
Research Council (SRC) (SaskPower, 2013a). Cowessess First Nation (2013) says that this 
project is “North America’s first wind turbine and lithium-ion battery system.” The SRC says, 
“this project allows SRC and Cowessess the exciting and innovative opportunity to develop and 
evaluate a variety of strategies and to demonstrate the potential benefits of coupling energy 
storage with wind energy” (Cowessess First Nation, 2013). 
This research reveals that many of the key elements identified in the literature as 
necessary for successful First Nations participation in the electricity sector (Krupa, 2012; 
Henderson, 2013) were not fulfilled in Saskatchewan to nearly the same extent as in Nova Scotia 
or Ontario (interviews 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9 and 10). The government’s embrace of clean energy projects 
has been relatively minimal, with its main focus instead on regime-reinforcing CCS technology. 
The government has created the FNPA as an agency to help First Nations navigate the 
complicated process of seeking to enter the electricity sector, but the government has not created 
easy mechanisms that facilitate the sale of electricity to the grid, such as the COMFIT in Nova 
Scotia or the FIT in Ontario. On a number of First Nations, there are committed and capable local 
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leaders serving as project champions, and strong governance to support the projects and ensure 
accountable and transparent financial management (interviews 2, 5, 7, 9 and 10). However, 
partnerships with private sector companies that can help to increase the capacity, capability and 
confidence of First Nations are actually somewhat difficult to access (interviews 2, 5 and 7).  
7.5 Conclusion 
Saskatchewan’s electricity socio-technical regime faced a variety of pressures, including 
aging infrastructure and rising demand. The most significant pressure was the external climate 
change policy agenda. However, none of these pressures have been significant enough to force 
meaningful change upon the province’s electricity socio-technical regime. Saskatchewan has 
largely responded to these pressures by adopting CCS technology, which reinforces the existing 
system and ensures that coal-fired generation will remain a big part of the province’s electricity 
generation mix well into the future. As a result, while Saskatchewan has taken very minimal 
steps along a transformation pathway, it has largely proceeded down a reproduction path. 
The minimal progress Saskatchewan has made along the transformation pathway can be 
explained by the relatively weak fulfillment of the TIS functions. Entrepreneurial 
experimentation, knowledge development, knowledge diffusion, guidance of the search, and 
resource mobilization are all heavily focused on regime-reinforcing CCS technology. Market 
formation is almost non-existent and support from advocacy coalitions is comparatively weak 
and scattered. As a result, Saskatchewan has only developed the most immature TIS motor: the 
science and technology push motor. 
Political dynamics have played a significant role in the trajectory of Saskatchewan’s 
electricity system. The dominant storyline used by the government and SaskPower has focused 
on the fact that: Saskatchewan has a 300-year supply of coal, which can be used to generate 
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affordable electricity and fuel economic growth in the province, so it just makes good sense to 
continue relying on coal; by investing in CCS technology, Saskatchewan is leading the world and 
will be able to benefit from that by selling our technology and knowledge; SaskPower already 
has a diverse generation mix and it will continue to rely on a variety of sources, including 
affordable renewable options, well into the future. The discourse coalition – the various actors 
that produced and used this storyline – consisted of the government and SaskPower. The 
coordinative discourse focused on minimizing the impact of the federal government’s new 
regulations respecting coal-fired power plants; delivering affordable power to Saskatchewan 
families and businesses; and using energy policy to achieve other policy objectives. The 
communicative discourse focused primarily on delivering a high quality of life and a prosperous 
economy by providing reliable electricity at affordable rates to Saskatchewan families and 
businesses. This dominant discourse served to restrict transformation of the socio-technical 
regime and led to $1.4 billion being poured into a single, regime-reinforcing CCS project. 
Despite the heavy focus on CCS and minimal changes to the socio-technical regime, the 
government has opened up space for IPPs to participate in the electricity sector. Currently, a bit 
less than 20 per cent of SaskPower’s electricity comes from IPPs. Over the next decade, 
SaskPower intends to add 1,450 MW of new, approximately 1,015 MW of which will be owned 
and operated by IPPs. The government also helped to establish the First Nations Power 
Authority, which is mandated to strengthen the capacity of First Nations to participate in and 
benefit from the electricity sector. While no First Nations are yet generating electricity in the 
province, projects amounting to about 87 MW, involving 11 First Nations, are currently in 
progress. 
Table 7-2 outlines the operationalization of the analytical framework in Saskatchewan. 
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Table 7-2.  Operationalization of analytical framework in Saskatchewan  
Concept Key dimensions Saskatchewan case 
Socio-technical 
regime 
Various components 
(policy, science, 
technology, industry, 
markets/user 
preferences and culture) 
that serve to stabilize 
and support the existing 
institutions 
- Centralized generation, primarily coal- and gas-
fired, operated by a publicly owned monopoly 
Niche-level 
innovations 
Different technologies, 
actors, networks and 
institutions than those 
stabilizing and 
supporting the existing 
institutions 
- Technologies: Main emphasis on CCS with 
peripheral focus on increasing reliance on IPPs 
- Actors: First Nations Power Authority, IPPs 
Landscape Natural environment, 
macro-economy, 
political culture, 
demographic 
characteristics and 
worldviews 
- Minimal regime-destabilizing effects at the 
landscape level, including little pressure for action 
to mitigate climate change 
TIS Functions TIS functions: (1) 
entrepreneurial 
experimentation; (2) 
knowledge 
development; (3) 
knowledge diffusion; 
(4) guidance of the 
search; (5) market 
formation; (6) resource 
mobilization; and (7) 
support from advocacy 
coalitions 
TIS motors: (1) science 
and technology push 
(STP) motor; (2) 
entrepreneurial motor; 
(3) system building 
motor; and (4) market 
motor 
- Entrepreneurial experimentation, knowledge 
development, knowledge diffusion, guidance of the 
search, and resource mobilization are all heavily 
focused on regime-reinforcing CCS technology  
- Market formation is almost non-existent and 
support from advocacy coalitions is relatively 
weak and scattered.  
- Saskatchewan has only developed the most 
immature TIS motor, the STP motor. 
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Concept Key dimensions Saskatchewan case 
Storyline Narratives, structuring 
ideas and themes, 
problem framing, 
metaphors, analogies, 
historical references, 
appeals to fear or guilt, 
cognitive and normative 
ideas 
- Saskatchewan has a 300-year supply of coal, 
which can be used to generate affordable 
electricity and fuel economic growth in the 
province, so it just makes good sense to continue 
relying on coal 
- By investing in CCS technology, Saskatchewan is 
leading the world and will be able to benefit from 
that by selling our technology and knowledge 
- SaskPower already has a diverse generation mix 
and it will continue to rely on a variety of sources, 
including affordable renewable options, well into 
the future 
Coordinative 
discourse 
Behind-the-scenes 
discussions and 
negotiations involving 
elected officials, civil 
servants, experts and 
interest groups 
- Minimizing the impact of the federal 
government’s new regulations respecting coal-
fired power plants 
- Delivering affordable power to Saskatchewan 
families and businesses 
- Using energy policy to achieve other policy 
objectives (i.e., increased investment and 
employment of First Nations) 
Communicative 
discourse 
Public discussion of 
ideas and public 
announcements of 
decisions 
- Delivering a high-quality of life and a prosperous 
economy by providing reliable electricity at 
affordable rates to Saskatchewan families and 
businesses  
Discourse 
coalitions 
The coalition of actors 
producing and using a 
particular storyline 
- Government and SaskPower using dominant 
storyline 
Effects of 
discourse 
Key actors’ use of 
ideas, concepts and 
categories 
- Minimal public debate over reliance on fossil fuel-
based electricity generation 
 Effects on government 
policy and 
organizational practice 
- $1.4 billion investment in CCS project 
- Establishment of a variety of relatively small 
programs to support increased reliance on 
renewable power 
- Establishment of First Nations Power Authority 
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Concept Key dimensions Saskatchewan case 
Transition 
dynamics 
Changes in the regime - Minimal changes in the regime 
- A niche innovation is being used to reinforce the 
regime 
- Regime rules are being slightly adjusted to allow 
for increased use of IPPs, including but not 
limited to those generating electricity using 
renewable sources 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
  
This dissertation is aimed at answering two specific questions: (1) how can the various 
elements of sustainability transition studies be combined and augmented to develop an integrated 
sustainability transition framework that is relevant to the Canadian context? And (2) how can 
insights provided by an integrated sustainability transition framework help us understand the 
likelihood of First Nations participation in sustainable electricity transitions? The nature of these 
research questions requires that I first develop an integrated sustainability transition framework, 
drawing on the existing literature as well as this research, and then extend that framework to 
address the issue of First Nations participation in sustainable electricity transitions. In this 
chapter, I outline my answers to each of the research questions; unpack the conclusions at which I 
have arrived; discuss relevant insights and potential recommendations for policy makers and First 
Nations leaders; outline the contributions to knowledge achieved through this dissertation; and 
discuss possible avenues for further research. 
Based on this research, I assert the following conclusions to answer the first question: 
• The MLP provides a sound and adequate heuristic framework to outline and explain the 
various complex dynamics that are involved in sustainability transitions of electricity 
systems; 
• In particular, the MLP framework provides useful insights into whether or not a window 
of opportunity will open that allows a sustainability transition to occur; 
• The typology of transition pathways (Geels & Schot, 2007) provides valuable insights 
into the likely direction of the transition; 
• The various TIS functions specified by Bergek et al. (2008), Suurs and Hekkert (2008) 
and Suurs (2009), combined with Suurs’ (2009) typology of TIS motors, add an important 
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element of agency to the framework and provide beneficial insights into the rate of 
progress along the particular transition pathways; 
• Hajer’s (1993; 1995) discourse coalition theory adds depth, by inserting an even greater 
degree of agency into the framework, and by explaining the political dynamics involved; 
and 
• By combining elements of the MLP and TIS frameworks, and supplementing them with 
elements of discourse coalition theory, I propose an integrated sustainability transition 
framework that is helpful, robust, and advances the field of sustainability transition 
studies. 
In answer to the second research question, I assert the following conclusions: 
• An integrated sustainability transition framework, which incorporates the relevant 
political dynamics and specific functions needed for successful First Nations 
involvement, can provide a helpful understanding of First Nations participation in 
sustainable electricity transitions; 
• Successful First Nations participation is more likely to occur where governments are 
actively seeking to engage in reconciliation efforts and resurgence support, where 
governments have a strong focus on extending opportunity and prosperity to First Nations 
communities, and where governments are proud of such efforts and do not see them as a 
political liability; 
• The type of political dynamics that are needed include an embrace of distributed, clean 
energy projects and a deliberate choice to open space for new actors to participate in the 
sector, including mechanisms that facilitate the sale of electricity to the provincial grid, 
and other government policies and programs that foster participation in the sector. Such 
dynamics create the opening for First Nations actors at the niche level to enter the socio-
technical regime; 
• In order to achieve the momentum needed to take advantage of the window of 
opportunity, First Nations actors need a project champion, stable governance, access to 
cash, partnerships with the private sector, and must ensure that the focus remains on 
sustainable development and delivery of benefits to the entire community. The fulfillment 
of these functions serves as a launching pad through the window of opportunity and into 
the socio-technical regime. 
In the following sections, I unpack and explore these conclusions and present my 
integrated sustainability transition framework, with two versions: the first focusing on the 
specific functions related to technological innovations, which answers my first research question; 
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and the second focusing on the specific functions related to First Nations participation in 
electricity transitions, which answers my second research question. 
8.1 An Integrated Sustainability Transition Framework 
 The electricity sector is highly complex, especially due to the layering of multiple 
generation technologies and the central role of electricity in both economic development and 
public welfare. This makes it difficult to cleanly apply sustainability transition theory to this 
particular sector (Rosenbloom and Meadowcroft, 2014). Nevertheless, the insights offered by the 
field of sustainability transition studies are highly useful for improving our understanding of the 
various dynamics involved in transitions of electricity sectors. 
The MLP provides a sound and adequate heuristic framework to outline and explain the 
various complex dynamics that are involved in sustainability transitions of electricity systems. In 
particular, the MLP framework provides useful insights into whether or not a window of 
opportunity will open that allows a sustainability transition to occur within a particular electricity 
system. Each of the three provinces discussed in this dissertation experienced landscape-level 
pressure. Nova Scotia faced a decline in domestic coal supplies; the soaring costs of importing 
coal; public resentment toward the privatized electrical utility; the trend toward increased 
competition within electricity systems elsewhere; and the growing pressure for climate change 
mitigation. Ontario also experienced growing calls for climate change mitigation, but more 
importantly, it faced the impact of coal-fired electricity generation on population health; the 
blackout of August 2003 and subsequent demand for a more resilient electricity system; as well 
as the economic crisis of 2008 and 2009, and the resulting pressure to spur investment and create 
jobs. Saskatchewan faced aging infrastructure and demand growth, but the most significant 
landscape pressure it faced was the external climate change policy agenda, in particular the 
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federal government’s new regulations for coal-fired power plants. The pressure on the existing 
socio-technical regime was especially strong in Nova Scotia and Ontario, and it was less strong in 
Saskatchewan, as is made clear by the fact that Saskatchewan successfully negotiated a reduction 
in the severity of the landscape pressure by partnering with other coal-based power utilities to get 
the federal government to pare back its regulations for coal-fired power plants. 
 Nova Scotia, Ontario and Saskatchewan responded differently to the pressures each of 
them faced. Nova Scotia brought in relatively aggressive targets for renewables and for GHG 
emission reductions, instituted hard caps on Nova Scotia Power’s emissions, and established the 
COMFIT program to support distributed generation. As a result, Nova Scotia has implemented 
89 COMFIT projects and, with other renewable projects added in, is well on its way to achieving 
25 per cent renewables by 2015 and 40 per cent by 2020. Ontario chose to force coal-fired 
electricity generation out of its electricity regime and, through initiatives such as the FIT 
program, is ramping up its reliance on renewable energy and moderately increasing natural gas-
fired generation to make up for the roughly 25 per cent of its generation mix previously supplied 
by coal. While Saskatchewan has undertaken some measures to increase reliance on renewable 
power, the vast majority of its resources have been devoted to CCS technology, which is serving 
to reinforce its coal-dominated electricity system. Clearly, the socio-technical regimes in Nova 
Scotia and Ontario were not able to withstand the landscape pressure and the criticism from 
outside voices that each of them faced and, as a result, a window of opportunity opened allowing 
a degree of change in their socio-technical regime. In Saskatchewan, the socio-technical regime 
has largely been able to withstand the landscape pressure and, as such, is currently being 
buttressed with regime-reinforcing niche innovations, rather than being significantly disrupted in 
any way. 
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 The typology of transition pathways (Geels & Schot, 2007) provides valuable insights 
into the likely direction of the transition. While Saskatchewan has largely remained on a 
reproduction pathway, it is fair to say that all three provinces embarked on a transformation 
pathway, to varying degrees. This pathway tends to be followed when landscape-level pressure 
occurs at a time when fully developed niche innovations already exist. Regime actors respond to 
the landscape pressure by adjusting their development paths, including through the adoption of 
niche innovations that add to the regime without substantially altering its basic architecture. 
While Nova Scotia and Ontario exhibit some elements of technological substitution, it would be 
inaccurate to characterize those provinces as being on a technological substitution pathway, 
primarily because the niche innovations adopted have not been disruptive to the system. To be 
characterized as reconfiguration, the provinces would have had to adopt niche innovations as a 
result of problems within the regime, with the aim of improving the regime’s performance; these 
component innovations would have then led to an overhaul of the basic architecture of the 
regime, or they would be well on their way to doing so. And to be characterized as de-alignment 
and re-alignment, significant landscape pressure would have led to regime actors losing faith and 
reducing investments in the existing technology, thereby opening up space for multiple niche 
innovations to co-exist and compete until one becomes dominant and stabilizes into a new 
regime. In each of the three provinces studied, the changes that occurred were a response to 
landscape-level pressure and outsider criticism; the niche innovations that were adopted were not 
disruptive to the existing socio-technical regime; the new actors that were invited to participate in 
the sector did not displace the incumbent actors; and the new knowledge involved was essentially 
added on to the existing knowledge. As such, each of these pathways is most appropriately 
characterized as transformation. 
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 The various TIS functions specified by Bergek et al. (2008), Suurs and Hekkert (2008) 
and Suurs (2009), combined with Suurs’ (2009) typology of TIS motors, add an important 
element of agency to the framework and provide beneficial insights into the rate of progress 
along the particular transition pathways. As noted in Chapter 4, I do not follow the traditional TIS 
approach, which focuses on the various dynamics at play in the emergence of new technologies 
and new products. I do not incorporate the TIS functions in a manner that is focused on moving a 
new technology from the concept phase to the commercialization phase. Rather, my analytical 
framework generally focuses on the deployment of technologies to new contexts. 
In both Nova Scotia and Ontario, entrepreneurial experimentation, knowledge 
development and knowledge diffusion were not crucial, because the adopted niche innovations 
were already proven. However, in both of those provinces, the following TIS functions were well 
fulfilled: guidance of the search, with positive and negative signals established through policy 
directives; market formation, with a bridging market; resource mobilization, with an array of 
incentives and support programs; and support from advocacy coalitions. In Saskatchewan, 
entrepreneurial experimentation, knowledge development, knowledge diffusion, guidance of the 
search, and resource mobilization are all heavily focused on CCS technology, which reinforces 
the province’s existing electricity socio-technical regime. Market formation is almost non-
existent in Saskatchewan and support from advocacy coalitions is relatively weak and scattered. 
The fulfillment of these TIS functions help to explain how much progress these provinces have 
made: Nova Scotia and Ontario are further ahead in their transformation of their electricity 
systems, in significant part because they have adopted niche innovations that are already proven 
and stabilized; meanwhile Saskatchewan is heavily focused on proving CCS technology, and 
expending less resources on adopting proven renewable power innovations. 
  177 
Hajer’s (1993; 1995) discourse coalition theory adds depth, by inserting an even greater 
degree of agency into the framework, and by explaining the political dynamics involved. In Nova 
Scotia, the dominant discourse focused on the following storyline: bringing stability and 
affordability to electricity rates; unshackling from foreign coal; taking back control of the 
province’s energy future; creating good jobs and boosting the economy; leading Canada, North 
America and the world; creating a cleaner, greener province; all, in significant part, by supporting 
local, community-based renewable power projects. The discourse coalition in Nova Scotia that 
produced and used that storyline is best described as a loose blend of government, political 
parties, First Nations actors, and advocacy groups. In Ontario, the dominant discourse focused on 
the following storyline: phasing out dirty coal-fired power plants means cleaner air and better 
health for Ontarians; more renewable energy means new investments in our economy and more 
jobs for Ontarians; Ontario is leading North America; focusing on distributed generation from 
smaller, cleaner sources rather than relying exclusively on large, centralized power plants means 
a more reliable system and more opportunities for smaller power producers, communities, First 
Nations, and others to become generators. The discourse coalition in Ontario that produced and 
used that storyline is also best described as a relatively loose coalition of government and 
political actors and advocacy groups. In Saskatchewan, the dominant discourse focused on the 
following storyline: Saskatchewan has a 300-year supply of coal, which can be used to generate 
affordable electricity and fuel economic growth in the province, so it just makes good sense to 
continue relying on coal; by investing in CCS technology, Saskatchewan is leading the world and 
will be able to benefit from that by selling technology and knowledge; and SaskPower already 
has a diverse generation mix and will continue to rely on a variety of sources, including 
affordable and reliable renewable options, well into the future. The discourse coalition that 
produced and used that storyline is really best described as government, including SaskPower, 
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which reflects the relative dominance of the government over the electricity sector in the 
province. In all three provinces, this discourse has solidified into institutions and organizational 
practices, thereby fueling TIS motors, and leading to varying degrees of transformation of the 
socio-technical regime. 
By combining elements of the MLP and TIS frameworks, and supplementing them with 
elements of discourse coalition theory, I propose an integrated sustainability transition framework 
that is helpful, robust, and advances the field of sustainability transition studies. Chapter Two 
articulated some of the complementary strengths of the MLP and TIS frameworks, as identified 
in the literature. In particular, the MLP framework is better than the TIS framework at taking into 
account the system’s broader environment, especially landscape-level dynamics. The TIS 
framework has a more analytical approach than the MLP framework, because of its elaborated 
functional analyses, and because of its more explicit incorporation of agency, which is important 
because the MLP framework is particularly lacking in the conceptual tools to adequately explore 
niche-level dynamics and it has little to offer with regard to agency.  
The integrated sustainability transition framework that I propose (Figure 8-1) incorporates 
the TIS functions and motors within the MLP framework: (1) the science and technology push 
motor, which includes knowledge development, knowledge diffusion, guidance of the search, and 
resource mobilization; (2) the entrepreneurial motor, which adds entrepreneurial experimentation 
and support from advocacy coalitions; (3) the system building motor, which adds support from 
advocacy coalitions; and (4) the market motor, in which support from advocacy coalitions is no 
longer a crucial element. Fulfillment of the TIS functions serves as the primary explanation for 
the success of niche innovations at reaching and impacting the socio-technical regime. Put 
another way, fulfillment of the TIS functions serves as the primary explanation for progress made 
along a particular transition pathway. 
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Both the MLP and TIS approaches have largely ignored the role played by politics in 
sustainability transitions. The integrated sustainability transition framework that I propose 
explicitly incorporates politics into the framework (note the thick, dashed lines in Figure 8-1). It 
recognizes that political dynamics can support or hinder developments at the niche level; they can 
serve to blunt pressure from the landscape level; and they can respond to landscape-level pressure 
by opening a window of opportunity for change to occur and by creating space for niche-level 
actors and innovations within the socio-technical regime. 
 
 
Figure 8-1.  Integrated sustainability transition framework 
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This framework provides an answer to the first research question of this dissertation, 
which asked how the various elements of sustainability transition studies can be combined and 
augmented to develop an integrated sustainability transition framework. However, it does not go 
far enough to address the second research question: how can the insights provided by an 
integrated sustainability transition framework help us understand the likelihood of First Nations 
participation in sustainable electricity transitions? TIS functions are focused on specific niche 
technologies, rather than actor groups. The next section outlines what this research reveals about 
First Nations participation and presents alternative functions for the integrated framework. 
8.2 The Likelihood of First Nations Participation in the Electricity Sector  
There are various ways to evaluate the relative success of each of the three provinces 
covered in this dissertation. From a simple participation perspective, Nova Scotia is undoubtedly 
the most impressive, with 100 per cent of First Nations in the province participating in the 
electricity sector; followed by 28 per cent in Ontario; and 15 per cent in Saskatchewan. From a 
project-based perspective, Ontario leads the way, not surprisingly, with 243 projects; six projects 
in Nova Scotia; and three projects in Saskatchewan. From a wattage-based perspective, Ontario is 
far ahead of the pack, with First Nations in that province generating or soon to be generating 690 
MW; followed by 87 MW in Saskatchewan; and 27 MW in Nova Scotia. From an average 
wattage perspective, Saskatchewan tops the list with an average of 43 MW per First Nation 
project – leaving out the very small demonstration project in the province – followed by a 4.5 
MW average in Nova Scotia and a 2.8 MW average in Ontario. And from a relative grid-impact 
perspective, First Nations electricity generation projects amount to approximately two per cent of 
available generating capacity in Ontario and Saskatchewan and one per cent in Nova Scotia. 
While it could be argued that each of these measures is the most worthwhile measure upon which 
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to focus, I take the view that simple participation combined with average project size is the most 
useful indicator of relative success of First Nations participation in the electricity sector. Any 
other measure is too easily distorted by relative size of province or the relative number of First 
Nations located within the province. Therefore, using what I argue are the most accurate 
measures, Nova Scotia has clearly had the greatest success in terms of First Nations participation 
in the electricity sector, followed by Ontario, and then Saskatchewan. 
 A variety of factors contributed to this relative level of success. At its most basic level, 
Nova Scotia set out to achieve a significant reduction in coal-fired electricity generation and, as a 
result, a significant increase in renewable power. Ontario had a similar dynamic to Nova Scotia in 
that regard. On the other end of the spectrum, Saskatchewan set out to achieve the least in this 
regard, choosing instead to focus most of its resources on regime-reinforcing CCS technology. 
Therefore, even just based on the general policy direction in each province, it would be expected 
that Nova Scotia and Ontario would have a greater level of success than Saskatchewan in terms 
of First Nations participation. 
 At another fundamental level, what is undoubtedly a contributing factor to the varying 
degrees of success observed in this dissertation is the number of First Nations in each province. 
With just 13 First Nations in Nova Scotia, and with all of them Mi’kmaw, it was comparatively 
easy for Nova Scotia’s First Nations to collaborate on a renewable energy strategy and jointly 
own renewable power projects. The situation is not so straightforward in Ontario, with 133 First 
Nations consisting of a variety of linguistic groups, or in Saskatchewan, with 74 First Nations, 
also consisting of several different linguistic groups. But there are deeper factors at play here then 
each of the province’s general policy directions or the number of First Nations within each of the 
provinces. 
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In part to respond to specific landscape pressure, and in part to address particular political 
dynamics in the province, and in part to respond to lessons learned from FIT programs elsewhere, 
Nova Scotia specifically chose to introduce a community-focused FIT program. That made it 
relatively easy and straightforward for First Nations in Nova Scotia to participate in the program. 
Ontario chose to include an Aboriginal price-adder in its FIT program to incentivize partnerships 
with First Nations communities and businesses. While Ontario’s approach has not achieved the 
same level of success as Nova Scotia, it’s success is still quite considerable. Saskatchewan chose 
to establish the First Nations Power Authority to be a liaison between First Nations, SaskPower 
and the government and specifically to help negotiate 20-year PPAs. SaskPower does not provide 
any special financial incentive for First Nations power projects. So far, Saskatchewan has 
achieved the lowest level of success in terms of First Nations participation in the electricity 
sector. 
What this research also reveals is that successful First Nations participation is more likely 
to occur where governments are actively seeking to engage in reconciliation efforts, resurgence 
support, and a strong focus on extending opportunity and prosperity to First Nations 
communities. And that is especially the case when governments are proud of such efforts and do 
not see them as a potential political liability. This is not to say that government’s efforts in Nova 
Scotia and Ontario are entirely altruistic and that they did not have to be pushed to act. The case 
studies in this dissertation make it clear that a series of court cases and protests led governments 
in both Nova Scotia and Ontario to change their approach to First Nations within their respective 
provinces. But, despite the less than virtuous records that these provinces had and the need for 
court cases and protests to prompt action, their commitment to reconciliation and supporting First 
Nations resurgence is notable – this is especially so for the Nova Scotia government, but also the 
Ontario government. In Nova Scotia, Premier Darrell Dexter took on the portfolio of Aboriginal 
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Relations, and his successor, Premier Stephen McNeil, has retained that portfolio. The Dexter 
government made a concerted effort to work in partnership with First Nations in Nova Scotia, to 
achieve greater economic and social benefits. Part of that was supporting the development of a 
Mi’kmaq Renewable Energy Strategy, and collaborating with the Assembly of Nova Scotia 
Mi’kmaq Chiefs. Granted, a former politician in the Dexter government told me that very few 
Nova Scotians were paying attention to such matters, so the potential for political backlash was 
minimal (interview 4). However, that same politician stressed that racism, discrimination and 
misunderstanding are somewhat rampant in the province, so the government’s stand is still 
notable for the courage and principle that was at its foundation. This almost certainly contributed 
to the level of success Nova Scotia has achieved in terms of First Nations participation in its 
electricity sector.  
Ontario has had a somewhat similar dynamic to Nova Scotia. Certainly, Ontario was 
forced to confront some harsh realities because of court cases, various protests, the police 
shooting of an unarmed First Nations man, the subsequent inquiry into that shooting, and the 
additional protests that occurred as a result. But the McGuinty government clearly saw 
reconciliation and resurgence support as one of its priorities and it set out to achieve that in a 
variety of ways. McGuinty appointed the first Minister of Aboriginal Affairs. McGuinty’s 
government also established Aboriginal set-asides in procurement projects and included an 
Aboriginal price adder in its FIT program. This was critical to the success of First Nations 
involvement in the electricity sector in Ontario.  
The dynamic in Saskatchewan is a bit murkier. In Saskatchewan, the current government 
actually eliminated the standalone Ministry of First Nations and Métis Relations in late 2007 and 
made it a branch of the Ministry of Government Relations. The current government not only 
shies away from anything considered a ‘special deal’ for First Nations, but the governing party 
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has also run attack ads characterizing their opponents as being in favour of ‘special deals’ for 
First Nations people (Mandryk, 2013). That said, the current Saskatchewan government did 
support the creation of the FNPA and signed a long-term PPA with a First Nations-owned 
biomass plant. It is also pursuing a partnership with another First Nation for a hydroelectric 
project, and is partnering with another First Nation for a small wind energy storage 
demonstration project. Despite these few examples, the overall political dynamic in 
Saskatchewan – in which the current government is loathe to anything that might be deemed a 
‘special deal’ for First Nations – is almost certainly a key contributing factor to the relatively low 
level of success the province has experienced when it comes to First Nations involvement in its 
electricity sector. 
It is well beyond the scope of this particular dissertation to assess all 220 First Nations in 
Nova Scotia, Ontario and Saskatchewan, so it is not possible for me to properly factor in the 
relative capacity, capability and confidence of the First Nations in each province. However, while 
there is a wide spectrum of First Nations within each province, from quite poor to quite 
financially secure, I would not anticipate significant differences in the average First Nation 
profile between the three provinces and I would not anticipate that any such differences would be 
significant enough to account for differences in the relative level of success observed in this 
study. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the same factors for successful First Nations 
participation were identified in all three of the provincial case studies. 
It is helpful to consider those factors for successful First Nations participation as 
important TIS functions. While this is a deviation from the TIS literature, I assert that it is a 
helpful addition to the sustainability transitions field. Drawing on the most relevant literature on 
First Nations involvement in the renewable electricity sector (Krupa 2012; Henderson 2013), and 
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drawing on my own research in Nova Scotia, Ontario and Saskatchewan, I propose the following 
list of factors that contribute to successful First Nations participation in the electricity sector: 
1. An embrace of distributed, clean energy projects by governments, utilities and regulators, 
which provides project proponents with long-term clarity about the electricity sector; 
2. Mechanisms that facilitate the sale of electricity to the provincial grid and other 
government policies and programs that foster participation in the sector; 
3. A project champion on the First Nation, and strong, stable governance which ensures an 
appropriate degree of separation of political and business decisions; 
4. Access to sufficient financial resources to enable revenue-generating activities; 
5. Partnerships with experienced actors, which not only leverage additional capital, but also 
bring beneficial knowledge to the table, thereby enhancing the capacity, capability and 
confidence of the involved First Nations; and 
6. A focus on sustainable development, ensuring the projects meets economic, 
environmental and social standards, and deliver real benefits to the whole community, 
which in turn leads to greater buy-in and a higher likelihood of long-term success. 
In Figure 8-2, I present the same integrated sustainability transition framework that was 
presented in Figure 8-1, but with different functional analysis. As discussed previously, the TIS 
functions and motors outlined in the literature (Bergek et al., 2008; Suurs, 2009; Suurs & 
Hekkert, 2009a; Suurs & Hekkert, 2009b) focus on niche-level technological innovations, and 
fail to provide sufficient help in understanding the possibilities for non-traditional actors to 
participate in transitions of socio-technical regimes. As such, in Figure 8-2, I replace the TIS 
functions with the functions that are applicable to First Nations actors, according to my research. 
Admittedly, this is a deviation from the TIS literature, but I assert that it is necessary to better 
understand the potential for non-traditional actors to participate in transitions. In response to 
landscape pressure, political dynamics (which are noted with the thick, dashed lines in Figure 8-
2) must include an embrace of distributed, clean energy projects and a deliberate choice to open 
up space for new actors to participate in the sector. That opening of space must include 
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mechanisms that facilitate the sale of electricity to the provincial grid and it must also include 
other government policies and programs that foster participation in the sector. Those dynamics 
create an opening for First Nations actors at the niche level to break through and become part of 
the socio-technical regime. But in order to achieve the momentum needed to take advantage of 
the window of opportunity, First Nations actors need a project champion, stable governance, 
access to cash, partnerships with the private sector, and they must also ensure that the focus 
remains on sustainable development and delivery of benefits to the entire community. The 
fulfillment of those functions – in a sense, climbing the successive steps – serves as a launching 
pad through the window of opportunity and into the socio-technical regime. 
 
Figure 8-2.  Integrated framework – key factors for First Nations participation 
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8.3 Recommendations for First Nations Leaders and Policymakers 
This dissertation is appropriately aimed at analyzing policy making, rather than at 
prescribing specific policy approaches. Nevertheless, the insights offered through this 
dissertation should be informative and enlightening for policy makers, First Nations leaders and 
stakeholders concerned with sustainability transitions, particularly in electricity systems, as well 
stakeholders concerned with First Nations sustainable development and economic self-
sufficiency more broadly. These insights also allow for reflection on possible policy 
recommendations. 
 For policymakers interested in facilitating the participation of First Nations in the 
electricity sector, the implications of this research are also clear: do not seek to blunt landscape 
pressure on the electricity socio-technical regime; rather, respond to landscape pressure by 
embracing distributed, clean energy projects; opening up space for new actors within the sector; 
establishing mechanisms that facilitate the sale of electricity to the provincial grid; and 
establishing other policies and programs that foster participation in the sector. As seen in the case 
studies within this dissertation, this can involve a variety of policy mechanisms, including: 
legislated targets for renewable energy, which are often associated with legislated targets for 
GHG emission reductions or mandates to phase out coal-based electricity generation; 
diversifying the actors involved in electricity generation, typically through FIT programs, but 
also through stand-alone power purchase agreements; and providing specific incentives for First 
Nations participation in the electricity generation sector. 
To build broad consensus around the need to transform the electricity sector, the case 
studies in this dissertation demonstrate that it is not necessary to emphasize the mitigation of 
climate change. In fact, climate change was not a crucial part of the dominant discourse in either 
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Nova Scotia or Ontario. Rather, the emphasis of the dominant discourse is more wisely focused 
on how changes in the electricity sector will benefit people – whether that is through the 
stabilization of electricity rates, as was the case in Nova Scotia, or through improved health 
outcomes and improved economic opportunities, as was the case in Ontario.  
In creating and implementing policy mechanisms, the role of policy learning is crucial, as 
demonstrated in the case studies. Ontario drew lessons from Germany’s experience with its FIT 
program. Nova Scotia looked to Ontario’s experience with its FIT program, and introduced an 
amended version of its own; in order to address the problems it saw in Ontario’s case. 
Finally, if provincial governments actively seek to engage in reconciliation efforts, to 
support First Nations resurgence, and to extend opportunity and prosperity to First Nations 
communities, the likelihood of successful participation of First Nations in the electricity sector 
will increase. In Nova Scotia and Ontario, the provincial governments more proudly engage in 
such efforts; whereas, in Saskatchewan, the provincial government is more timid in this regard, 
outwardly concerned with anything that may be seen to be a ‘special deal’ for First Nations 
people.  
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For First Nations leaders and community members, the implications of this 
research are also clear: if you want to be ready to take advantage of a window of 
opportunity to enter the electricity sector, there are several key things you need to 
do in order to increase your likelihood of success. The steps include: finding a 
project champion who will provide the committed leadership needed to get a 
project off the ground; ensuring your governance structures are sound and stable, 
and that you have an appropriate degree of separation between politics and 
business; ensuring that you have access to sufficient financial resources for 
revenue-generating activities; establishing secure partnerships with knowledgeable 
and experienced actors, which will enhance your own capacity, capability and 
confidence; and maintaining a strong focus on sustainable development and 
ensuring that benefits are delivered to the whole community, which in turn 
increases community buy-in and support.8.4 Contributions to Knowledge 
 This dissertation provides several important contributions to the field of sustainability 
transition studies. It presents an integrated sustainability transition framework, which has been 
called for by many prominent researchers within the field. The integrated framework is 
augmented by discourse coalitions theory in order to incorporate political dynamics, filling 
another significant gap that has been repeatedly identified within the field. This dissertation 
provides research from a non-European context, which continues to be quite rare in the 
sustainability transitions field. As well, as far as I am aware, the focus on the role of Indigenous 
groups is a first for the field. And, while sustainability transitions research has been conducted in 
both Ontario and Saskatchewan to limited degrees, to my knowledge such research has not 
previously been undertaken in the context of Nova Scotia. 
8.5 Possible Avenues for Further Research 
 There are a number of potentially fruitful avenues for further research building on the 
findings of this dissertation. Several of the main possibilities are briefly discussed below.  
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 This dissertation focused on three case studies. However, as the integrated framework 
developed through the analysis is intended to be broadly applicable, it would be interesting and 
useful to apply it to electricity systems in other Canadian provinces, and other jurisdictions 
around the world. Tapping into a wider empirical base would undoubtedly allow for the claims 
made in this dissertation to be strengthened, and likely modified. It would be especially 
interesting to explore the dynamics at play in cases in which transition pathways other than 
transformation are pursued. 
 This dissertation focused on electricity systems. But, again, since this integrated 
framework is intended to be broadly applicable, it would be helpful to apply the framework to a 
variety of other socio-technical systems. This would not only fortify the framework, but it would 
likely challenge several aspects and, therefore, yield certain adjustments. 
 This dissertation used discourse coalition theory to account for political dynamics. It 
could be a fruitful endeavour to apply other approaches to incorporating politics, including more 
traditional notions of politics, which have focused heavily on interests and power struggles. This 
would offer a new perspective to the field of sustainability transition studies, and it could produce 
intriguing challenges to the integrated framework presented in this dissertation. 
Finally, the nature of this dissertation did not allow me to delve into the various 
interactions between the levels of the framework and add new details to our understanding of 
these important dynamics. I believe such a research endeavour would prove beneficial, because 
our current understanding of the various interactions between the regime, niche and landscape 
levels could use further elaboration. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A: 
 
 
List of interviews conducted for the Nova Scotia case study 
 
Position of interviewee Interview date 
Interviewee 
code 
Former CEO, First Nation June 23, 2014 1 
Business manager, First Nation June 25, 2014 2 
Advisor, Kwilmu’kw Maw-klusuaqn Negotiation Office 
(Mi’kmaq Rights Initiative) June 26, 2014 3 
Former MLA, Government of Nova Scotia June 27, 2014 4 
Former researcher, Atlantic Policy Congress of First Nations 
Chiefs Secretariat June 28, 2014 5 
Staff member, Ecology Action Centre Aug 6, 2014 6 
Other (multiple roles in government and Nova Scotia Power) Aug 11, 2014 7 
Business advisor, First Nation Aug 11, 2014 8 
Staff member, Ecology Action Centre Aug 11, 2014 9 
Other (multiple roles in government and Nova Scotia Power) Aug 19, 2014 10 
 
 
 
List of interviews conducted for the Ontario case study 
 
Position of interviewee Interview date 
Interviewee 
code 
Staff member, Ontario Power Generation May 21, 2014 1 
Energy advisor, First Nation May 27, 2014 2 
Staff member, Hydro One June 6, 2014 3 
Energy advisor, First Nation July 23, 2014 4 
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Business manager, First Nation energy company July 28, 2014 5 
Former cabinet minister, Government of Ontario July 30, 2014 6 
Staff member, Ontario Power Authority  Aug 11, 2014 7 
Staff member, Ministry of Energy Aug 18, 2014 8 
Researcher, Canadian Council for Aboriginal Business Aug 18, 2014 9 
Researcher, Canadian Council for Aboriginal Business Aug 18, 2014 10 
Former staff member, Ontario Power Generation Aug 20, 2014 11 
Expert, electricity industry Aug 21, 2014 12 
Former cabinet minister, Government of Ontario Aug 29, 2014 13 
George Smitherman, former Minister of Health and Energy Sept 8, 2014 14 
 
 
 
List of interviews conducted for the Saskatchewan case study 
 
Position of interviewee Interview date 
Interviewee 
code 
Former staff member, SaskPower Sept 5, 2014 1 
Representative, Meadow Lake Tribal Council Biomass Project Sept 5, 2014 2 
Wind power proponent Sept 8, 2014 3 
Former Minister responsible for SaskPower Sept 15, 2014 4 
Other (multiple roles, First Nations perspective) Sept 16, 2014 5 
Board member, Saskatchewan Environmental Society Sept 16, 2014 6 
Former chief, Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations Sept 18, 2014 7 
Chad Eggerman, renewable energy lawyer Sept 19, 2014 8 
Staff member, SaskPower Sept 19, 2014 9 
Representative, First Nations Power Authority Sept 22, 2014 10 
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Appendix B: 
 
Semi-structured interview guide 
 
Main questions Additional questions Clarifying questions 
What role(s) have you had in 
the electricity sector?  
Can you expand a little on 
this? 
Can you tell me anything else? 
Can you give me some 
examples? 
What are your thoughts on 
how the electricity system in 
this jurisdiction has been 
changing? 
What has changed? 
What do you think prompted 
that change? 
What has been the role of 
government policy? 
What do you think motivated 
government involvement in 
promoting or facilitating 
change in the electricity 
sector?  
What policy problems do you 
think government was trying 
to address? 
Why do you think the status 
quo wasn’t acceptable to the 
government? 
What do you think the role of 
different groups has been in 
terms of pushing for one thing 
or another? 
What groups – formal or 
informal – have you seen 
pushing a particular agenda? 
What agenda have those 
groups been pushing? 
How effective do you think 
those groups have been? 
Have you seen new actors 
begin to participate in the 
electricity sector? 
What kind of new actors? 
What facilitated their 
participation? 
How would you describe the 
opportunities for First Nations 
to participate in the electricity 
sector? 
What have you heard about 
First Nations involvement in 
electricity generation? 
Do you think government has 
made it a public policy priority 
to increase First Nations’ 
participation in electricity 
generation? 
What do you think would 
increase the likelihood of First 
Nations participation in 
sustainable electricity 
generation? 
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Main questions Additional questions Clarifying questions 
Is there anything else you 
would like to add on this 
topic? 
 
 
